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Abstract
The classical treatment of market transactions in Economics presumes that buyers and
sellers engage in transactions instantly and at no cost. In a series of applications in
the housing market, the labour market and the market for corporate bonds, this thesis
shows that relaxing this assumption has important implications for Macroeconomics and
Finance. The first chapter combines theory and empirical evidence to show that search
frictions in the housing market imply a housing liquidity channel of monetary policy
transmission. Expansionary monetary policy attracts buyers to the housing market,
raising housing liquidity. Higher housing sale rates in turn allow lenders to threaten
foreclosure more effectively, because the expected carrying costs on foreclosure inventory
are lower. Ex-ante, this makes banks willing to offer larger loans, stimulating aggregate
demand. The second chapter uses a heterogeneous firm industry model to explore how
the macroeconomic response to a temporary employer payroll tax cut depends on the
hiring and firing costs faced by firms. Controversially, the presence of non-convex labour
adjustment costs suggests that tax cuts create fewer jobs in recessions. When firms hoard
labour during downturns, they do not respond to marginal tax cuts by hiring additional
workers. The third chapter develops a theory in which trader career concerns generate
an endogenous transaction friction. Traders are reluctant to sell assets below historical
purchase price, since realizing a loss signals to the employer that the trader is incompetent.
The chapter documents empirically several properties of corporate bond transaction data
consistent with this theory of career-concerned traders.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research Question
The classical treatment of market transactions in Economics presumes the existence of a
centralized market for each good. All potential buyers and sellers come together in the
market place, prices adjust to ensure that demand equals supply and transactions take
place - instantaneously and at no cost. This Walrasian markets approach has proven
extremely influential and offers a reasonable approximation to many market situations.
However, in reality it takes time for a housing seller to search for an appropriate new
buyer, firms face substantial costs when hiring (or firing) a worker and institutional
constraints may prevent traders from selling corporate bonds at current market prices.
This thesis aims to demonstrate, though a series of applications in the housing mar-
ket, the labour market and the market for corporate bonds, that allowing explicitly for
transaction frictions can yield important insights into phenomena in Macroeconomics and
Finance.
The first chapter explores how search frictions in the housing market impact the mon-
etary policy transmission channel. The standard housing channel of monetary policy ig-
nores housing transaction frictions. A fall in the policy rate raises house prices. Consumer
credit constraints relax because their property offers lenders better collateral protection
against default. Does this basic story have to be augmented once one accounts explicitly
for the fact that housing sellers have to search for an appropriate housing buyer before
they can sell? Does the response of housing liquidity to the policy rate play a quantita-
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tively important part in the monetary policy transmission process? The answer to these
questions has broader implications for how policy interventions in the housing market
should be evaluated.
The second chapter studies the interaction between non-convex labour adjustment
costs faced by firms and the macroeconomic employment response to a temporary em-
ployer payroll tax cut. Standard theory neglects that firms face substantial costs in hiring
and firing a worker. Once these costs are taken into account, should we still expect tem-
porary tax cuts to effectively stimulate firm employment? What factors drive the answer
to this question? If payroll tax cuts are still effective, do labour adjustment costs influ-
ence when tax cut stimulus will be cost-efficient? The study draws out implications of
this analysis for macroeconomic theory, empirical studies of fiscal multipliers as well as
for policy makers.
The third chapter is motivated by empirical evidence showing that traders are less
likely to sell assets at loss than at gain. Since standard asset pricing theory suggests
that traders should evaluate positions only considering future asset returns (irrespective
of historical purchase price), the standard explanation for these findings has been a
behavioural bias: traders suffer from loss averse preferences. The problem with this
explanation is that professional traders make decisions with high stakes, the high decision-
making frequency offers them plenty of opportunity to learn and they are under constant
pressure to be replaced if they underperform. If there is a setting in which decisions
should not suffer from behavioural biases, then it is the financial market. This paper
therefore asks: can career concerns explain why profit-maximizing traders may make
trading decisions as if they were loss averse? Are there distinct predictions of this career-
concerns theory that can be tested in the data?
1.2 Methodology
The three chapters of this thesis share a common broad methodological approach. In
each application, I use a theoretical model to show that explicitly allowing for plausible
transaction frictions yields novel insights into how markets function. Based on realistic
assumptions, the augmented models presented put into question common wisdom on how
13
markets operate. Wherever possible, theoretical predictions are linked to empirical data.
However, the modelling approach in each chapter is tailored for its specific purpose
and, jointly, the methods used in this thesis therefore span a range of approaches on how
to do applied theory research in economics.
To formalize the housing liquidity channel of monetary policy proposed in the thesis,
the first chapter builds on a New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(NK DSGE) Model. This framework has been labelled the workhorse of modern macroe-
conomics. In contrast to Keynesian models of previous generations, DSGE models are
based on an internally consistent structural model of consumption, labour and production
sectors. The framework is New Keynesian in the sense that product prices are assumed
not to be fully flexible, allowing for monetary policy to have temporary real effects on the
macroeconomy. Since this class of models is often characterized by a large state space,
log-linearization is generally used to solve for impulse response functions of the framework
around the steady state. The first chapter of this thesis contributes to this methodologi-
cal approach by showing how housing market search frictions and credit frictions can be
jointly embedded in the DSGE framework and by exploring how this change impacts the
simulated response of the economy to monetary policy shocks.
The second chapter studies the interaction between non-convex labour adjustment
costs, the employment decisions of firms and fiscal policy. Since the impact of non-
convexities can generally not be explored in log-linearized versions of the model, this
analysis requires using global solution methods (this study uses value function iteration).
Since employment at the firm level differs substantially from macroeconomic dynamics,
the setup explicitly computes statistics by aggregating across a simulated population of
heterogeneous firms.
The third chapter makes a qualitative point: rational traders may choose to behave
loss averse in their trading decisions when they are career-concerned. To preserve trans-
parency, the argument is therefore developed in a two period model. As a dynamic game
of incomplete information, the concept of a (weak) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE)
is used to derive equilibrium predictions on trader behaviour.
The theoretical predictions of these three chapters are linked to empirical analysis
wherever possible. In the first chapter, dynamic regressions using US Macroeconomic
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data explore in how far changes in the policy rate impact housing market liquidity em-
pirically. These estimates are combined with data on US property tax rates and housing
maintenance cost to gauge whether a housing liquidity channel of monetary policy can
be quantitatively significant. In the second chapter, the jobs created by a temporary
employer payroll tax cut are computed based on a heterogeneous firm simulation with
micro-founded parameter values. In the third chapter, the predictions of the trading
model are shown to be born out in US corporate bond transactions data made avail-
able by the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) set up by the Financial
Industry Regulation Authority (FINRA).
1.3 Results and Contribution to the Literature
Most of the existing literature on the housing channel of monetary policy puts focus on
house prices. The first chapter of this thesis uses dynamic regressions to document that
empirically the housing market responds much more through sales volume than through
house prices. Does this housing liquidity response matter? This chapter presents a
macroeconomic general equilibrium model with credit constrained consumers and hous-
ing market search frictions which suggests that the answer is yes. Higher housing sale
rates allow lenders to threaten foreclosure more effectively, because the expected carry-
ing costs on foreclosure inventory are lower. Ex-ante, this makes lenders feel comfortable
offering larger loans and consumer credit constraints relax. Using property tax and hous-
ing maintenance cost estimates to calibrate the carrying costs of foreclosure inventory,
simulations show that this housing liquidity effect can play a quantitatively important
role for monetary policy transmission. This link between housing market liquidity and
functioning mortgage markets implies that monetary policy alternatives, such as home
buyer tax credits, should also be evaluated on basis of their impact on both house prices
and housing sale rates.
The second chapter of this thesis uses heterogeneous firm industry simulations to
show that employer payroll tax cuts can continue to stimulate employment even if firms
face large hiring and firing costs. The two empirical factors that drive this result are (i)
the high rate at which workers quit employment and (ii) the high firm-specific volatility
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in business conditions. Together, they imply that many firms are actively hiring in the
simulation steady state. These marginal firms remain responsive to tax cuts even given
substantial hiring and firing costs. Does this mean we can ignore labour adjustment costs?
On the contrary, the presence of labour adjustment costs implies that tax multipliers are
contingent on policy design. Because firm employment decisions are forward-looking,
the multiplier strengthens with length of announcement period and length of tax cut
implementation. Because the hiring decision of firms hoarding labour is insensitive to
stimulus measures, a force towards procyclical fiscal multipliers emerges. For empirical
researchers, these results imply that no single payroll tax multiplier exists. The multiplier
depends on the specifics of the implementation plan. For policy makers, the results
suggest that a cost-effective payroll tax cut stimulus is pre-announced, prolonged and
takes place after the worst of the recession is over (as firms start to switch back into
hiring).
The third chapter of this thesis develops a model in which career concerns make
rational traders behave loss averse. The trader is employed by a financial institution
and the financial institution decides whether to retain the trader. If the trader realizes
a trading loss, he reveals that he is incompetent. The trader responds by only entering
trades on which he is very unlikely to make a loss and, once a trade is entered, by
“fishing” until an opportunity to resell at gain emerges. Consistent with loss averse
trading behaviour, this study empirically documents that the distribution of prices at
which corporate bond dealers sell is truncated sharply at the last observed buy price.
Furthermore, the data supports a key prediction of the career-concerns hypothesis (not
shared with baseline theories of underlying loss-averse preferences): traders appear to
place special weight on avoiding multiple trade losses in a row.
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Chapter 2
Monetary Policy, Hot Housing
Markets and Household Debt
The conventional story of the housing channel of monetary policy transmission puts focus
on housing transaction prices. Lower short-term policy rates feed through to mortgage
rates, raising house prices to equilibrate demand and supply. As the transaction price
of housing collateral rises, lenders allow credit-constrained consumers to borrow more.
This stimulates aggregate demand and the macroeconomy. But this story neglects the
substantial rise in the volume of housing sales following monetary policy easing. This
study finds that a temporary 1% fall in the federal funds rate raises transaction prices
by 3% on impact, while the monthly rate at which housing is sold rises by 20%.
Does this housing sales rate response matter for macroeconomic monetary policy
transmission? This paper explores one channel that suggests the answer is yes. Intuitively,
lenders value property collateral primarily for its resale value in case of default. This
liquidation value depends on both (i) costs associated with carrying the property from
moment of foreclosure until a buyer is found and (ii) the eventual transaction price
at which the house is resold to a new household. The response of the housing sales
rate to expansionary monetary policy therefore matters, because it implies that housing
liquidation values rise by more than recorded housing transaction prices when policy rates
are lowered. This offers a theory for how loose monetary policy can cause a rise in the
leverage ratios that lenders are willing to accept.
In a first step towards assessing the quantitative importance of this housing liquidity
17
effect, this study backs out the monetary policy response of lender liquidation values
from the empirical impulse responses of housing sales rate and transaction prices. Key to
implementation of this exercise, net carrying costs on foreclosure inventory are approxi-
mated using estimates of property tax and maintenance costs. The housing liquidity effect
more than doubles the impact response of lender liquidation values relative to housing
transaction prices.
In a second step, this study evaluates the general equilibrium role of this housing
liquidity effect for monetary policy transmission to the macroeconomy. Incorporating
housing market search frictions into a Iacoviello (2005) New Keynesian macroeconomic
model with credit-constrained entrepreneur-households, a framework emerges that for-
malizes the housing liquidity transmission channel in general equilibrium. Temporarily
low interest rates make home purchase relatively attractive. As more home buyers scout
the market of for-sale property, housing sellers can find counterparties more quickly. A
temporary increase in the housing sales rate therefore arises as an endogenous response
to expansionary monetary policy. In turn, higher housing sale rates increase housing liq-
uidation values and allow lenders to threaten foreclosure more effectively. Ex-ante, this
raises the willingness of lenders to provide credit. Borrowing margins relax, credit flows
more easily and this stimulates aggregate activity. In a calibrated model, this housing
liquidity effect contributes substantially to monetary policy transmission.
The importance of this housing liquidity transmission mechanism is not limited to
monetary policy. It has also, for example, direct implications for our evaluation of the
US home-buyer tax credit of 2009-2010. Consider a temporary subsidy to house purchases
of 3% relative to trend house prices. Conventional macroeconomic analysis emphasizes
that sellers may be able to exploit resulting greater housing demand by raising transaction
prices. But this effect is bounded from above by a 3% house price rise (in which case
the benefits of the subsidy are fully passed on to the seller). Taking search frictions
into account, the overall impact on housing debt capacity may however be much larger.
Because the subsidy encourages buyers to enter the market, it raises housing liquidity.
Lender liquidation valuations of collateral may rise by more than transaction prices.
Direct cyclical subsidization of home purchases may be a more effective substitute for
monetary policy than conventional analysis suggests.
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In establishing these results, this paper develops a new explanation for why expan-
sionary monetary policy causes looser borrowing margins: lenders feel more comfortable
lending because seized property collateral can be resold more easily in hot markets. Fur-
thermore, the paper develops a tractable Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model
with both search frictions in the housing market as well as credit-constrained agents.
This allows examination of the interaction between asset market search frictions and
credit frictions in a medium-scale macroeconomic framework. Finally, this analysis offers
a novel approach towards calibrating the housing market search frictions technology. In
the labour markets literature, search friction technology parameters can be estimated
directly, since both the number of workers searching for work (the unemployed) as well
as job vacancies are recorded. In the housing market however, while measures of for-sale
housing are available, the mass of searching house buyers is not. Instead this study pro-
poses an indirect calibration approach using perturbations from monetary policy shocks.
This paper expands on the growing literature that explores the macroeconomic im-
plications of credit frictions. In the spirit of Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997), agents have to offer collateral in order to access loans. Specifically,
this paper builds on work by Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) in which
consumers borrow against housing. However, while existing work puts emphasis on the
feedback from asset prices to credit access (keeping borrowing margins fixed), this pa-
per focusses on the amplifying role of time-varying borrowing margins. Emphasizing the
substantial time-variation in housing transaction volumes and loan-to-value ratios, this
study suggests that an exclusive focus on asset prices may substantially underestimate
the response of overall asset debt capacity to monetary policy.
In this sense, this study complements other current work studying procyclical borrow-
ing margins.1 Eisfeldt (2004) and Kurlat (2009) develop a theory of borrowing margins
based on the greater severity of asymmetric information problems during downturns.
Geanakoplos (2009) shows that disagreement between optimists and pessimists can cause
1The Costly-State-Verification models of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1999) also introduce time-varying leverage in a macroeconomic general equilibrium model,
though this is not their focus. Because the setup implies a positive relation between credit spreads and
leverage, their finding that spreads fall after expansionary monetary policy implies that leverage should
fall. Linking their setup with the search frictions theory of asset liquidation values developed in this
study appears a fruitful area for further research.
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leverage to rise during asset booms.2 Relative to this literature, this paper identifies the
collateral sales rate as key contributing factor to borrowing margins in the housing mar-
ket. Furthermore, this paper speaks directly to the popular notion that loose monetary
policy causes loose credit conditions.
Finally, this paper is heavily indebted to the literature on markets with search fric-
tions. Specifically, in terms of formalization and notation, this study borrows from the
labour markets search frictions survey in Pissarides (2000). The idea that housing market
search frictions are important for the evolution of house prices and transaction volume has
been explored, among other contributions, in Wheaton (1990), Williams (1995), Krainer
(2001), Albrecht et al. (2007), Novy-Marx (2009), Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) and Ngai
and Tenreyro (2009). This paper applies these insights to study the interaction between
search frictions in the housing market and access to mortgage finance.3’4
Section 2.1 documents the response of the macroeconomy and the housing market to
monetary policy shocks. Section 2.2 uses these impulse response functions in a simple
accounting exercise to propose that housing liquidation values plausibly respond much
more strongly than regular house transaction prices alone would suggest. To explore
the macroeconomic significance of this housing liquidity effect, section 2.3 develops a
New Keynesian general equilibrium model with borrowing-constrained households and
search frictions in the housing market. Section 2.4 shows that this liquidity effect also
magnifies the predicted potency of a more targeted stimulus to housing demand, such as
a home-buyer tax credit. Section 2.5 offers concluding comments.
2Simsek (2012) refines this work further, distinguishing between belief disagreement on the upside or
downside of risk. In a related line of research, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Adrian and Shin
(2010) link borrowing margins to collateral asset return volatility.
3Parallel to the writing of this paper, Hedlund (2011) also proposes analysing the interaction between
credit frictions and housing market search frictions. His paper puts focus on matching unconditional
business cycle moments of the data, while this paper analyses how the interaction impacts the monetary
policy response. This paper shows how to introduce this interaction in a New Keynesian general equilib-
rium model. Furthermore, this study disciplines the argument that search frictions matter using direct
estimates of inventory holding costs: values for property tax and maintenance costs from the housing
literature. This methodological insight is key to the quantitative exercises in this study. Also related,
Milbradt and He (2012) study the interaction between liquidity and credit premium on corporate bonds
in a search and matching market environment.
4Wasmer and Weil (2004) explore the interaction between labour search frictions and credit search
frictions. A financial accelerator emerges because fewer entrepreneurs lower the number of financiers
searching for counterparties and vice versa. In contrast, this paper explores the effect of search frictions
in the collateral asset market. This allows the paper to offer a theory explaining cyclicality of borrowing
margins.
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2.1 Dynamic Regressions: The Effect of Monetary
Policy on the Housing Market
Documenting the reduced form dynamic response of the macroeconomy and the housing
market to monetary policy shocks, this section establishes the key facts that frame and
discipline the argument developed in this paper. To overcome endogeneity of monetary
policy stance, this study adopts the methodology of Romer and Romer (2004).5
Naive causal interpretation of the correlation between monetary policy stance and
state of the real economy would conclude that expansionary monetary policy causes
economic contractions. However, this neglects that the central bank policy rate responds
endogenously to economic conditions, lowering rates in times of crisis precisely in order
to counteract shocks from other sectors of the economy. To identify exogenous shocks
to monetary policy, Romer and Romer (2004) therefore regress the historical intended
federal fund rate on contemporaneous forecasts of the future macroeconomic state. They
interpret the resulting estimated functional relationship as an estimate of the central
bank policy response function. The historical deviation of actual federal funds rate from
the policy rule (labelled ft) therefore identifies movements in monetary policy that are
not a response to macroeconomic fundamentals. Figure 2.1 plots the resulting monthly
time series of exogenous US monetary policy shocks for the period 1969-1996.6’7
To analyse the dynamic impact of monetary policy shock ft on an economic variable
of interest xt, Romer and Romer (2004) propose the single-equation regression model
5Appendix A.2 lists data sources used in this empirical study. Appendix A.1 explores robustness
of the results developed. Crucially, it shows the key results developed in this section are qualitatively
robust to using a recursive Vector-Autoregressions identification scheme along the lines of Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) given the set of endogenous variables considered. The key benefit of using
the Romer and Romer (2004) method in the main text is that the impulse response functions developed
do not depend on the exact set of endogenous variables considered in the analysis.
6Romer and Romer (2004) have generously made this data series available on their website
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/users/cromer/Shocks/RomerandRomerDataAppendix.xls at time of writing.
7What interpretation can we give to the monetary policy innovation ft? Romer and Romer (2004)
discuss six sources for the shock series: i. changes in central bank operating procedures (i.e. switch from
focus on quantity measures to setting interest rates), ii. changes in the economic model used to reach
policy decisions (i.e. speed of transmission from economic slack to inflation), iii. changes in tastes and
goals of the monetary policy committee (i.e. periods of particular distaste for inflation), iv. political
considerations (ie pursue expansionary monetary policy to secure renewed nomination of chair), v. special
emphasis on non-standard targets during particular episodes (i.e. exchange rates in the mid-80s) and vi.
idiosyncratic random elements in central bank decision making (i.e. mood swings).
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Figure 2.1: The Romer and Romer (2004) monetary policy shock series
2.1.1. Monthly dummies (Dt(k) for dummy month k) are used as seasonal controls.
Wherever not otherwise stated, the availability of the Romer and Romer (2004) shock
series constrains the sample period considered in the regression.8
∆log(xt) = a0 +
11∑
k=1
akDt(k) +
Lx∑
l=1
bl∆log(xt−l) +
Lf∑
l=1
cl∆ft−l + t (2.1.1)
Figure 2.2 plots the six monthly time series considered in this analysis: the federal
funds rate, real output, the price level, real house prices, housing rents and the monthly
housing sales rate (the monthly ratio of new houses sold to new houses for-sale).9’10 As
crucial variable in the analysis of this study, note that the housing sales rate is highly
cyclical (and seasonal). Furthermore, in any given month, the number of for-sale proper-
ties far exceeds the number of houses actually sold. Given an average sales rate of 17.7%
(implying an average time-to-sale of 5.7 months), the time series reaches a minimum value
8Note specifically this means the results in this study, for better or for worse, do not cover the housing
bubble of 2003-2007 and the subsequent credit crunch of 2006-2009.
9Note that the housing price series used (the Freddie Mac House Price Index) starts in 1975.
10Assuming (i) that for (most) households new and existing housing are broadly substitutable and (ii)
that households prefer to search in less crowded markets, the new housing sales rate serves as useful
proxy for the overall housing sales rate.
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of 7% and a maximum value of 33%.11’12’13
What is the dynamic response of these macroeconomic and housing market aggre-
gates to a one standard deviation Romer and Romer (2004) monetary policy shock?14
Figure 2.3 shows that the effective federal funds rate falls by 100 basis points within two
months, recovers and then overshoots after two years (presumably reflecting the system-
atic response of the Federal Reserve to rising inflation). The macroeconomic response to
monetary policy is substantial. Output rises to peak at 3% (relative to its trend value)
after two years. The aggregate price level responds sluggishly at first, but inflation de-
cidedly gains momentum as the economy reaches the two year mark.15 Turning to the
housing market, as documented in for example Iacoviello (2005), house prices rise sub-
stantially after a fall in the federal funds rate (reaching a peak at 3% relative to steady
state after 2 years). Rents, responding sluggishly to economic conditions, only decline in
real terms as CPI inflation picks up.16
The crucial point of this section however is that the price response of housing pales in
11The inverse of this sales rate is often used in the real estate industry as measure of months of supply
available (the months it would take to sell current for-sale inventory given stable monthly sales and no
new housing coming on the market). As in this paper, the measure reflects how many sellers are on the
market relative to buyers (how crowded the market is). This measure is computed as part of the US
Housing Census output for example.
12The procyclicality of housing transaction volumes has been previously documented in Stein (1995)
for US data and Andrew and Meen (2003) for the UK economy. Stein (1995) proposes that downpayment
effects can explain this pattern. In recessions, house prices fall and household equity shrinks. Conse-
quently, the sale of the current house would not cover downpayment for a mortgage on a new property
and households cannot move. Genesove and Mayer (2001) propose that volume may dry up in times
of falling house prices because households are averse to realizing losses on their housing investment.
In contrast, this paper explains time-variation in housing transaction volumes based on the idea that
the real estate market is characterized by search frictions (following Wheaton (1990), Williams (1995),
Krainer (2001), Albrecht et al. (2007), Novy-Marx (2009), Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) and Ngai and
Tenreyro (2009)). The aim of this study is to explore the consequences of this housing liquidity response
for household access to mortgages.
13Note also that this paper does not speak to housing market fluctuations at seasonal frequency. For
work exploring this dimensionality of the data, see for example Ngai and Tenreyro (2009) and references
therein.
14Following Romer and Romer (2004), confidence intervals are computed through Monte-Carlo sim-
ulations. 10000 regression coefficients and associated impulse responses are drawn from a multivariate
normal distribution with mean at the point estimates and estimated variance-covariance matrix. The
month k standard error is then computed as the standard deviation across impulse response function
values at month k.
15These impulse responses for the macroeconomic aggregates follow closely the results in Romer and
Romer (2004). Specifically, relative to traditional recursive identification schemes, the real effect of
monetary policy is stronger and the price level effect is more delayed.
16Note that a rental sector is not explicitly modelled in section 2.3 and it is not central to the mechanism
of this study. Impulse response functions for rents are nonetheless included in this section to provide a
more holistic picture of the housing market response to monetary policy.
23
19
50
20
00
20
50
05101520
Ye
ar
Rate (%)
Fe
de
ra
l F
un
ds
 R
at
e
19
00
19
50
20
00
20
50
0
0.
51
1.
52
2.
53
Ye
ar
Index (normalized 2007)
In
du
st
ria
l P
ro
du
ct
io
n
19
00
19
50
20
00
20
50
012345
Ye
ar
Index (normalized 1982)
CP
I
19
60
19
80
20
00
20
20
0.
81
1.
2
1.
4
1.
6
1.
82
Ye
ar
Index (normalized 1975)
R
ea
l H
ou
se
 P
ric
e
19
60
19
80
20
00
20
20
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
Ye
ar
Sales / For−sale housing
H
ou
si
ng
 S
al
es
 ra
te
19
00
19
50
20
00
20
50
0.
91
1.
1
1.
2
1.
3
Ye
ar
Index (normalized 1975)
R
ea
l R
en
ts
Figure 2.2: Raw time series
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Figure 2.3: Response of the housing market (Romer and Romer (2004) shocks; in log
dev. from trend; 95% confidence intervals)
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comparison with the response of the housing sales rate: the latter jumps by 20 percent
immediately following the policy shock (from a long term average of 17.7% to 21.2%).
Only over time, as house prices pick up, does this increase in transaction volumes recede.17
This finding motivates the key questions pursued in this paper: Why do housing
transaction volumes pick up after monetary policy easing? Does the housing liquidity
response contribute to macroeconomic transmission of monetary policy? Or is it simply
a symptom that plays no active role in transmission? Is there a housing liquidity channel
of monetary policy?
2.2 A First Look at the Housing Liquidity Channel
of Monetary Policy
This section proposes one channel through which housing liquidity can play an active
role in the overall monetary policy transmission process. Subsection 2.2.1 introduces the
intuition behind this channel. Subsection 2.2.2 proposes a partial equilibrium accounting
exercise to explore whether this mechanism can be quantitatively important. This paves
the way for subsequent general equilibrium analysis.
2.2.1 Intuition for the Channel
At the heart of the traditional housing channel of monetary policy transmission lies the
idea that central bank interest rates impact on the liquidation value lenders assign to
housing collateral. With higher liquidation values, lenders support larger mortgages.
High recovery rates make default less risky. Equally, higher liquidation values allow
lenders to effectively threaten borrowers with seizure of collateral should households de-
mand renegotiation of the mortgage. Either way, the resulting relaxation of borrowing
constraints allows households to expand consumption and to fuel aggregate demand.
The housing liquidity channel developed in this paper shares with this traditional
account its focus on housing liquidation values. Where the two stories differ however is
on how liquidation values depend on current housing market conditions. In the baseline
17Previous studies that look at the response of housing market variables to monetary policy on the
price and volume dimension confirm these empirical results (see Hort (2000) for Swedish data).
26
credit frictions literature centred on Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) and Iacoviello (2005), the assumption of Walrasian asset markets implies that
banks can instantly resell foreclosed housing at current market price (allowing for one-off
costs associated with the transaction). By implication, the monetary policy response
of housing liquidation values is directly tied to the extent to which central banks move
current real estate transaction prices. In contrast, this paper captures the fact that banks
take time to resell foreclosed property on the market. Given regular house transaction
prices, housing liquidation values are higher in a hot housing market in which houses can
be sold quickly, since the seller faces lower expected holding costs (such as maintenance
and tax on the vacant property). In this setup, the response of vacant housing liquidation
values to monetary policy depends both on the monetary policy response of house prices
and the housing sales rate.18
Taking into account this link between liquidation values and housing time-to-sale, a
natural mechanism emerges through which the housing market liquidity response from
section 2.1 may play an active role in monetary policy transmission. As expansionary
monetary policy lowers mortgage rates and attracts more buyers into the housing market,
time-to-sale for foreclosed properties falls. This means that the liquidation value banks
assign to housing collateral rises by more than transaction prices. The resulting excess
sensitivity of housing credit access (relative to housing transaction price) gives rise to a
housing liquidity channel of monetary policy.
2.2.2 An Initial Quantitative Exploration
This subsection uses a simple accounting exercise to offer an initial quantitative explo-
ration of this housing liquity channel. Denote the liquidation value banks assign to a
vacant house in their foreclosure inventory by qv,t. Denote the per-period net holding
costs the bank pays on vacant property, such as maintenance costs and property tax, by
ch. Given a new occupier for the property is found, the house is sold at market price
18On foreclosure, properties are generally subject to an auction. Only if the auction fails, does the
property become part of the lender foreclosure inventory. Because in the foreclosure dataset of Campbell,
Giglio and Pathak (2009) only 18% of foreclosures are sold at that stage, this paper abstracts from the
auction procedure and assumes housing directly enters the lender housing inventory to be sold on the
regular housing market.
27
qm,t and the seller pays a one-off proportional fixed sales cost Fs (reflecting for example
real estate agent fees). Denoting the probability that a seller finds a willing buyer in
period t with Ps,t and denoting the seller stochastic discount factor with Qt, the housing
liquidation value is given by present value equation 2.2.1.
qv,t = Et(Qt+1(−ch + Ps,t+1qm,t+1(1− Fs) + (1− Ps,t+1)qv,t+1) (2.2.1)
To make equation 2.2.1 operational, this section requires an expression that identifies
the seller discount factor Qt+1 empirically. The study therefore makes the assumption
that banks price the risk-free asset with return Rf,t, yielding equilibrium expression 2.2.2.
1 = Rf,tEt(Qt+1) (2.2.2)
Equations 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 represent basic accounting equations that will hold in a
large class of general equilibrium settings. For example, they will be derived as outcomes
of optimizing behaviour in the macroeconomic model of section 2.3. Key however is that
these two expressions in themselves impose sufficient structure to infer from the impulse
responses in section 2.1 how housing liquidation values respond to monetary policy.
Using first order approximations around the non-stochastic steady state, iterating
2.2.1 forward, imposing a no-bubble condition and using 2.2.2 to substitute out the dis-
count factor, yields expression 2.2.3.19 This equation is key to the quantitative exercise in
this section. Given a calibration for ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3, it backs out the liquidation value banks
assign to housing collateral given the expected path of the risk-free rate, the housing sales
rate and housing transaction prices (computed in section 2.1).
At this point, it is useful to note two features of this setup. First, note that the
liquidation value can be interpreted as the price at which housing can be sold instantly
on the market (to any speculator). Any intermediary will be willing to buy the house
at liquidation value, since the implied fire-sale discount relative to regular transaction
price compensates for expected holding costs until the house can be resold to a buyer
household.20 Second, the sensitivity of housing liquidation values to the housing sales rate
19Terms with star superscript denote steady state values and terms with hat accent denote (log)
deviations from steady state. Appendix A.5 derives expression 2.2.3 formally.
20In other words, the fire-sale discount reflects compensation for delegation of the search task to
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depends on the difference between this steady state fire-sale discount 1− (q∗v/q∗m) and the
one-off cost of making the sale Fs (see ρ1). Approximately, this difference represents
how much of the steady state fire-sale discount is explained by expected holding costs.
If expected holding costs are important, then the fire-sale discount also becomes more
sensitive to fluctuations in the sales rate around steady state.
qˆv,t = −
∞∑
j=0
ρj3Et(rˆf,t+1+j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Discount factor component
+ ρ1
∞∑
j=0
ρj3Et(pˆs,t+1+j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sales rate component
+ ρ2
∞∑
j=0
ρj3Et(qˆm,t+1+j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Price component
(2.2.3)
where ρ1 =
Q∗((1− Fs)− (q∗v/q∗m))P ∗s
(q∗v/q∗m)
(2.2.4)
ρ2 =
Q∗P ∗s (1− Fs)
(q∗v/q∗m)
(2.2.5)
ρ3 = Q
∗(1− P ∗s ) (2.2.6)
To calibrate expression 2.2.3 at monthly frequency, set the yearly steady state risk-
free rate to 4%. To gauge the size of the steady state fire-sale discount in the housing
market, this study uses evidence from existing empirical studies. Mayer (1998) finds that
housing sales at auctions in the 1980s (generally associated with foreclosure events) sell
at discounts of up to 9% in Los Angeles (boom market) and 9-21% in Dallas (oil bust).
In a study of the Massachusetts housing market, Campbell, Giglio and Pathak (2009)
estimate foreclosure-related price discounts of 27% of house value.21 Taking orientation
around these numbers, this paper assumes an average fire-sale discount of 15% as baseline
scenario.22
It is generally difficult to pin down what fraction of the fire-sale discount on housing
is explained by expected holding costs during time-to-sale and what fraction is explained
another agent.
21The Campbell, Giglio and Pathak (2009) foreclosure discount is an imperfect proxy for the fire-sale
discount discussed in this paper, since they consider all sales of foreclosed housing (irrespective of whether
they are instant) relative to regular transaction prices.
22This calibration has a second convenient interpretation. In the general equilibrium model of section
2.3, it will also represent the loan-to-value ratio on mortgages of credit-constrained households. A loan-
to-value ratio of 85% for credit constrained households conforms with the prior set in Iacoviello and Neri
(2010) for example.
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Figure 2.4: Response of liquidation value to temporary 1% exogenous fall in federal funds
rate
by the one-off seller transaction costs once a buyer household is found.23’24 At the same
time, as the expression for ρ1 demonstrates, exactly this calibration decision is crucial in
determining how sensitive housing liquidation values are to the housing sales rate. This
study therefore takes a conservative baseline approach in the main text. It formulates
a lower bound on the size of expected holding costs and shows that, even given this
conservative choice, the housing liquidity channel is a potent factor in the valuation of
vacant for-sale housing. Specifically, as in Poterba (1991), this study assumes yearly
holding costs of a vacant property equal yearly property tax and maintenance costs at
2% and 3.9% of house price respectively (ch = m + τ). Through expression 2.2.1, this
implies one-off seller transaction costs of around 10% of steady state regular house price.
Under this conservative baseline parameterization, the impulse response function for
the housing liquidation value can be backed out by feeding the section 2.1 reduced-
form responses of the sales rate, transaction prices and the risk-free rate into expression
2.2.3. This results in figure 2.4 and illustrates the main point of the paper: housing
liquidation values plausibly respond much more strongly to monetary policy than regular
23This problem is made even more difficult in that, strictly speaking, the one-off transaction costs in
this accounting framework represent only those transaction costs that are incurred if the house is sold
to a new household in a regular sale - over and on top one-off transaction costs that would be incurred
irrespective of whether the house is sold to a household or to a speculator.
24This problem is at the heart of the empirical study by Campbell, Giglio and Pathak (2009) for
example.
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transaction prices alone would suggest.25 Figure 2.5 shows that this overshooting can
be traced back in large part to the strong sales rate response of the housing market.26
Only after transaction volumes return to steady state in year 3 (post policy shock) does
the response of liquidation values reflect more closely the behaviour of contemporaneous
transaction prices.
Three arguments suggest that, in practice, figure 2.5 likely represents a lower bound
on the true sensitivity of liquidation values to fluctuations in the housing sales rate.
First, the 10% one-off seller transactions cost implied by the calibration appear high.
Suppose, as is standard in the US, that housing sellers pay real estate agents a fee of 3%
of the house price.27 Assume an additional 1% in additional legal fees associated with
the sales procedure. This leaves another 6% of the estimated one-off seller transaction
cost unexplained. These additional costs could be rationalized by the cost of housing
repairs and a general pre-sale face-lift, but more likely they suggest that the calibration
underestimates expected holding costs during time-to-sale. Second, note that, in fact,
Poterba (1991) suggests that ownership risk substantially drives up the holding costs
of property. Effectively, owning a vacant house creates exposure to future house price
fluctuations. Adding a yearly 4% risk premium to property holding costs, Poterba (1991)
therefore estimates that overall yearly holding costs for housing are about 10% (relative
to the 6% parameterization used in the conservative baseline scenario of this paper).28
25To make equation 2.2.3 operational, the summation is truncated at 60 months. Results are insensitive
to raising the number of months considered.
26The discount factor and future transaction price components reinforce this effect. First, temporarily
lower interest rates lower the opportunity cost of funds tied up in foreclosure inventory. Second, on
impact, expansionary monetary policy feeds expectations of future house price appreciation (see the im-
pulse response of house prices in section 2.1). Both these additional components raise housing liquidation
values relative to current housing transaction prices (reinforcing the effect of a temporarily high sales
rate).
27See Hsieh and Moretti (2003) and Levitt and Syverson (2008) that document this pricing practice
and discuss its implications.
28Though adding a risk premium to the baseline property holding cost used in this study would
strengthen the estimated magnitude of the housing liquidity channel (and therefore the case of this
paper), this study refrains from its inclusion in the conservative baseline calibration for two reasons.
First, the size of this risk premium is highly uncertain. By showing that the housing liquidity effect is
important even if one believes that the risk premium is negligible, this paper highlights that whatever
one assumes about the risk premium is not crucial to the quantitative argument in this paper. Second,
note that this paper develops solutions using first-order approximation methods (as is common in the
macroeconomic business cycle literature). In these approximations, risk considerations generally do
not enter (they start to matter moving to second order approximations and higher). Ignoring the risk
premium therefore ensures consistency of the calibration with the solution method used.
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Figure 2.5: Response of liquidation value to temporary 1% exogenous fall in federal funds
rate
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Finally, notice that some empirical studies offer (rough) points of orientation regarding
the trade-off between time-to-sale and sales price in the housing market. Genesove and
Mayer (2001) suggest that homeowners with larger mortgages relative to housing value
prefer to sell housing at a higher price. Specifically, 100% loan-to-value sellers keep houses
15 percent longer on the market and sell at 4% higher price (relative to an 80% loan-
to-value seller). Levitt and Syverson (2008) find that realtors keep their own houses 10
percent longer on the market and end up selling at a 4% higher price than when they
sell someone else’s house. To explain this, Levitt and Syverson (2008) point to fixed
real estate agent fees (proportional to sales price). This pricing structure means that
agents have an incentive to sell other people’s houses quickly (they bear all the search
costs associated with keeping the property on the market for longer, while reaping only
a fraction of the eventual gain in sales price). Either of these studies suggests that
house prices are significantly more sensitive to time-to-sale than the model in this paper
suggests.
Overall, this quantitative exercise shows that the empirical housing liquidity response
to monetary policy is indeed strong enough to substantially raise housing liquidation
values relative to observed transaction prices. However, it does not offer a story for why
the housing market responds to central bank action through both house price and sales
rate margin. It does not explicitly spell out how this collateral liquidity effect translates
into expanding consumer credit and output growth. It does not estimate the contribution
of the housing liquidity channel of monetary policy to the overall macroeconomic effect
of central bank action. Section 2.3 develops a structural macroeconomic model that
attempts to address these issues.
2.3 A Macroeconomic General Equilibrium Model
This section introduces housing market search frictions into the Dynamic Stochastic Gen-
eral Equilibrium model with credit-constrained consumers developed in Iacoviello (2005)
and Iacoviello and Neri (2010). In this setup, the housing sales rate naturally manifests
itself as a determinant of housing fire-sale discounts and of household borrowing margins,
yielding a housing liquidity channel of monetary policy transmission to the real economy.
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The model is calibrated to match the monetary policy impulse response functions of
section 2.1. A counterfactual simulation then allows to gauge the quantitative significance
of the liquidity effect for monetary policy transmission to mortgage lending and the real
economy. If lenders were forced to maintain steady-state loan-to-value ratios on new
mortgages (in effect re-establishing the traditional link between housing debt capacity
and house price of the Walrasian setup), the simulations predict that the cumulative
impact of a 1% temporary fall in the policy rate on output would fall from 5 % to 3%.
2.3.1 Model Structure
The economy consists of four agent types. Patient (p) consumer households consume,
work, occupy housing and trade in a range of financial assets. Impatient (ip) entrepreneur
households also consume, work, occupy housing and trade in a range of financial assets.
However, in addition, they operate wholesale firms on their properties to produce inter-
mediate goods. In equilibrium, impatient households will demand to borrow from the
patient, creating a role for credit markets. Retail firms transform intermediates produc-
tion into final goods that are sold to consumers under monopolistic competition with
Calvo-style price adjustment rigidities. Finally, a central bank regulates nominal interest
rates according to a Taylor-type monetary policy rule.
As shown in figure 2.6, each period t consists of four phases. In the first phase,
aggregate shock innovations to the economy are observed. In the second phase, a fraction
of occupied housing becomes unsuitable for the current occupiers (it becomes effectively
vacant). The household may have to move town because of a new job opportunity. A
growing family may require a house with more room for their children. A retired couple
may wish to trade down into a smaller housing unit with wheelchair access. In the third
phase, the housing, goods, labour, equity and debt markets open. Key is that households
engage in a costly and time intensive search process to find a suitable new home. In the
fourth phase, debtor households can make an offer to renegotiate debt (in the spirit of
Hart and Moore (1994) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)). The creditor has the choice
of accepting or rejecting the proposal. This renegotiation threat makes the collateral
constraint of debt contracts relevant in equilibrium.
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Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
Aggregate 
shocks realized 
Markets openSome of occupied
housing becomes
mismatched
Option to
renegotiate debt
Period t
Figure 2.6: Period t consists of four distinct phases
Households
Type i households value consumption cit and fit-for-occupation (matched) housing h
i
t.
They experience disutility from providing labour effort lit. Assuming that within-type
households insure each other against idiosyncratic shocks through informal and formal
financial contracts, all within-type households face identical decision problems. For ana-
lytical tractability, the setup can therefore be thought of as consisting of one patient and
one impatient representative household.29 As in Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri
(2010), this paper assumes an expected utility objective function 2.3.1 for type i house-
holds with log utility in consumption and housing as well as general CRRA utility in
leisure.30 As key distinguishing feature between the two consumer types, patient house-
holds put greater weight on future felicity (βp > βip). In equilibrium, this will generate
existence of a debt market in which patient households lend their savings to impatient
households.
29The big family assumption is clearly a convenient stylized modelling device (see its explicit use in
Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996)). However, the notion has roots in reality. Assume a grandfather is
bound to a wheelchair and can therefore not climb the stairs of his home. The daughter may have to
drive to the grandfather’s house after work every day to help him with the household. An office worker
may find a new job in a distant city. To avoid the long commute, he may ask friends to stay in their
guest room weekdays until his old house can be sold and he can himself settle closer to work. In utility
terms, the cost of mismatched housing may well be spread across the extended network of a household.
30The log functional restrictions for consumption and housing ensure a stable relation between housing
expenditures and consumption even in periods of prolonged house price deviations from steady state (see
Davis and Heathcote (2005) and Fisher (2007)).
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∑
s=0
(βi)t+sEt(ln(c
i
t+s) + jln(h
i
t+s)− χ
(lit+s)
1+η
1 + η
) (2.3.1)
(2.3.2)
A fraction z of occupied housing becomes unfit for its current residents in phase 2 of
period t. For simplicity, assume that owning housing that is unfit yields no utility benefits
to its current owner. In this sense, unfit housing becomes effectively vacant. Given new
acquisitions of matched housing aim,t, equation 2.3.3 denotes the evolution of occupied
housing for households of type i.
hit = (1− z)hit−1 + aim,t (2.3.3)
To acquire new occupied housing, households search with effort eit ≥ 0. Denoting
by Pb,t the probability of finding appropriate housing (per unit of search effort), new
acquisitions of matched housing are described by equation 2.3.4.
aim,t = Pb,te
i
t (2.3.4)
Housing that becomes vacant is offered for sale to households searching for new homes
(with per-period probability of sale Ps,t). If an appropriate buyer household is found, the
transaction takes place at regular market price qm,t. Once the search market closes, a
vacant housing spot market opens in which vacant lots can be sold instantly to specu-
lators at fire-sale price qv,t (denote by a
i
v,t net acquisitions of vacant housing in the spot
market). These instant sales effectively delegate search for new housing end-users to
other households acting as intermediary. Equation 2.3.5 denotes the evolution of vacant
housing held by type i households at the end of period t.31
31The existence of a spot market for vacant housing has two aims. First, conceptually, it offers
households the option to sell quickly to a speculator (at a liquidation discount) or to engage in lengthy
and costly search for a regular house buyer (and then sell at a higher regular price). In a stylized way,
the framework therefore features a trade-off between speed of sale and sale price. In this sense, monetary
policy affects the steepness of this trade-off. Second, technically, the vacant housing spot market ensures
that vacant housing is priced by those households that put highest value on holding it (the patient
households in equilibrium). This will simplify the bargaining game, since all sellers put the same value
on owning vacant housing at the end of every period.
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vit = (1− Ps,t)(vit−1 + zhit−1) + aiv,t (2.3.5)
Transactions on the housing market are costly. In search market transactions that
lead to occupation, buyers and sellers incur proportional one-off transaction costs Fb and
Fs. Buyers pay consumption cost κb per unit of search effort devoted to finding new
housing fit for occupation.32 At the start of period t, households pay maintenance m and
property tax τ on all housing held (vacant as well as occupied).
Equity in retail firms held oit (normalized to net supply measure 1) trades on a spot
market at price qo,t. Given retail firm dividends Πr,t, equity holdings yield Πr,to
i
t−1 in
period t. Denote by Πiw,t profits from wholesale production activity by consumer type
(Πpw,t = 0 trivially, since only the impatient consumer is assumed to act as entrepreneur)
taxed at rate τw. Denote government transfers to households by T
i
t . Denoting the nominal
return on debt by Rt−1 and denoting inflation by pit = pt/pt−1, the real debt yield is
Rt−1/pit. Given wage wit, equation 2.3.6 denotes the consumer budget constraint.
cit +
Rt−1bit−1
pit
+ qo,t∆o
i
t − (witlit + bit + oit−1Πr,t + (1− τw)Πiw,t + T it ) (2.3.6)
= qm,t(1− Fs)Ps,t(vit−1 + zhit−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenue from housing sales to new occupiers
− (qv,taiv,t + qm,t(1 + Fb)aim,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of property purchases
− κbeit︸︷︷︸
Cost of search effort
− ((m+ τ)(hit−1 + vit−1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of tax and maintenance on housing
Finally and crucially, the threat of debt renegotiation in phase four of period t im-
poses a borrowing constraint (as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005)).
Effectively, borrowers have the option to repudiate the debt contract (in the spirit of
Hart and Moore (1994)) in phase four of period t. In that case the lender takes control of
the housing collateral underlying the contract. The borrower makes a take-it-or-leave-it
alternative loan repayment offer to keep the house. The lender can either accept this
32As in section 2.2, assume sellers face no per-period direct intermediation costs (intermediation costs
instead are paid one-off as part of Fs). Notice this assumption is not crucial for results. In fact, raising
the cost of holding vacant housing inventory would increase the relevance of the housing liquidity channel
further.
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alternative offer or he can move the house into his foreclosure inventory.
To prevent renegotiation, lenders ex-ante must keep the loan small enough relative
to the liquidation value they assign to collateral. They can then credibly commit to not
accepting renegotiation offers. Equation 2.3.7 denotes the relevant condition.
Et(Q
i′
t+1
Rt
pit+1
)bit ≤ qv,thit (2.3.7)
Search And Matching In The Housing Market
The search market for fit-for-occupation housing uses the labour market formalization
summarized in Pissarides (2000). Assume a Cobb-Douglas matching function Mt that
determines the mass of matches between buyers and sellers as function of aggregate buyer
search effort et and vacant housing (the old stock vt−1 carried over from last period and
newly vacated housing z
∑
i h
i
t−1).
Mt = e
1−γ
t (vt−1 + z
∑
i
hit−1)
γ (2.3.8)
Here aggregate search effort and vacant properties are straightforwardly defined from
their type-specific equivalents:
et = e
p
t + e
ip
t (2.3.9)
vt−1 = v
p
t−1 + v
ip
t−1 (2.3.10)
Defining market tightness θt as the ratio of search effort over vacant housing, this
yields closed-form solutions for the matching probabilities of buyers and sellers.
Pb,t =
Mt
et
= θ−γt
Ps,t =
Mt
vt−1 + z
∑
i h
i
t−1
= θ1−γt
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How is the average transaction price qm,t determined once a household finds a vacant
house it is willing to occupy? From section 2.1, it appears that house prices are sluggish.
The model therefore assumes that house prices have a backward-looking component (en-
compassing flexible price Nash-bargaining as a special case). Specifically, assume that
the average house transaction price in period t is determined as weighted average of the
average transaction price in the preceding period and the current price outcome from
Nash bargaining (qNm,t). In calibration of the model, the sluggishness parameters s of this
pricing equation is set to match the impulse response function of the housing market to
monetary policy (with s = 1 yielding fully flexible Nash-bargained house prices).33
qm,t = sq
N
m,t + (1− s)qm,t−1 (2.3.11)
In the Nash bargaining solution to the search market house price qNm,t, denote the buyer
and seller surplus from a transaction as the gain from making the transaction happen
against the outside option of breaking off negotiations (without a new counterparty search
being possible in period t). Since sellers can sell on the vacant housing spot market if they
cannot sell on the search market, the outside option of sellers (of either consumer type)
equals the vacant housing liquidation price qv,t in equilibrium. Denoting by ω the share of
the total transaction surplus accruing to the seller (the bargaining weight) and by V ft the
fundamental valuation that households assign to fit-for-occupation housing, this implies
a unique per-period Nash bargained price determined by equation 2.3.12 (irrespective of
which consumer type is buyer or seller in a specific negotiation).34
qNm,t(1− Fs)− qv,t = ω(V ft − qv,t − (Fs + Fb)qNm,t) (2.3.12)
33A simple story justifying pricing rule 2.3.11 goes as follows. Assume that the economy consists of a
large number of regions (and, implicitly, that search effort cannot be directed at specific regions). In a
given region, the transaction price is determined with reference to the previous period transaction price
with probability 1 − s. With probability s, the transaction price is determined by the outcome qNm,t of
Nash bargaining between buyer and seller (defined further below). It follows that a region features the
Nash bargaining price of k periods ago with probability (1− s)ks. If transactions occur whenever buyers
find an appropriate vacant property, it follows that the average transaction price is given as weighted
average of past Nash bargaining prices: qm,t = sq
N
m,t+ (1− s)sqNm,t−1 + s(1− s)2qNm,t−2 + .... Writing this
expression recursively yields equation 2.3.11 (as a natural analogue to Calvo pricing in firm price-setting).
34In the neighbourhood of the steady state, fundamental valuation of a matched property will be
equalized across household types (see below). In introducing notation in this section, I anticipate this
result.
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Firms, Policy & The Shock Process
Impatient households use their occupied property, together with hired labour, to produce
intermediate inputs. Output is sold to retailers in a perfectly competitive market at price
pt. Denoting by xt the retailer mark-up on prices, equation 2.3.13 denotes the problem
of the wholesale firm. The parameter α sets the equilibrium fraction of income going to
labour. Equally, µ determines the fraction of labour income going to patient workers.35
Max
1
xt
A(hipt )
α((lpt )
µ(lipt )
1−µ)1−α −
∑
i
witl
i
t (2.3.13)
Following the New Keynesian literature, retail firms differentiate output by type j and
set prices pt(j) in a monopolistically competitive environment subject to Calvo-pricing
(a fraction ϑ of firms can adjust prices in period t). Consumers aggregate output subject
to a Dixit-Stiglitz technology. The optimisation problem for those retail firms that can
adjust prices is therefore given by expression 2.3.14.36 Profits from market power are
rebated to the consumer through lump-sum per period dividends Πr,t.
Maxpt(j)
∑
s=0
(ϑfβ
p)s
cpt
cpt+s
pt
pt+s
(pt(j)− pt+s)yt+s(j) (2.3.14)
s.t.yt+s(j) = (
pt+s
pt(j)
)
λf
λf−1yt+s (2.3.15)
Following standard derivation (see Gali (2008)), this setup yields a forward-looking
Phillips curve. Current inflation depends on expectations of future inflation and current
mark-up of retailers over wholesale producers (Xˆt in deviation from steady state). Here
we define ν = (1− ϑ)(1− βpϑ)/ϑ).
pit = β
pEt(pit+1)− νXˆt (2.3.16)
35In equilibrium, competitive input markets imply wholesale profits Πipw,t =
(α/xt)(A(h
ip
t )
α(lpt )
(1−α)µ(lnpt )
(1−α)(1−µ)/hipt ). By assumption, Π
p
w,t = 0 since patient households
are assumed not to be entrepreneurs. Notice, as special case of this framework, α = 0 is observationally
equivalent to a model in which patient and impatient are only households, wholesale firms make no
profits and use only labour in production.
36The assumption that firms use the discounting factor of the patient consumer to evaluate future
profits is subsequently validated, as in the neighbourhood of the steady state only patient households
will hold firm equity.
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The central bank sets interest rates according to a Taylor-type interest rate rule for
monetary policy. Effectively, the central bank lowers the interest rate in response to
widening of the output gap as well as rising inflation. Implicitly, the model assumes zero
steady state inflation.
Rt = R
∗pi1+rpit (
Yt
Y ∗
)rYmr,t (2.3.17)
The baseline setup explores AR(1) monetary policy shocks to this Taylor rule of form:
log(mr,t) = ρmrlog(mr,t−1) + mr,t (2.3.18)
Finally, assume that government redistributes tax on wholesale firm profits to patient
consumer households. This is a technical assumption to ensure that patient households
remain economically significant in steady state debt markets (despite the asymmetric as-
sumption that only impatient households derive income from entrepreneurial activity).37
T pt = τ(Π
w
t ) (2.3.19)
Equilibrium
To recapitulate, it is useful to define formally an equilibrium in this environment. An
equilibrium is an allocation of prices (Rt, rt, w
i
t, qm,t, qv,t, pt, qo,t) and quantities (a
i
m,t,
aiv,t, c
i
t, h
i
t, v
i
t, e
i
t, l
i
t, o
i
t, b
i
t, yt(j)) such that households maximimize utility, firms maximize
profits, the search and matching market for foreclosed housing follow the dynamics set out
in subsection 2.3.1, monetary policy follows the prescribed Taylor rule and all remaining
markets clear given any history of shock realizations. Figure 2.7 presents a graphical
overview of the markets in this economy. Appendix A.3 derives the first order conditions
associated with the equilibrium.
37This transfer policy implies trivially T ipt = 0.
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Search market for
housing fit for
occupation (q_mt)
Spot market for
foreclosures after
matches with new
occupants (q_vt)
Labor market (w_t)
Firm equity (o_t)
Goods market (1)
Bond market (r_t)
Figure 2.7: Schematic for markets in the model economy
2.3.2 Analytical Implications
The main features of this general equilibrium model can be represented analytically.
First, the assumed joint existence of a search market in which housing can be sold to
new occupants as well as a spot market in which vacant housing can be sold to specula-
tors (effectively delegating search for new occupants) ensures that the steady state (and
dynamics around the steady state) can be characterized transparently. Second, because
low interest rates make home ownership more attractive, expansionary monetary policy
raises the number of buyers searching for housing and therefore the rate at which vacant
houses are sold. Third, higher housing sale rates raise the liquidation value of a foreclosed
house (relative to regular house price), making the foreclosure threat of lenders more ef-
fective and therefore making banks ex-ante more willing to offer households larger loans.
This suggests the existence of a housing liquidity channel of monetary policy transmis-
sion to the real economy. Fourth, under a flexible Nash-bargaining of house prices, a low
housing sales rate allows buyers to drive down house prices, making buyer entry into the
housing market more attractive and raising the housing sales rate. To get quantitatively
large movements in housing liquidity in response to external shocks, some sluggishness in
house prices is needed.38 This subsection discusses each of these four model implications
38Alternatively, one could limit free buyer entry into the housing market or modify the assumption of
a Cobb Douglas matching function. However, given the empirical dynamic response of house prices in
section 2.1 suggests sluggishness in price setting, breaking the Nash bargaining assumption appears a
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in turn.
Steady State
Since the remainder of the paper will be concerned with local perturbations around the
steady state, it is useful to start by specifying the salient properties of this steady state
through a series of statements (appendix A.4 develops analytical proofs).
Implication 2.3.1. In any non-stochastic steady state, the impatient consumer is borrowing-
constrained and the patient consumer is not
A simple contradiction argument offers an intuitive interpretation. Conjecture a
steady state in which the impatient consumer is not borrowing-constrained. For the
bonds market to clear, steady state bond interest rates must be such that the impatient
consumer is indifferent between borrowing and saving. But then the patient consumer
must have unbounded demand for saving. The bond market cannot be in equilibrium.
This explains why the assumed heterogeneity in consumer discount rates ensures an
operational (non-trivial) steady state credit market in the model. Moreover, for small
perturbations of the model economy, it follows that the response of impatient households
is limited by a binding credit constraint (while the patient consumer is unconstrained).
Implication 2.3.2. In any non-stochastic steady state:
• Patient and impatient households are committing search effort to finding new hous-
ing for occupation (eit > 0 ∀ i = p, ip)
• Patient and impatient households assign the same fundamental value to occupied
housing (V pf,t = V
ip
f,t)
Again a contradiction argument is enlightening. Suppose consumer type i did not
search for newly occupied housing in steady state. Remember now that a fraction of
existing matched housing becomes vacant in every period, cost of searching and purchas-
ing new housing for occupation is finite and marginal utility of occupied housing nears
infinity as the occupied housing stock approaches 0. The supposition therefore implies
natural starting point.
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that the consumer’s marginal valuation of housing exceeds the cost of purchasing new
housing for occupation in finite time. At that point, not searching for housing cannot be
optimal for the consumer. Both consumer types searching must be part of any steady
state solution.
Suppose now that both consumer types search for appropriate housing in steady
state, but fundamental valuation of housing differs by type. Since both types must then
(weakly) prefer searching to not searching, the type with higher fundamental valuation
must strictly prefer searching. Optimally, the high fundamental valuation type should
therefore raise search effort, increasing housing market tightness and search costs for both
types until the lower valuation type is persuaded to quit searching. This contradicts a
steady state in which both consumer types search actively for housing fit for occupation.
Implication 2.3.3. In any non-stochastic steady state:
• the patient consumer holds all equity and vacant housing
• the patient consumer (the marginal buyer), prices equity and after-search vacant
housing
Intuitively, the patient consumer requires a lower rate of return to hold assets until
the next period. The patient therefore price equity and vacant housing down to the level
at which the impatient consumer leaves these markets. It follows that patient households
hold all assets in steady state (as well as for small deviations around the steady state).39
Jointly, statements 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 lead to a key representational simplification of the
model: in every period there exists a unique Nash bargained transaction price for housing.
To understand why this is surprising, note that the Nash-bargained price depends on the
payoffs and outside options of buyer and seller involved in a transaction. It follows that
a model with two consumer types generally exhibits four different Nash bargained house
prices (a price when the buyer is patient and the seller is patient, a price when the buyer
is patient and the seller is impatient and so on).
In this specific modelling setup however, a unique Nash bargained transaction price
emerges. Why? Notice implication 2.3.3 implies that the seller outside option does
39Appendix A.4, besides formally verifying these statements, also proves existence of a unique well-
defined steady state.
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not depend on seller type. Because of the spot market in vacant housing, the outside
option of both types equals the liquidation value of housing for a patient consumer.
Because implication 2.3.2 shows that the buyer pay-off is independent of type, it therefore
follows that, in this framework, the Nash-bargained price of all four buyer-seller type
encounters is identical. While this setup is presumably not crucial (in a qualitative sense)
for the main conclusions developed in this paper, it substantially increases transparency
of model output (as well as the calibration procedure). Implication 2.3.4 summarizes this
argument.
Implication 2.3.4. In any non-stochastic steady state:
• patient and impatient households face the same outside option during negotiations
to sell a vacant house to a new occupant (the vacant house price)
• patient and impatient households face the same gain from successfully concluding
negotiations to buy a vacant house for occupation (see fundamental value result for
implication 2.3.2)
• by implication, all period t matches lead to a transaction at the same price qm,t
(irrespective of buyer and seller types involved)
Why Does Expansionary Monetary Policy Raise The Housing Sales Rate?
The interaction between housing market search frictions and house price Nash-bargaining
offers a natural explanation for the section 2.1 finding that monetary policy stimulates
housing liquidity. The argument relies on two steps. First, notice that the consumer
optimality condition for buyer search effort et implies free entry condition 2.3.20:
40 In
equilibrium, the net gain from purchasing a unit of housing equals expected search costs
for buying that unit. Second, (and abstracting from house price rigidities) Nash bar-
gaining in prices implies that the buyer surplus from moving into a vacant house is
proportional to the economic surplus accruing from the household-property match.
40The free entry condition is already simplified taking into account local properties around the steady
state summarized in implication 2.3.2.
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κb
θ1−γt︸︷︷︸
Expected cost of buyer search
= V ft − qm,t(1 + Fb)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Buyer surplus
(2.3.20)
= (1− ω) (V ft − qv,t − (Fs + Fb)qm,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total match surplus
In combination, these two steps offer a story for the link between monetary policy
and housing market liquidity. Temporary low interest rates raise the present value (in
consumption terms) of the current and future flow of housing services to an occcupier
household. This drives up the economic surplus from a match between household and
property and, through Nash bargaining, the buyer payoff from purchasing a home. In
equilibrium, more buyers enter the housing market, driving up search costs to the point
that search costs equalize expected benefits from locating a house. From a seller perspec-
tive, in a market crowded with potential buyers, the rate at which vacant housing can be
resold to new occupiers rises.41
Why Does A Higher Housing Sales Rate Raise Consumer Credit Access?
In any period, a vacant house can be sold in two ways. First, a seller can offer the vacant
property for sale on the search market for new occupants. If new occupants are found,
then the vacant house can be sold at regular market price qm,t. Second, if the search
is unsuccessful, the seller can instantly sell the house on the period t spot market to a
speculator at price qv,t . This speculator then effectively takes over the task of searching
for a new occupier household in subsequent periods. The ratio between qv,t and qm,t
therefore represents a fire sale discount reflecting costs for searching for a new end-user
of the asset.
This fire sale discount plays a central role in the housing liquidity channel of monetary
41Two additional comments are useful at this point. First, key to this result is that buyers have
bargaining power. This ensures that house prices rise by less than the change in fundamental housing
value following a fall in interest rates. It follows that the sensitivity of housing liquidity to monetary
policy rises in buyer bargaining power. Second, notice house price rigidities mean that house prices
respond even more sluggishly to monetary policy than under Nash bargaining. Following the intuition
in the main text, this makes buyer surplus and housing liquidity even more sensitive to changes in the
policy rate.
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policy developed in this study. Notice first that a pricing equation for vacant property
of the form studied in section 2.2 emerges naturally from the first order conditions of the
patient consumer in this general equilibrium model. Rescaling equation 2.2.1 by current
regular transaction price of housing yields an expression for the determinants of the fire
sale discount (equation 2.3.21). Crucially, it depends on current and future measures of
housing market tightness. When current and/or future housing sale rates are low, then
searching for a new occupier of a vacant property is costly. It follows that speculators
are only going to accept taking over the search process if the fire sale discount is large
enough to compensate for high expected time-to-sale.
qv,t
qm,t︸︷︷︸
Fire-sale discount
= Et(Q
p
t+1
qm,t+1
qm,t
(−m+ τ
qm,t+1
+ Ps,t︸︷︷︸
Sales rate
(1 + Fs − qv,t+1
qm,t+1
) +
qv,t+1
qm,t+1
))
(2.3.21)
In turn, rewriting the impatient consumer credit constraint (that binds around steady
state according to implication 2.3.1), the fire sale discount emerges as crucial determinant
in household access to credit. The security offered to lenders by housing collateral depends
inherently on the costs associated with liquidating that collateral in case of default.42
When liquidation costs are high because fire-sale discounts are large, then banks tighten
credit access.
bipt︸︷︷︸
Debt capacity
=
1
Et(Q
p
t+1
Rt(1−z)
pit+1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inverse bond return
qv,t
qm,t︸︷︷︸
Fire-sale discount
qm,th
ip
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Value of housing
(2.3.22)
Equations 2.3.21 and 2.3.22 therefore offer a natural argument suggesting that the
housing sales rate response to monetary policy matters for the overall transmission pro-
cess. By raising housing liquidity, monetary policy relaxes consumer credit constraints
42Assuming that households can use equity and vacant housing to secure credit has no impact on
the model solution. Around the steady state, borrowers will not choose to hold such asset types in
equilibrium. Therefore, in either case occupied housing is the only collateral used by borrowers. Ruling
these other asset classes out ex-ante has the advantage of reducing clutter in an already complex modelling
setup.
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over and above the rise in regular book value of the housing stock.
Why are backward-looking house prices needed to generate large housing
liquidity responses to monetary policy?
Notice that the Nash bargaining price implies that buyer and seller suplus from matching
a vacant house to a new household are positively related (see equation 2.3.23). Com-
bined with buyer free entry and a Cobb-Douglas matching technology, this generates a
mechanism significantly dampening housing liquidity fluctuations.
Intuitively, buyers take advantage of low housing sale rates to drive down Nash-
bargained prices in negotiations (since the seller surplus from a transaction rises). In
turn, this raises the ex-ante incentive to search for housing. The number of buyers in
the housing market rises, housing liquidity rises and the original fall in house prices is
dampened.
ω (V ft − (1 + Fb)qNm,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Buyer surplus from match
= (1− ω) (qNm,t(1− Fs)− ql,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Seller surplus from match
(2.3.23)
As will be seen in the calibration of the subsequent section, the model therefore
strongly suggests that house prices do not follow Nash-bargaining. Instead, house prices
have a backward looking component. Buyers cannot instantly take advantage of the bad
bargaining position of house sellers in illiquid property markets. In equilibrium, this
amplifies the role of housing liquidity fluctuations.
2.3.3 Calibration
The quarterly calibration of the model follows a two-step procedure. Wherever possible,
this study uses reference parameters from the literature. The housing search friction
parameter γ, the house seller bargaining weight ω, the size of the underlying monetary
policy shock m,1, the house price persistence parameter s as well as the housing shock
persistence parameter ρm are set to match the empirical response of housing market and
aggregate output to the Romer and Romer (2004) monetary policy shock.
As in Iacoviello (2005), set the yearly discount factors of patient and impatient house-
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holds to 0.99 and 0.97. This reflects estimates on the range of discount factors across the
US population.43 Set labour market parameter χl = 1 and housing preference parameter
χh = 2.5 (to ensure a steady state housing-GDP ratio of 6). Set a 75% Calvo price ad-
justment parameter ϑ. Normalize productivity factor A = 1 and the total housing supply
H¯ to 1. Set the monetary policy response to output gap and inflation as in Iacoviello
(2005) (ry = 0.21 and rpi = 0.16). Following convention, set labour wage elasticity to
ϕ = 1 and steady state mark-up X∗ = 0.15.
As in Ngai and Tenreyro (2009), set the rate at which housing is unmatched z to
2.78% for consistency with an average stay in a house of 9 years.44 Matching a steady
state time-on-market for vacant housing of 5.7 months and a fire-sale discount of 15%,
set m, τ and Fs following the calibration approach in section 2.2. Given lack of other
information, assume buyer fixed costs are equal to the seller’s (Fb = Fs).
45 Set κb to
ensure a steady state monthly sales rate of 20%.
As in Monacelli (2009) and Sterk (2010), set the fraction of labour income going to
patient households µ to 0.5. This is close to the calibration used in Iacoviello (2005)
and Iacoviello and Neri (2010).46 Considering the empirical literature, note that this
number reflects Campbell and Mankiw (1989) who find that about 50% of US households
appear to behave as if they were rule-of-thumb households (or credit-constrained).47 To
ensure the assumption that the credit unconstrained own the wholesale firms does not
affect relative economic weight of the two population groups, assume government lump-
43Iacoviello (2005) cites the micro studies of Lawrance (1991), Carroll and Samwick (1997) and Samwick
(1998) as sources of these ballpark estimates.
44Ngai and Tenreyro (2009) in turn base their figures on median duration of stay in a house according
to the American Housing Survey 1993-2005.
45Some evidene in favour of such equal sharing of costs comes from Levitt and Syverson (2008). They
report that real estate agents on buyer and seller side generally charge each about 3% of house price for
their services.
46This number is slightly greater than the DSGE estimates in Iacoviello (2005) (64%) and Iacoviello
and Neri (2010) (using a Bayesian approach, they use a prior of 65% and find a mean posterior of
79%). Attempting direct calibration of this parameter in this framework, results turned out to be very
sensitive to other parameter choices. This study therefore chooses to postulate a reasonable value for
this parameter exogenously.
47The Jappelli (1990) study might suggest that a baseline number µ = 0.5 is too low. He uses micro
evidence from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances to identify that 20% of households either applied
for a loan and were rejected or were deterred from applying because they expected rejection. However,
this definition of the credit constrained may be more restrictive than that relevant for this study. For
the purpose of this paper, the credit-constrained are those households whose terms of credit are sensitive
to the debt capacity of their housing. This plausibly includes a much larger fraction of the population
than those that are fully excluded from the credit market.
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sum transfers T it to move 50% of wholesale firm revenues from the unconstrained to the
constrained.
The housing search friction parameter γ, the house seller bargaining weight ω, the
size of the underlying monetary policy shock m,1, the house price persistence parameters
s as well as the housing shock persistence parameter ρm are set to minimize the squared
distance between model and empirical impulse responses to monetary policy. Specifically,
set target moments as first quarter and fourth quarter response of house price and housing
sales rate. Additionally, set parameters to ensure that peak model and empirical response
of output coincide.48 Formally, denoting by u and uemp respectively the model and
empirical peak response of variable x (in log-dev. from steady state), model parameters
are chosen according to optimality criterion 2.3.25.
u =

Pˆs,1
Pˆs,4
qˆm,1
qˆm,4
yˆ1

(2.3.24)
Minω,γ,s,ρm(
u− uemp
uemp
)′(
u− uemp
uemp
) (2.3.25)
The resulting calibration suggests setting γ = 0.1, ω = 0.19, ρm = 0.8, s = 0.33
and m,1 = 0.007. Intuitively, a low seller bargaining weight ω makes the buyer surplus
especially sensitive to changes in the overall match surplus from occupying a house. A low
γ in turn ensures that changes in the buyer surplus lead to large equilibrium buyer entry
into the housing market. These two parameter choices therefore contribute to making
the housing sales rate sensitive to monetary policy. Equally, a low value for parameter
s ensures that house prices respond sluggishly to monetary policy, generating a hump-
shaped response in prices that further raises the responsiveness of housing liquidity to
48Note that, in the model developed, output peaks on impact, while the Romer and Romer (2004)
estimation results suggest a delayed output response. This weakness of the model is shared with many
others. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) propose several bells and whistles to the baseline
model that generate additional persistence in output and inflation impulse response functions. This
paper refrains from introducing these additions in order to focus attention on the core features driving
the housing liquidity channel of monetary policy.
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policy intervention. Table 3.1 summarizes the baseline calibration.
2.3.4 Counterfactual: Monetary Policy without Liquidity Effect
To evaluate the contribution of the liquidity effect to macroeconomic transmission of
monetary policy, consider a counterfactual scenario in which lenders are only allowed to
raise loan amounts in line with house transaction price qm: modified borrowing constraint
2.3.26 holds. Effectively, this rule blends out the liquidity effect, since a direct link
between transaction prices and borrowing limit is artificially imposed. Figures 2.8, 2.9,
2.10 and 2.11 consider the impact of a 1% monetary policy shock under the baseline
model (solid line) and the counterfactual no-liquidity effect scenario (dashed line).
Et(Q
i
t+1
Rt
pit+1
)bit ≤
q∗v
q∗m
qm,th
i
t (2.3.26)
Consider first a monetary policy shock in the counterfactual no-liquidity effect model
(dashed line). As in a standard New Keynesian model with perfect credit markets,
the expansionary monetary policy shock lowers the returns on savings and encourages
households to move consumption to the present. Because goods prices are sluggish,
demand stimulates output, raises firm demand for labour inputs and starts a protracted
period of inflation. Following the imposed Taylor rule, the nominal interest rate rises
on impact to counteract the surge in output and inflation.49 Additionally, in this setup
with credit-constrained households, lower interest rates raise the attractiveness of home
ownership, driving up house prices. The borrowing-constrained can access more credit.
They therefore buy more housing, they raise consumption disproportionally and they
raise work effort by less than patient households (since current income is more valuable
when credit constraints bind tightly).50
Consider now the response of the economy to monetary policy shocks in the full model
49Notice this positive interest rate response to the expansionary monetary policy shock is counterfactual
(compared to the empirical results in section 2.1). However, it is shared with other papers in this
modelling class (see for example Sterk (2010)). Furthermore, note that the real interest rate in fact does
fall in response to the policy shock since the rise in inflation is large and protracted.
50In this setting, housing search frictions play a secondary role. Effectively, as more buyers enter the
housing market after expansionary monetary policy, the search cost of looking for housing rises. However,
search frictions only really start to matter for the rest of the economy once interaction between credit
and search friction is introduced.
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Parameter Value Target
Consumer preferences
βp 0.99
1
4 Iacoviello & Neri (10)
βip 0.97
1
4 Iacoviello & Neri (10)
χh 0.25
q∗mh∗
y∗ = 6 (Iacoviello (05))
χl 1 Iacoviello (05)
ϕ 1 elastic labour demand
Production technology
α 0.3 Labour income share of 70%
ϑf 0.75 av. 1 yr price reset (Iacoviello (05))
λf 1.15 Iacoviello (05)
µ 0.5 Sterk (2010)
Housing search market
z 0.0278 av. ownership 9 yrs (Ngai & Tenreyro (09))
κb 1.57 satisfy buyer free entry
Fs 0.1
V ∗s
q∗m
= 0.85 (emp. fire-sale discount)
Fb 0.1 Fb = Fs
m
q∗m
0.04/4 Poterba (91)
τ
q∗m
0.02/4 Poterba (91)
ω 0.19 match housing market impulse response
γ 0.1 match housing market impulse response
s 0.33 match housing market impulse response
Policy
ry 0.21 Iacoviello (05)
rpi 0.16 Iacoviello (05)
rr 0.72 Iacoviello (05)
τh 0.5 split housing return evenly across types
ρm 0.8 match housing market impulse response
1,m 0.007 match housing market impulse response
Table 2.1: Calibration for baseline DSGE
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(the solid line) that allows for interaction between housing search market and the credit
market. Because the lower policy rate encourages buyers to enter the housing market,
the housing sales rate rises. This boosts liquidation prices of housing by more than actual
transaction prices.51 The fire-sale discount on property narrows and, following equation
2.3.22, loan-to-value ratios offered by lenders rise. The housing liquidity effect roughly
doubles the impact effect of monetary policy on debt expansion and output. Overall, these
general equilibrium simulations suggest that the liquidity effect contributes substantially
to the macroeconomic housing channel of monetary policy transmission.
2.4 Liquidity Effect & Home-Buyer Tax Credits
If housing liquidity plays an important role in the housing channel of monetary policy
transmission, then a natural question must be whether the liquidity effect also raises the
macroeconomic impact of other policy levers that operate through the housing market.
In other words, does ignoring the liquidity effect lead us to underestimate the impact of
housing market interventions in general? The macroeconomic model developed in section
2.3, calibrated using evidence on the housing and macroeconomic impact of monetary
shocks, provides a natural environment in which to tackle this question.
A housing market intervention that received widespread coverage during the financial
crisis of 2007-2009 will serve as inspiration for this exercise: the 8000 USD first time
home-buyer tax credit towards purchase of new primary residences enacted by Congress
on February 29 2009 as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)
(ultimately extended until summer 2010).52’53 Given an average transaction price of
292,600 USD for new homes sold in the United States in 2008 (according to Census
Bureau statistics on new housing sales), this policy measure amounts to an effective
subsidy of slightly less than 3% on average new US home purchases.
In the model of section 2.3, such a temporary tax credit is proxied as a mean-reverting
51Following the analysis in section 2.1, liquidation values also rise because monetary expansion implies
house price growth and liquidation values are forward-looking once an explicit time-to-sale assumption
is introduced.
52The Act was preceded by another home buyer tax credit in 2008 in the form of an interest-free loan.
53The tax credit is limited to 10% of the house purchase price or 8000 USD. Recipients can add the
tax credit to their tax refund (distinguishing the tax credit from a tax exemption).
53
0
5
10
15
20
−
40
−
200204060
P s
0
5
10
15
20
−
15
0
−
10
0
−
5005010
0
v
0
5
10
15
20
−
0.
50
0.
51
1.
52
q m
0
5
10
15
20
−
0.
50
0.
51
1.
52
2.
5
q l
Figure 2.8: Simulated monetary policy IRF (% dev SS) baseline model (solid line) and
the counterfactual no-liquidity effect scenario (dashed line)
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the counterfactual no-liquidity effect scenario (dashed line)
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process that provides housing buyers with partial compensation for the fixed costs asso-
ciated with housing purchase.
st = φsst−1 + s,t (2.4.1)
The key equations of the baseline model affected by the subsidy are the Nash bar-
gaining equation and the consumer budget constraint. The study assumes the subsidy is
financed with equivalent lump-sum taxes for the two consumer types T is,t.
qm,t(1− Fs)− qv,t = ω(V ft − qv,t − (Fs + Fb − st)qm,t) (2.4.2)
Figures 2.12, 2.13, 2.14 and 2.15 depict the response of the economy to a 3% shock to
housing subsidy with persistence parameter φs = 0.8. Consider first the solid line impulse
response functions of the full framework. In the first instance, the subsidy raises house
prices, as sellers capture some of the greater value that buyers put on closing the property
transaction. At the same time, lower ultimate transaction costs attract more buyers into
the housing market, raising housing market liquidity. Both the fall in time-to-sale and
higher transaction prices raise the liquidation value that lenders associate with property
collateral. Credit-constrained households respond by increasing consumption and by
purchasing more housing. This allows them to expand their entrepreneurial activity and
to raise aggregate output.
Consider now again the artificial no-liquidity effect exercise from section 2.3 for the
subsidy shock. The stimulus to aggregate consumption and output is substantially weak-
ened. The peak output response to the tax credit is 1/3 less. The housing liquidity
effect introduced through housing search frictions plays a substantial role in the policy
transmission process.54
Overall, the simulations in this section suggest that the macroeconomic stimulus pro-
vided by the housing tax credit of 2009-2010 may be much larger than an evaluation
according to price impact alone would imply. As the subsidy encourages home buyers to
54Overall, it should be noted that the impact of the housing subsidy on the macroeconomy appears
generally very high in this calibrated DSGE model. Nonetheless, the simulations are instructive in
illustrating that the housing liquidity channel of monetary policy plausibly plays an important role in
determining the relative magnitude of credit frictions over the business cycle.
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Figure 2.15: Simulated housing subsidy policy IRF (% dev SS) baseline model (solid line)
and the counterfactual no-liquidity effect scenario (dashed line)
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enter the housing market, it may have preserved housing collateral liquidity and stimu-
lated a limited willingness of banks to provide households with mortgage finance in the
crisis. The macroeconomic stimulus provided by housing market interventions should be
judged based on their impact on both price and volume.
2.5 Concluding Discussion
This paper shows that the impact of monetary policy on housing debt capacity is plausi-
bly much greater than the response of property transaction prices alone suggests. When
lenders evaluate the security provided by property collateral, they should not only take
into account the eventual resale price of the house in case of default, but also the sub-
stantial carrying costs they face until an appropriate counterparty is found. Based on
the empirical finding that a fall in interest rates substantially lowers the time-to-sale of
housing, simulations show that this housing liquidity effect can play an important quanti-
tative role (distinct from the standard house price effect) in the transmission of monetary
policy to household credit access and the macroeconomy.
Calibrating the model to fit monetary policy impulse response functions, the simulated
impact of a temporary home buyer tax credit on the macroeconomy also rises substantially
once its combined impact on time-to-sale and housing transaction prices is taken into
account. Direct intervention in the housing market may constitute a more powerful
substitute for conventional monetary policy than standard analysis would suggest.
For policy makers, the crucial message of the paper is therefore that housing market
policies need to be evaluated not only by their impact on prices, but also by their impact
on housing sales volume. Both price and volume plausibly matter for consumer access to
mortgage credit. Having calibrated a macroeconomic model with borrowing-constrained
households and housing market search frictions using empirical monetary policy impulse
response functions, this study has developed a macroeconomic policy laboratory that
takes into account both of these response dimensions.
This study naturally suggests several further avenues for research. First, to maintain
links with the existing literature, this study has considered the impact of monetary policy
in a macroeconomic model with one period risk-free mortgages. In light of the financial
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crisis of 2008-2009, introducing more realistic debt contracts constitutes an important
step towards quantitatively meaningful macroeconomic models.55 While the overall im-
portance of the mechanism studied in this paper is conjectured to be robust to these
extensions, exploring the exact quantitative implications of interaction between these re-
finements in the debt contracts and the liquidity effect is an important agenda item for
further research.
Second, integrating housing market search frictions into a general equilibrium model
of the US economy with credit-constrained households, this study proposes a theory for
time-varying borrowing margins. In the face of a demand-slump, central banks face a
trade-off between boosting demand through expansionary monetary policy and sowing
the seeds of the next financial crisis by encouraging private sector leveraging. Analysing
optimal monetary policy facing this trade-off requires at least a second-order approxima-
tion solution to the macroeconomic model developed and constitutes a potentially fruitful
area for further research.
Third, the notion that asset debt capacity depends on the severity of resale market
search frictions and fire-sale discounts offers a promising and tractable approach towards
understanding fluctuations in credit access more generally. For example, the ability of
the banking sector to sustain high leverage ratios may depend on the liquidity of the
secondary market for the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) held by these institutions.
Applying this search-theoretic approach to procyclical borrowing margins in over-the-
counter financial asset markets is a fascinating topic for further research.
55Current research makes first steps in this direction. Forlati and Lambertini (2011) introduce risky
mortgages in the DSGE framework. Calza, Monacelli and Stracca (2007) explore the impact of intro-
ducing long-term mortgages into macroeconomic general equilibrium setups.
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Chapter 3
When Do Temporary Payroll Tax
Cuts Work? Taking Hiring and
Firing Costs Seriously
Can a temporary employer payroll tax cut stimulate job creation? Given a regular US
employer payroll tax contribution of 6.2% of yearly wage, even a complete full-year payroll
tax holiday may reasonably not pay for the costs of hiring (and eventual firing) of an
additional worker. This implies that the tax cut will only sway firms with employment
levels at which hiring new workers is close to profitable ex-ante. But how many firms
have employment levels close to this hiring threshold?
Using simulations in a dynamic heterogeneous firm model with non-convex labour
adjustment costs, this paper finds that the job creation multipliers associated with em-
ployer payroll tax cuts can be substantial. In the baseline framework, a one year payroll
tax cut to 3% leads to a peak employment response of 2% relative to steady state. The
source for this result lies in the high empirical rate at which workers quit employment
and the importance of idiosyncratic shocks to firm-level business conditions. These two
factors imply that, in normal times, many firms have employment levels close to the hir-
ing threshold. These marginal firms remain responsive to tax cuts even given substantial
labour adjustment costs.
Does this mean that hiring and firing costs can be ignored for the analysis of aggregate
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tax multipliers? On the contrary, when firms face labour adjustment costs the cost-
effectiveness of tax stimulus depends crucially on exact tax design. First, tax cuts should
be pre-announced. Announced future tax cuts persuade firms to retain employment today
without lowering current tax intake. Second, tax cuts should be bold. If firms know that
tax cuts are sustained, they respond more strongly to current tax incentives, making
the stimulus more cost-efficient. Third, labour adjustment costs weaken multipliers in
recessions. When business cycle conditions suddenly deteriorate, hiring thresholds move
far below current employment levels. Many firms are hoarding labour and, at the margin,
aggregate employment becomes less sensitive to tax incentives. This formalizes the notion
that tax cuts persuade few firms to raise hiring when demand conditions are weak.
The study highlights three implications from these results. First, this work offers an
important caveat for empirical work on fiscal multipliers. One cannot use the employment
effect of a prolonged backloaded increase in employer payroll tax in normal times (such
as a permanent rise in employer payroll tax in the 1950s to finance expansion of social
security) to directly infer the impact of a present-value adjusted temporary frontloaded
payroll tax cut in bad times (such as a temporary tax cut to boost employment during
a recession). This suggests an important role for structural macroeconomic estimation
(that can take into account the specific implementation of a given present value tax cut)
in stimulus policy evaluation.
Second, for policy makers, the mechanism studied in this paper offers several take-
away messages on when and how to use employer payroll tax stimulus. While policy
implementation lags are generally seen as an argument against the use of fiscal stimulus,
allowing firms to foresee a future tax cut may maximize the total number of jobs created
per tax dollar foregone. Current practice to propose stimulus measures for one or two
years at a time may limit the effectiveness of policy, since tax cut persistence matters
for the strength of the multiplier. By the same logic, tax cuts in election years may
be particularly ineffective if elections are contested and firms are not certain that the
stimulus will be implemented at full length (in case of a change in ruling party).
Third, and maybe most controversially, these findings put into question a commonly
held belief that fiscal policy is always more effective in recessions. In an economy with
a high labour adjustment cost sector and a sector with low labour adjustment costs,
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the recessionary labour hoarding effect that makes fiscal stimulus less effective in down-
turns may operate only in the high labour adjustment cost sector. Countercyclical fiscal
multipliers for stimulus targeted towards low-labour-adjustment-cost sectors (such as the
countercyclical government spending shock multipliers recently found in Almunia et al.
(2010), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010) and Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Vegh (2010)) may
be consistent with procyclical multipliers for broad-based employer payroll tax cuts.1 A
broad brush statement, based on empirical government spending multipliers, that all
fiscal multipliers are countercyclical may miss on this important distinction.
The analysis in this paper links with a large empirical and theoretical body of work on
the impact of fiscal policy. Empirically, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) introduce recursive
identification of tax liability shocks using Vector-Autoregressions. Romer and Romer
(2010) propose a narrative approach to identify exogenous tax liability changes. Neither
approach however distinguishes between the source of tax cuts considered. Ilzetzki (2011)
uses a novel international panel dataset on income, VAT and corporate tax rates in a
first attempt to disentangle the effect of various tax cuts. Reflecting limited historical
experience, none of these studies consider explicitly the impact of payroll tax cuts (on
employer or employee side).
On the theoretical front, starting with Baxter and King (1993), the workhorse model
for analysis of fiscal policy has been the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
model. Using log-linearizations, the strength of this line of research has been full gen-
eral equilibrium analysis of fiscal policy outcomes. Contributions following this approach
touch on various issues discussed in this paper, though the conclusions reached are quite
different. Concerning tax cut anticipation effects, Susan Yang (2005), House and Shapiro
(2006) and Mertens and Ravn (2011) suggest that anticipated labour tax cuts are re-
cessionary in the pre-implementation phase due to intertemporal labour substitution by
workers.2 In contrast, this paper highlights a force that makes anticipated labour tax cuts
1Note that Ramey (2011) points out that Pereira and Lopes (2010) and Pereira and Lopes (2010)
do not find that fiscal mutlitpliers depend on the business cycle. She suggests a key distinction may be
whether estimation treats the business cycle state as exogenous or endogenous.
2Mertens and Ravn (2011) also provide some empirical evidence that anticipated tax liability changes,
using the identification scheme, are recessionary before implementation. They however concede in their
conclusions that the impact of specific tax policy changes may be quite heterogeneous. Unfortunately,
limited historical variation in employer payroll tax does not allow repetition of their exercise for the
specific tax measure analysed in this paper only.
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expansionary today. Firms may hire today because they expect that the present value of
payroll taxes paid on the position will fall due to a future tax cut stimulus. Concerning
the length of the tax cut, papers starting with Baxter and King (1993) have highlighted
the crucial role intertemporal utility maximization by consumers plays in translating ex-
pectations of tax cut length into current response of the economy. This paper argues that,
even if consumers respond mostly to current business conditions and are therefore less
forward-looking than classical models predict, labour adjustment costs create a strong
incentive for forward-looking firms to adjust their labour market response to stimulus
length. Concerning business-cycle-dependent fiscal multipliers, Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Rebelo (2011) show fiscal multipliers may be much larger when the economy is at the
zero lower bound on nominal interest rates (implying countercyclical fiscal multipliers).
Michaillat (2011) suggests that employer payroll tax multipliers may be countercyclical,
because labour markets are “slack” in downturns. This paper shows that non-convex
labour adjustment costs imply a force towards procyclical fiscal multipliers. Slackness
inside the firm creates a force towards tax stimulus multipliers, just as slackness outside
the firm (in the labour market) creates a force towards countercyclical policy multipliers.3
The importance of non-convex adjustment costs for macroeconomic dynamics has
been highlighted in a growing literature starting with Oi (1962). The framework applies
the modelling approach used in papers such as Bertola and Caballero (1994), Abel and
Eberly (1994), Caballero and Engel (1999) and Bloom (2009) towards analysis of payroll
tax multipliers.
This paper proceeds by developing the model policy laboratory used for analysis in
section 3.1. Section 3.2 analyses the response of this economy to a baseline temporary
employer payroll tax cut. Section 3.3 shows that hiring and firing costs make tax mul-
tipliers contingent on exact policy design. Section 3.4 discusses two implications that
follow from these results. Section 3.5 offers concluding comments.
3Bloom, Floetotto and Jaimovich (2010) use a model with non-convex input adjustment costs to
show that wage subsidies are less effective when economic uncertainty is high. Vavra (2012) shows that
recessionary uncertainty leads firms to readjust prices more frequently, meaning that monetary policy
is a less effective stimulus tool in high uncertainty periods. In contrast to this work, my study shows
that policy will be less effective in downturns without having recourse to simultaneous second moment
shocks.
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3.1 The Policy Laboratory
The main goal of the paper is to highlight the economic forces that non-convex labour
adjustment costs introduce into a simulated dynamic heterogeneous firm economy subject
to a temporary employer payroll tax cut. The model used therefore aims to be rich enough
to encompass the major channels through which labour adjustment costs matter, while
preserving expositional transparency.
Subsection 3.1.1 describes the theoretical model used as policy laboratory. Subsec-
tion 3.1.2 proposes a baseline calibration. Subsection 3.1.3 discusses the steady state
properties of the model. This sets the stage for the policy experiments conducted in this
paper.
3.1.1 Setup
In every period t, the problem of monopolistically competitive firm i consists of choosing
output price pit ≥ 0, hours per worker hit ≥ 0, the mass of workers to hire eit ≥ 0 and
the mass of workers to fire f it ≥ 0 to maximize expected present discounted profits 3.1.1
subject to output demand 3.1.2, the evolution of employed workers lit ≥ 0 described
in equation 3.1.3 and the production function 3.1.4. Firms are risk-neutral and use
discount factor r to evaluate future profits. They are subject to an employer payroll tax
contribution defined as a fraction τt of their payroll expenditure.
4
Max
hit+s,l
i
t+s,e
i
t+s,f
i
t+s
∑
s
Et((
1
1 + r
)s(pit+sy
i
t+s(h
i
t+s, l
i
t+s)− (1 + τt+s)w(hit+s)lit+s − c(eit+s, f it+s)))
(3.1.1)
Output demand is negatively related to output price set by the firm (with price
elasticity ) and positively related to a random demand shifter bit.
4Notice this rule amplifies how the employer payroll tax operates in practice. Specifically, it ignores
that earnings above a maximum threshold are not subject to payroll tax (“Maximum taxable earning”).
There is also a policy debate whether to introduce a payroll tax cut that applies only to new hires by
the firm (by limiting the tax cut to payroll expenditure in year t beyond expenditure in year t-1). For
more information on this, please see a short history of the US employer payroll tax in appendix B.2.
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yit(h
i
t, l
i
t) = b
i
t(p
i
t)
− (3.1.2)
Labour hired today becomes operative in the following period.5 Given a fraction λ of
the existing workforce quits (employee-initiated job separations) in every period, equation
3.1.3 describes the dynamic path of employment at firm i.
lit+1 = l
i
t(1− λ) + eit − f it (3.1.3)
The production function 3.1.4 allows for diminishing returns to labour α˜ in employed
workers and hours. Technology is subject to random productivity shifter a˜it.
yit(h
i
t, l
i
t) = a˜
i
t(h
i
tl
i
t)
α˜ (3.1.4)
Combining expressions 3.1.1, 3.1.2 and 3.1.4 yields the optimization problem 3.1.5.
This takes the form of an “as-if” competitive firm maximisation problem subject to
“productivity shocks” only (where α = 
−1 α˜ and a
i
t = (a˜
i
t)
−1
 (bit)
1
 ). To link with previous
literature, this paper from hereon refers to ait as a productivity shock, though the implicit
understanding is that the shock reflects wider business conditions (such as weaker demand
for the product).
Max
hit+s,l
i
t+s,e
i
t+s,f
i
t+s
∑
s
Et((
1
1 + r
)s(ait(h
i
tl
i
t)
α − (1 + τt)w(hit+s)lit+s − c(eit+s, f it+s))) (3.1.5)
Following Bloom (2009), wages per worker w(ht) depend on hours per worker ht
through flexible form 3.1.6. Effectively, the model therefore assumes that firms can ask
workers to shift to a part-time work arrangement, take on an extra shift or work overtime
in return for wage compensation. This reflects that firms can, to some extent, circumvent
hiring and firing costs by adjusting labour input along the intensive labour utilization
margin.
5This realistic assumption (used also in Bloom (2009)) allows pre-optimization of hours in a given pe-
riod, substantially speeding up computation of the model solution. Effectively, one can solve analytically
for optimal labour hours given period t employment and productivity shock. The numerical procedure
then only has to determine the optimal employment policy response.
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w(hit) = ω1(1 + ω2(h
i
t)
γ) (3.1.6)
The baseline setup assumes that hiring and firing workers entails a proportional com-
ponent (that rises linearly with the number of hires and fires). This is formalized in
equation 3.1.7.6
c(eit, f
i
t )) = cp,ee
i
t + cp,ff
i
t (3.1.7)
The stochastic processes for demand shifter bit and productivity shifter a˜
i
t are ex-
pressed directly in terms of a combined stochastic process for the reduced-form shock ait.
Specifically, assume that the reduced-form shock can be represented as the product of a
firm-specific component af,it and a macroeconomic component a
m
t shared by all firms.
ait = a
f,i
t a
m
t (3.1.8)
Both the firm-specific and macroeconomic component can be expressed as log-AR(1)
processes with persistence parameter φ.7 Since the simulations consider the impact of
payroll tax cuts given a certain state of the business cycle, only idiosyncratic firm pro-
ductivity is subject to stochastic shocks (independently distributed across firms).
log(af,it ) = φlog(a
f,i
t−1) + 
f,i
t ; 
f,i
t ∼ N(0, (σf )2) (3.1.9)
log(amt ) = φlog(a
m
t−1) (3.1.10)
Of course, the partial equilibrium nature of this framework ignores a range of factors
that potentially interact with the effect of employer payroll tax cuts. At this point, it is
useful to discuss some of these more prominent factors. First, the tax cut could improve
demand conditions. Higher employment (and maybe some pass-through of the tax cut
6Bloom (2009) also considers quadratic adjustment costs (that raise the cost of hiring in the number
of hires) and fixed adjustment costs (that are incurred for hiring and firing activity irrespective of the
number of hires and fires). Key for the results in this paper is the existence of non-convex labour
adjustment costs.
7Assuming that firm-specific and macroeconomic component shocks both share the same persistence
parameter improves computational tractability. Under this assumption, firms do not keep track of the
contribution of idiosyncratic and macroeconomic shocks to their current business environment (instead
using as state variables overall business environment and current firm-specific employment stock only.
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to higher worker wages) could stimulate consumption and raise the overall stimulus from
the policy. Equally, if central banks respond to inflationary pressure created by the stim-
ulus by raising interest rates, demand may decline. Second, the rise in labour demand
may put upward pressure on real wages. This would dampen hiring. Third, payroll tax
multipliers may be stronger if firms could respond by also expanding physical capital
(weakening diminishing returns to employment). In contrast, the policy laboratory pro-
posed keeps market conditions, wages and physical capital effectively exogenous to the
policy intervention.8
To take the simulation multipliers presented in this paper at face value, one would
therefore need to assume these other channels of secondary importance for the stimulus
response. And indeed, since the intervention considered is inherently short-run, this
interpretation has some appeal. There may be significant frictions that prevent these
other forces to play out at this high frequency. Consumers may be reluctant to raise
consumption in response to the tax cut, if uncertainty over the future path of the economy
remains significant (as is plausibly the case in crisis when stimulus is introduced). Wages
may be rigid in the short run (for example Olivei and Tenreyro (2007) show wages are
often negotiated yearly). Physical capital investments may be subject to substantial
time-to-build.
This paper however pushes a more conservative interpretation. The results presented
provide a first stab at the impact of non-convex adjustment costs on fiscal multipliers
in dynamic heterogeneous firm economies. As such, emphasis lies on transparency and
tractability. The paper highlights several fundamental forces and shows that they can be
quantitatively significant in the partial equilibrium setting considered (implicitly conjec-
turing that results will be robust to future general equilibrium analysis).9
8The model also abstracts from the fact that worker quits respond endogenously to labour market
conditions (see for example http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2011/08/art2full.pdf on worker quits during
the Great Recession of 2008-2009) and that firms can smooth production by accumulating inventories
during recessions.
9The solution procedure proposed in Krusell, Smith and Jr. (1998) appears applicable for a general
equilibrium extension. Thomas (2002) suggests that these general equilibrium considerations can par-
tially undo the effect of non-convex adjustment costs. I conjecture however that the results in this paper
will be robust to this extension assuming realistic adjustment frictions in prices.
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3.1.2 Calibration
The baseline calibration considers an economy with 1000 homogeneous firms. The quar-
terly calibration of the model follows standard values wherever possible.10 The standard
deviation of idiosyncratic productivity shocks is set to match the empirical standard
deviation in firm-level sales growth.
Following King and Rebelo (1999), the annual firm discount factor r is set to 6.5%
and the labour elasticity of production α˜ is set to 0.6. Setting the shock persistence
parameter ρ to 0.96 reflects slow-changing business conditions. As in Bloom (2009), the
demand elasticity  is set to 4, the quit rate λ is set to a yearly rate of 10% and γ
is set to 2. ω1 is set to normalize quarterly wage to 1, while ω2 ensures that hourly
wage is maximized at 40 hours per week. The employer payroll tax is initialized at 6.2%
of yearly wage bill, reflecting 2010 employer payroll tax contribution to social security
(”http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/factsheets/HowAreSocialSecurity.htm”).
Considerable uncertainty over labour adjustment cost parameters remains. Empirical
work offers some anecdotal industry/occupation level direct estimates of hiring and firing
costs. However, given substantial heterogeneity in these costs across industries, it is not
clear which number should be used as empirical counterpart to the hiring and firing costs
in the model. The theoretical literature on labour adjustment costs has therefore turned
to indirect calibration of these parameters to match firm-level or macroeconomic data.
Results based on this approach have turned out to be sensitive to exact specification
considered. Table 3.1 offers an eclectic survey of non-convex labour adjustment costs
used in the literature.
Given this disparity in results (and the sensitivity of indirect calibration to model
assumptions), this paper chooses as baseline a conservative proportional hiring and firing
cost of a monthly wage (8.3% of yearly worker wage or 33% of quarterly worker wage).
Bentolila and Bertola (1990) use the same specification and these numbers are generally in
the range of reported estimates in table 3.1. This baseline implies that labour adjustment
costs are substantial (a premise for the relevance of this paper). Notably, the cost of
10The simulation results are substantially unchanged if the number of firms is increased. A quarterly
calibration reflects standard practice in business cycle modelling as well as the frequency at which many
macroeconomic aggregates are reported.
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Costs Prop. (%)
Baseline in this paper 8.3
Bloom (2009) 1.8
Nickell (1987) 8-25
Oi (1962) 5.4
Bentolila and Bertola (1990) 8.3
Blatter, Muehlemann and Schenker (2008) 32
Table 3.1: Labour adjustment cost parameters used in literature; proportional hiring
costs are reported as percent of yearly worker wage
hiring a worker is not covered even by a full one year payroll tax holiday. Acknowledging
uncertainty on this labour adjustment cost parameter choice, the results in the main text
consider sensitivity of results to this parameter.
Statistics and graphs are represented as average results from 1000 macroeconomic
simulation runs over 100 quarters (25 years). The tax cut is announced in quarter 49
(though graphs will label the tax announcement quarter as period 1 for reference). The
exact computational strategy is presented in appendix B.1.
To calibrate standard deviation for idiosyncratic business cycle conditions, the sim-
ulations aim to match idiosyncratic yearly firm sales growth standard deviation from
Compustat.11 The model can match yearly empirical sales growth volatility for an id-
iosyncratic productivity shock standard deviation of 0.06. Table 3.1 then summarizes the
baseline calibration used in the simulation.
3.1.3 Characterizing the Steady State
To gain a sense of the properties of this modelling setup, this subsection reviews behaviour
of the heterogeneous firm framework in steady state. Notice steady state in this class
of models does not imply the absence of uncertainty. Firms are subject throughout to
idiosyncratic business condition shocks. Instead, steady state refers to the distribution
the economy converges to after a prolonged period with payroll tax at 6.2%. Several
11Following Bloom (2009), the following filters were applied to yearly Compustat North America
entries to compute empirical sales growth standard deviation. To deal with mergers and acquisitions,
observations with sales or employment growth in the top or bottom 1% were excluded. To ensure a
minimum level of homogeneity of firms, data for firms with less than 500 employees were excluded.
74
Parameter Value Target
r 0.0053 6.5% US yearly firm discount rate (King and Rebelo (1999))
 4 33% markup (Bloom (2009))
λ 0.019 JOLTS average monthly quit rate (2001-2010)
α˜ 0.6 60% labour income share
γ 2 Bloom (2009)
ω1 0.47 normalize monthly wage to 1
ω2 3.1 ∗ (10−5) hourly wage minimized at 40 hour week
τ ∗ 0.062 US employer payroll tax 2011
φ 0.95 persistent productivity shocks
cp,e 0.33 proportional hiring costs (% quarterly wage)
cp,f 0.33 proportional firing costs (% quarterly wage)
σf 0.06 monthly firm productivity shock (match firm sales volatility)
Figure 3.1: Calibration for accounting exercise (quarterly frequency)
crucial features stand out.
First, non-convex labour adjustment costs introduce a zone of inaction in the firm
employment decision. Firms will only hire if the marginal value product of taking on
an extra worker exceeds significantly the marginal wage cost of employing that worker
- such that expected profits from the employment relationship cover the costs of hiring
(and possible eventual firing). Firms will only fire if the marginal value product of that
worker significantly falls short of the marginal wage cost of employing that worker - such
that expected losses from continuing employment exceed the cost of firing the worker.
Figure 3.2 plots the steady state distribution of firms in firm-specific employment-
productivity space (each cross represents a firm in the simulation). All firms below the
solid line optimally hire new workers in that quarter. This line is referred to as the hiring
threshold from here on. All firms above the dashed line fire workers in that quarter. This
line is referred to as the firing threshold. All firms in between these two thresholds are
inactive (in the sense that they neither hire nor fire - though of course they still use their
existing workforce to produce).
Second, the firm distribution in the model reflects several important empirical stylized
facts. Empirically, the inactivity zone of the model fits evidence of lumpy firm labour
75
adjustment first documented by Hamermesh (1989).12 Equally, in the theoretical frame-
work, hiring and firing employment thresholds rise with productivity. Firms facing more
favourable business conditions optimally produce on a bigger scale, since they run into
diminishing marginal returns at a higher level of employment. Empirically, this pattern
between productivity and firm size is documented for example in van Ark and Monnikhof
(1996) for OECD countries. Finally, the log-normal distribution of productivity shocks
translates into a firm productivity distribution skewed towards lower productivities. This
implies that, as in the data, the majority of firms operate on a small scale (with a few
exceptionally large firms). In broad brushes, this mirrors the pattern documented empir-
ically (see Axtell (2001) for example).
Third, figure 3.2 reveals that, despite a relatively large inaction zone, a substantial
fraction of firms do hire and fire every period. In the model, two factors move firms
out of the inaction zone. First, and trivially, firms are subject to stochastic changes in
business conditions that can lead them to re-evaluate target employment levels. Second,
firms suffer labour attrition due to worker quits. This moves firms into the hiring range
to replenish employment. Overall, this skews the firm distribution towards the hiring
threshold. As we will see below, the interaction between idiosyncratic business condition
shocks and labour attrition will act as crucial driver of the aggregate employment response
to tax cuts.
3.2 Exploring a Baseline Payroll Tax Cut
This section considers the impact of a baseline employer payroll tax cut on the economy
of section 3.1. Specifically, consider an employer payroll tax cut from 6.2% to 3% given
the economy is in initial steady state. The tax cut is announced at the start of quarter
1 and then implemented for quarters 2 to 5. In effect, this reflects a legislative proposal
adopted in Q4 of year x for the payroll tax applicable in fiscal year x + 1. Figure 3.3
illustrates the timing of the tax cut.
Subsection 3.2.1 characterizes the baseline macroeconomic response and subsection
12Indeed the response to Hamermesh (1989) has been a large literature arguing that non-convex labour
adjustment costs are important for firm and macroeconomic dynamics.
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Figure 3.2: Steady state firm distribution; with hiring threshold (solid line) and firing
threshold (dashed line); cross represents firm in employment-productivity state space
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Figure 3.3: Timing of tax cut experiment
3.2.2 explores why the tax cut remains effective in an environment with high hiring and
firing costs.
3.2.1 The Macroeconomic Effect of the Tax Cut
Figure 3.4 shows impulse response functions for the macroeconomy under the baseline
parameterization of section 3.1 (solid line) as well as a counterfactual economy without
labour adjustment costs (dashed line).
Consider first the model without labour adjustment costs. On impact, employment
jumps by 6% as firms face lower marginal wage costs per employee. Hours per worker
are unresponsive, since firms set hours to minimize wage cost per worker. It follows that
total hours (defined as persons employed times work hours per employee) also rise by 6%.
Overall, this jump in employment raises output by more than 2.5%.
Taking account of labour adjustment costs, this macroeconomic response is pre-
dictably dampened. Firms in the inactivity region do not respond to marginal changes
in employer payroll tax cuts. However, the extensive employment decision of firms re-
mains significant (the peak response is still 2% relative to steady state). Furthermore,
firms adapt by exploiting the intensive labour utilization margin (the hours choice) to
expand payroll and take advantage of low taxes, while circumventing the costs of hiring
and (eventual) firing of workers. Total labour hours rise to a peak response of 3% relative
to steady state . Overall, the stimulus therefore remains surprisingly effective even given
significant labour adjustment costs. The peak response of output to the tax stimulus is
1.5%.
Following the methodology of the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO), this paper
considers two measures for evaluation of program cost-effectiveness. First, the cumulative
output multiplier reports the ratio of total output produced over tax revenues foregone
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Figure 3.4: Macroeconomic response for baseline tax cut in economy with labour adjust-
ment costs (solid line) and without (dashed line)
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(relative to steady state without tax policy intervention). Second, this paper reports the
tax revenue foregone relative to full-time equivalent (FTE from hereon) job-years created
by the stimulus. 13’14
MY =
∆
∑
t Yt
∆
∑
t Tt
(3.2.1)
ML =
∆
∑
t Tt
∆
∑
t Lt
(3.2.2)
The value of these multipliers depends on the interval over which numbers are cumu-
lated. Table 3.2 shows multipliers for the baseline tax cut from 1 year to 5 years. As
expected, multipliers are very large in a counterfactual world without labour adjustment
costs. With labour adjustment costs, fiscal multipliers strengthen considerably when
longer time intervals are evaluated. This reflects the fact that labour adjustment costs
introduce a certain sluggishness in the employment response.15
To establish a sense of magnitudes involved, consider the CBO testimony before the
Committee on the Budget of the United States Senate (entitled Policies for Increasing
Economic Growth and Employment in 2012 and 2013 (http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=12437).
This offers CBO estimated output and employment multipliers for an employer payroll
tax cut implemented over fiscal year 2012, considering the cumulative effect of the policy
over the period 2012 to 2013.16 At the two year interval, table 3.2 reports an output
13Note the simulation results in fact allow us to track the simulated response of hours per worker as
well. It is therefore possible to compute employment multipliers taking into account the overall labour
hours response (persons and hours per person). The study focusses on multipliers based on fixed work
hours for two reasons. First, this ensures comparability with CBO methodology. Second, while outside
of the model, to the extent that policy makers attempt to alleviate unemployment (and associated skills
deterioration, crime, health costs) arguably the extensive employment margin should be the focus of
policy evaluation.
14To operationalize these measures, the study uses (2010) US GDP of 14.6 trillion USD and employer
payroll tax revenue of 318 billion USD in steady state. FTE job-years assume a 40 hour work week for
every week of the year.
15To explain this sluggishness, consider the firm response to a tax cut in quarter t. In quarter t,
those firms ex-ante in the hiring range will decide to hire more workers. Some firms ex-ante in the
inactivity range will decide to start hiring. Overall, period t employment rises. In period t + 1, a new
set of firms experience an improvement in business conditions that shift them out of inactivity into the
hiring zone. Again, the tax cut will lead these firms to raise hiring by more than they would in steady
state. Meanwhile, most firms that have hired in period t will retain their workforce since firm business
conditions are persistent. Overall, period t+1 employment (relative to steady state) will exceed the
period t labour market response. It is this effect that translates into sluggish employment response to
policy given labour adjustment costs.
16Notice also that the 2011 tax stimulus proposal on which the CBO bases its estimates only roughly
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1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years
Employment Mult. Adj. costs 45.57 38.52 36.24 35.36 35.10
(1000 USD) No adj. costs 24.61 24.62 24.51 24.47 24.55
Output Mult. Adj. costs 1.29 1.52 1.63 1.67 1.67
No adj. costs 2.36 2.36 2.38 2.39 2.37
Table 3.2: Baseline employer payroll tax cut multipliers evaluated over different horizons
multiplier of 1.52 (meaning that every dollar in tax revenue foregone generates an in-
crease in industry output of 1.52 dollars) and an employment multiplier of 38,520 dollars
(meaning 38,520 dollars in tax revenue are foregone per job created). In comparison, the
CBO reports output multipliers in the (admittedly wide) range of 0.2 to 1.3. Every one
million dollar in tax revenue foregone would create 3 to 13 FTE job-years in the period
2012-2013 (for a tax cut in fiscal year 2012). This compares with an estimate of 26 jobs
created based on the simulations in this study.17’18
Overall, the baseline model multipliers therefore exceed current CBO estimates for
the impact of policy in fiscal year 2012. This result is not surprising, since the partial
equilibrium analysis in this paper makes a range of assumptions (such as wage rigidity
and no policy uncertainty) that create “ideal” conditions for fiscal policy to be effective.
This reflects the aim of the study to provide a transparent analysis of the interaction
between labour adjustment costs and the cost-effectiveness of temporary tax cuts to kick
start the economy.
corresponds to the 50% reduction of the employer payroll tax considered in the model. For a more
detailed discussion of the ‘American Jobs Act”, see appendix B.2.
17Note here the study simply uses the inverse of the cost per job measure from the simulation to
compute jobs per dollar. Strictly speaking, since the numbers reported are expected multipliers, simply
taking the inverse is incorrect. However, for the purposes of this study, it offers a rough sense of
magnitudes.
18While a message of this paper is that fiscal policy interventions cannot all be lumped together, it
is nonetheless informative to briefly compare how these estimates compare with other fiscal multipliers
found in the literature. Hall (2009) reviews existing research. Empirically, he suggests government
spending multipliers in the range of 0.7 to 1. However he acknowledges substantial uncertainty given
currently available estimation strategies. Romer and Romer (2010) for example examine exogenous
changes in tax liability and find a tax multiplier of 3. On the theory front, Real Business Cycle models
typically yield multipliers smaller than 1. But New Keynesian models (especially when monetary policy
does not actively move against the fiscal stimulus such as when nominal interest rates are at the zero
nominal lower bound) can yield multipliers up to 1.7.
81
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
ai,t
l i,t
 
 
Hiring threshold SS
Firing threshold SS
Hiring threshold t=2
Firing threshold t=2
Figure 3.5: Tax cut shifts hiring and firing thresholds
3.2.2 Why Does the Tax Cut Stimulate?
The fact that tax stimulus policy remains effective even in a model in which firms face
substantial hiring and firing costs is striking. Figure 3.5 illustrates this. Effectively,
tax cuts do not move hiring and firing thresholds by much relative to the size of the
inactivity region. The tax stimulus persuades few firms to hire that were not hiring in
the first place. Instead, the tax stimulus raises employment in the model because, at any
given time, many firms are hiring- and marginal tax stimulus will persuade these active
firms to hire more.19
But this shifts the question to the next level. Why are so many firms hiring work-
ers in steady state? Figure 3.6 helps to illustrate the role of two factors by comparing
the baseline employment response to a hypothetical scenario without labour attrition,
a scenario without business condition shocks and a scenario with neither worker quits
nor business condition shocks. Without labour attrition, figure 3.6 shows that the em-
19Technically, the tax cut also persuades firms that are originally firing to fire less (or not at all) by
moving the firing threshold upwards. Since the firm distribution is tilted towards the hiring margin,
firing plays little quantitative role for the simulation results.
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ployment response dampens substantially relative to the baseline. Worker quits skew the
distribution of firms toward the hiring threshold, contributing to a large number of firms
being active in recruiting in steady state. In the absence of worker quits, the tax stimulus
remains effective because idiosyncratic market conditions still shift enough to force firms
to hire and fire workers.
This argument would suggest that idiosyncratic business condition shocks unambigu-
ously contribute to making labour markets responsive to tax stimulus when hiring and
firing costs are large. However, this is not the case as figure 3.6 illustrates. In a hypothet-
ical world in which firms experience worker quits but no idiosyncratic business condition
shocks, employment would be even more responsive to the tax cut than in the base-
line simulation.20 In this case all firms cluster exactly on the hiring threshold in steady
state. In this sense, there are no inactive firms and employment at all firms responds to
a marginal cut in payroll taxes. Only in a hypothetical scenario without idiosyncratic
business condition shocks and without worker quits, is the tax stimulus ineffective. In
steady state, all firms are inside the inactivity region in graph 3.5 and no firms respond
to marginal hiring incentives. The source of the result that payroll tax stimulus remains
effective even in the face of significant labour adjustment costs lies in the interaction
between labour attrition and idiosyncratic business condition shocks.
3.3 Contingent Tax Multipliers
At first sight, the results in section 3.2 suggest that hiring and firing costs, making room
for some quantitative adjustments (perhaps by making labour supply inelastic enough
in a Real Business Cycle setup), can be abstracted from in the study of fiscal policy.
This section shows that this conclusion is not warranted. Introducing labour adjustment
costs yields qualitative insights. The broad thrust of this argument lies in the idea that,
within the class of heterogeneous firm labour demand models considered in this paper,
introducing labour adjustment costs makes the cost-effectiveness of the stimulus program
sensitive to exact tax design. This point is made considering three dimensions of policy
20In fact, responsiveness is very similar to the employment response in figure 3.4 when there are no
labour adjustment costs.
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Figure 3.6: Comparison baseline employer payroll tax cut employment response with
hypothetical scenarios (i) without labour attrition, (ii) without business condition shocks
and (iii) without either labour attrition or business condition shocks
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layout: length of anticipation period, length of the tax cut and macro business cycle
conditions. This offers new insights both for policy makers designing effective stimulus
measures as well as for empirical research on fiscal multipliers.21
This section is subdivided into three parts. Subsections 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 develop
respectively results for tax multiplier contingency on announcement period, length of the
actual tax cut and state of the business cycle.22
3.3.1 The Benefit of Announcements
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show that tax multipliers increase in the announcement period before
the stimulus is implemented. All other parameters of the tax cut follow section 3.2.
Reflecting uncertainty about the actual size of hiring and firing costs, multipliers are
computed for a range of parameter values (including the case of no labour adjustment
costs). In this setting, allowing for a four quarter announcement of the policy change
reduces the baseline cost of creating a full-time job for a year by more than 5.000 USD
(or 18%). Highlighting the role of labour adjustment costs in this anticipation effect, note
that the relation breaks down in the frictionless special case of the model.
To explain this anticipation effect, note that labour adjustment costs make the hiring
and firing decision of firms forward-looking. In effect, the labour force becomes a form
of capital that the firm invests in.23 To illustrate this more clearly, turn to the first
order conditions of the firm problem in section 3.1. The shadow value of employing a
worker in firm i, denoted µit, is given by the present discounted value of profits from the
employment relationship.
µit = Et(
1− λ
1 + r
(α
ait+1(h
i
t+1l
i
t+1)
α
lit+1
− (1 + τt+1)w(hit+1) + µit+1)) (3.3.1)
Firms do not hire if the shadow value is below the proportional cost of hire. They do
21In the wider class of general equilibrium models with fiscal policy, other mechanisms have been
highlighted to generate a link between tax design and fiscal multipliers. However, as will be seen, labour
adjustment costs can yield forces going in directions opposite to some popular stories in this literature.
22Simulations in this section are run over 9 years to fully capture the overall impact of all payroll tax
cuts considered.
23Notice that these two properties would also emerge in a log-linearized model with quadratic input
adjustment costs for the firm. In the context of fiscal policy however, existing general equilibrium models
tend to focus on forward-looking behaviour of consumers (and not firms).
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Figure 3.7: Output multipliers for employer
payroll tax cut depending on announcement
periods
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Figure 3.8: Employment multipliers for em-
ployer payroll tax cut depending on an-
nouncement periods
not fire if the shadow value is above the proportional cost of firing. This logic is formally
reflected in the complementary slackness conditions associated with the firm optimization
solution.24
cp,e ≥ µit; eit ≥ 0; (cp,e − µit)eit = 0 (3.3.2)
µit ≥ −cp,f ; f it ≥ 0; (cp,f − µit)f it = 0 (3.3.3)
It follows that a promise of a future tax cut raises the shadow value of employment
today and encourages more hiring for given firm business conditions. Effectively, the firm
hires today “for free” in the sense that taxpayers are not currently foregoing tax dollars.
This logic also explains why the anticipation effect in figure 3.8 runs into diminishing
returns. As firms plan with a high worker quit rate, tax reductions are discounted in
current decision-making if they occur far into the future. Effectively, this reflects the
substantial likelihood that the newly hired worker will have left the company by the time
the stimulus kicks in.
24In the special frictionless case, note the equilibrium must involve µit = 0. Firms hire and fire up to
the point that marginal productivity equals wage in that period. Only in this special case is the firm
(optimally) myopic in its employment policy.
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3.3.2 Bold Tax Cuts
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show that persistence of the tax cut also raises policy cost-effectiveness.
As in the previous exercise, all other parameters are kept as in section 3.2. The simula-
tions are repeated for a range of labour adjustment costs parameters. For the baseline
parameterisation, the cost of creating an FTE job falls from 42.000 USD to 32.000 USD
(or roughly 24%) as the tax cut period is extended from half a year to two years.
The intuition for this implementation effect follows directly that in the previous sub-
section. Hiring a worker today is an investment - and the associated stream of profits
depends on current as well as future tax costs associated with payroll expenditure. If
payroll tax cuts are extended for longer, hiring becomes more attractive for firms today.
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Figure 3.9: Output multipliers for employer
payroll tax cut depending on implementation
periods
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3.3.3 Procyclical Employment Multipliers
Figures 3.11 and 3.12 consider how tax multipliers depend on the state of the business
cycle. Starting from steady state, the model economy is shocked with a simultaneous x%
fall in macro business conditions shock as well as the temporary tax cut of section 3.2.
Multipliers are computed relative to a recession economy without the tax stimulus.
Surprisingly, the tax multiplier is stronger in booms than in recessions. The reason
for this lies in the fact that adverse market conditions imply that many firms move from
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active hiring into inactivity. Since the number of ex-ante active firms is key for the
effectiveness of the stimulus (see discussion in subsection 3.2.2), fewer jobs are created in
response to the payroll tax cut in recessions.25
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Figure 3.11: Output multipliers for employer
payroll tax cut depending on depth of reces-
sion
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recession
3.4 Extensions
The finding that labour adjustment costs make tax multipliers contingent on specific
tax design has implications for policy makers as well as researchers. This section aims to
discuss two issues raised by these results. First, subsection 3.4.1 offers an important caveat
for researchers that estimate multipliers for a temporary payroll tax cut stimulus using
historical permanent increases in payroll tax associated with social insurance expansion.
Second, subsection 3.4.2 offers a more nuanced perspective on the subsection 3.3.3 result
that payroll tax multipliers can be procyclical.
25Of course, one could imagine a disastrous recession in which demand conditions are so weak that
most firms are actively firing. In this case, tax multipliers would be large, since marginal payroll tax
cuts would persuade firms to fire less. The procyclical tax multiplier must therefore be qualified as a
local result. It applies for reasonably small shocks to market conditions.
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3.4.1 Tax Multipliers from Structural Adjustments and Stimu-
lus
Section 3.3 implies an important caveat for empirical work on employer payroll tax cuts.
Using the tax multiplier estimated using historical payroll tax changes to directly infer
by how much a future payroll tax cut stimulus would help the economy may be seriously
misleading.
Key is that historical tax changes have not been stimulus measures. In the period 1953
to 1990, payroll taxes were increased in a series of steps from 2% to 12.4% in the early
1990s (split in equal measure between employer and employee contributions) to finance
the growing US social security system.26 Legislation concerning payroll tax increases in
this period tended to specify a schedule of future tax increases (as noted in Romer and
Romer (2010): “The 1950 amendments, for example, called for a change in the tax base
in 1952 and for changes in the tax rate in 1954, 1960, 1965, and 1970”). A substantial
fraction of payroll tax changes was therefore announced. Since the tax increases reflected
structural change in the social security system, we can safely assume that they were
largely expected to be permanent. None of the tax increases of 1952-1990 occurred in a
period of recession as deep as the current crisis.
In the language of section 3.3, the historical structural changes in employer payroll
tax cut were thus (largely) announced, bold and occurring in normal business condi-
tions. In contrast, a stimulus employer payroll tax cut, in all likelihood, would be largely
unannounced (in response to a crisis), short term (limited to the next fiscal year) and in
recession. Taking the policy laboratory results in section 3.3 at face value, multipliers
from structural tax changes would be much larger than those associated with stimulus
payroll tax cuts.
To illustrate this point, consider a stylized comparison between (i) a one year unan-
nounced 3% employer payroll tax reduction when the economy is hit by a 3% productivity
shock (“stimulus”) and (ii) a two year 3% payroll tax in normal times that is announced
one year in advance (“structural adjustment”). Figure 3.13 illustrates just how much
stronger the structural adjustment policy impacts employment. Furthermore, 3.14 illus-
26Appendix B.2 proposes a historical summary of the US payroll tax introduction.
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“Stimulus” “Structural Adjustment” Difference
Employment Mult. Adj. costs 38.21 29.39 30.00 %
No adj. costs 24.86 25.81 -3.68%
Output Mult. Adj. costs 1.54 1.94 -20.73%
No adj. costs 2.35 2.19 7.31%
Table 3.3: Multipliers for alternative payroll tax cuts
trates that this result depends almost entirely on the presence of hiring and firing costs.
Table 3.3 reports output and employment multipliers for the interventions confirming this
visual impression. Moreover, the table makes clear that the two policies evaluated would
yield largely similar multipliers in a framework without labour adjustment costs.27
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Overall, the results in this paper suggest that using multipliers associated with his-
torical employer payroll tax changes to directly infer the impact of a future payroll tax
cut stimulus may lead to over-optimistic predictions. Key to this result are the presence
of non-convex labour adjustment costs. Instead, a more promising approach may be to
27Notice that, even in the frictionless comparison simulations, multipliers differ across policy scenarios.
This difference goes in the opposite direction of the overestimation effect due to labour adjustment
frictions. This study attributes this discrepancy to sample uncertainty remaining even though statistics
are averaged over a large number of simulation runs.
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calibrate a structural macroeconomic model (as developed in this paper), to validate it
against its ability to match historical structural payroll tax change multipliers and then
to analyse the impact of a payroll tax cut stimulus within the model framework.
3.4.2 Tax Multipliers in a Heterogeneous Sector Economy
A widely held view is that fiscal policy is countercyclical. On the theoretical front,
Michaillat (2011) uses a search frictions framework to formalize the idea that fiscal mul-
tipliers may be stronger in downturns because labour markets are “slack”. Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011) show fiscal multipliers may be much larger when the econ-
omy is at the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates (implying countercyclical fiscal
multipliers). Empirically, Almunia et al. (2010), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010)
and Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Vegh (2010) find evidence that government spending multipli-
ers may be larger during recessions. However, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010) also
acknowledge that evidence on tax multipliers is less clear cut.
In contrast, one of the results highlighted in section 3.3 has been that labour adjust-
ment costs yield a force towards procyclical multipliers. Intuitively, when firms face weak
demand and are running below capacity (hoarding labour), then tax cuts of reasonable
size cannot persuade them to hire more workers. This result sits uncomfortably with the
current empirical studies - cited above - that find countercyclical government spending
multipliers. Does this mean that the force towards procyclical multipliers highlighted in
this paper is outweighed by other factors that have not been considered explicitly in the
model of section 3.1?
This section proposes a more nuanced perspective. Even if government spending
multipliers are countercyclical, employer payroll tax multipliers may well be procyclical.
The crux of this argument lies in the proposition that government spending stimulus
is directed in large parts towards sectors with low labour adjustment costs (such as
education, transport and infrastructure). In these sectors, labour hoarding in downturns
is less likely to matter. The force towards procyclical multipliers from hiring and firing
costs emerges only for broad-based stimulus measures that encompass sectors with high
labour adjustment costs - such as an employer payroll tax cut. This means that, even
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if government spending multipliers are procyclical, employer payroll tax multipliers may
plausibly turn out to be procyclical.
Allowing for two modifications, the model from section 3.1 can analyse this argument
quantitatively. First, up to this point, the paper has assumed that firms are homogeneous
in labour adjustment costs. In reality, hiring a waiter may be significantly less costly
than training a nuclear scientist. To study the impact of sectoral heterogeneity in labour
adjustment costs, this section therefore introduces two firm-types into the framework.
Firm type 1 faces no labour adjustment costs. Firm type 2 faces hiring and firing costs
equal to a quarterly wage. For scaling, the no friction sector represents ω of the total
workforce in steady state. All other parameter choices reflect calibration in section 3.1.
Second, the model so far has assumed that wage rates do not respond to the stimulus.
In reality, one would expect that an increase in labour demand would put upward pressure
on wages. Furthermore, this demand pressure effect may plausibly be larger in booms
than during downturns (say because workers have more bargaining power in the tight
labour market associated with the boom). Full modelling of equilibrium wage dynamics
is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, this study adopts a quasi-GE approach as
suggested in Bloom (2009). In effect, this paper introduces a wage shifter ct into the
wage equation (yielding modified wage equation 3.4.1) that temporarily “shocks” wages
for the length of the stimulus (announcement and implementation period). To reflect the
difference between normal times and a downturn, the wage shifter raises wages by 1% in
response to the stimulus in normal times and leaves wages unaffected during downturns.
In reduced form, this modification introduces a powerful force towards procyclical fiscal
multipliers.
w(ht) = ctω1(1 + ω2h
γ
t ) (3.4.1)
The experiment considers, as in section 3.2, a temporary employer payroll tax cut
to 3% announced in quarter 1 and implemented for quarters 2 to 5. In scenario 1, the
tax cut occurs in normal times and is broad-based. In scenario 2, the tax cut occurs
in normal times and is narrow (restricted to the low labour adjustment cost sector). In
effect, scenario 2 offers an ad-hoc way of introducing a stimulus policy focussed on sectors
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with low labour adjustment costs (like a government spending stimulus). Scenarios 3 and
4 consider multipliers if the tax cut coincides with a disastrous 10% fall in the business
conditions variable. Figure 3.15 explore how tax multipliers for these four scenarios
evolve as a function of employment share in the high labour adjustment cost sector (ω)
and idiosyncratic business condition volatility.
The graphs show that the wage response to the tax cut in booms makes narrow tax
cuts strongly countercyclical. Broad tax cuts can be procyclical however, if idiosyncratic
business condition volatility is low enough and the employment share of the high labour
adjustment cost sector is large enough. Why? With low idiosyncratic business condition
volatility the distribution of firms in employment space “does not forget quickly.” After
the downturn, many high labour adjustment cost firms move into the labour market
inactivity region and become insensitive to taxes.
3.5 Concluding Discussion
Can a temporary employer payroll tax cut stimulate employment? This paper has shown
that substantial hiring and firing costs in themselves do not imply that such a stimulus
measure is ineffective. Business condition shocks and labour attrition move many firms
close to the hiring threshold. In turn, these firms that are marginal to hiring do respond
strongly to tax cut incentives even if labour adjustment costs are substantial.
The presence of non-convex labour adjustment does however make the labour market
response sensitive to the exact design of the tax cut. For policy makers, this paper
suggests that a cost-effective implementation would include a) pre-announcement of the
policy, b) pledging to keep the tax cut in place for a prolonged period of time and c)
waiting until the economy has left the deepest trough of the recession. Recognizing that
labour adjustment costs differ across sectors, cost-efficiency would also suggest targeting
the tax cut on sectors with low adjustment costs that are relatively more responsive
(especially during downturns).
Of course, in practical policy making, stimulus cost-effectiveness would be only one
criterion used to judge the optimal course of action for government. If the duration
of the recession is uncertain, allowing for an announcement phase of policy may imply
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Figure 3.15: Tax cut multiplier graphs; top to bottom graphs vary firm-level idiosyncratic
productivity volatility (σf = 0.01, σf = 0.03, σf = 0.06); right to left graphs show output
multipliers and employment multipliers; ω denotes share of high labour adjustment cost
sector in economy; scenario 1 is tax cut with focus on low labour adjustment cost sector
in recession (solid line); scenario 2 is tax cut with focus on low labour adjustment cost
sector in normal times (dashed line); scenario 3 is broad tax cut in recession (dotted line);
scenario 4 is broad tax cut in normal times (dash-dot line)
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that stimulus kicks in when the downturn is already over. Bold tax cuts may worsen
fiscal deficits and cause funding problems on the sovereign debt market. Realizing that
legislation on tax cuts is the result of compromise across the political spectrum, bold
measures may simply not be feasible. A case can be made arguing government should
help the people most when the recession is at its worse, even if firms require strong tax
incentives to start hiring then. Targeting stimulus to low-labour adjustment cost sectors
may be more cost-effective in recessions, but this inherently throws up the question
whether such a policy would be fair.
For the empirical study of fiscal multipliers, contingency of tax multipliers offers
an important caveat. The presence of labour adjustment costs means that no unique
tax multiplier exists. The macroeconomic response to stimulus depends on exact tax
design. Estimates of historical tax change multipliers cannot be used to directly infer the
effectiveness of current stimulus proposals.28
This paper is part of a first generation of studies that analyse fiscal multipliers in
heterogeneous firm economies with non-convex labour adjustment costs. For tractability
and transparency, the analysis has therefore considered a baseline with rigid wages and
interest rates. It has abstracted from physical capital accumulation. One the one hand,
these simplifications do reflect presumed short-run rigidities in price and factor adjust-
ment. On the other hand, these modelling assumptions allow this study to highlight the
interaction between non-convex labour adjustment costs and payroll tax stimulus at the
heart of this analysis. The findings in this paper suggest that future work, moving this
framework closer to general equilibrium, could yield further important insights in our
quest for the size of fiscal multipliers.
28One way forward would be to use the empirical historical response to tax changes to calibrate a struc-
tural model of the labour market. One could then use the structural model to infer the stimulus impact
of tax changes with alternative design properties. Such a quantitative approach would require a more
refined modelling environment than the one used in this study (which instead emphasizes transparency
and simplicity).
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Chapter 4
Trader Loss Aversion and Career
Concerns
It is generally difficult to believe that sophisticated financial traders suffer from a be-
havioural bias such as loss aversion. The Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposition
that people have reference-dependent preferences has proven extremely insightful in un-
derstanding people’s every-day decisions. Specifically, it offers an explanation for why
people appear to place special value on avoiding outcomes perceived as loss (relative to
a status quo).1 However, in financial markets, List (2003) argues that learning and selec-
tion effects should ensure that (approximately) standard profit-maximizing preferences
prevail.2 Since sophisticated traders face investment decisions at great frequency and
with high stakes, they have opportunity and incentive to overcome innate behavioural
biases such as aversion to losses. If they do not, then they will be driven out of the market
by others that do focus on profit maximization.3 In sum, sophisticated financial traders
1Key subsequent theoretical contributions to reference-dependent preferences are Tversky and Kah-
neman (1991), Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Koszegi and Rabin (2005). Various empirical tests
of loss aversion in the laboratory and in the field have been conducted since Kahneman and Tversky
(1979). In the laboratory, examples include Thaler et al. (1997) and Gneezy and Potters (1997). In the
field, Camerer et al. (1997) for example find evidence that New York Taxi drivers adjust labor supply
to reach daily income targets. Pope and Schweitzer (2011) suggest that professional golf players are loss
averse. Linked to the notion that reference points matter for behaviour, Mas (2006) shows that policing
performance falls if pay negotiations fail to meet a certain threshold expected by the police force.
2List (2003), List (2004) and List (2011) find evidence for this. Dhar and Zhu (2002) and Calvet,
Campbell and Sodini (2009) show that wealthier households are less likely to display loss aversion in
their portfolio trading decisions.
3The market selection theory in favour of rational agents can be traced back to Alchian (1950). Recent
work (such as Long, Shleifer and Waldmann (1991)) shows conditions under which agents deviating from
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should make trading decisions to maximize expected future (risk-adjusted) profits- and
put no inherent value on whether a sale takes place above the price at which the position
was historically purchased.
However, these theoretical arguments for profit-maximizing trader preferences clash
with empirical evidence suggesting traders do in fact avoid closing trades at a loss.4
Traders are more likely to sell stocks that have appreciated in value since purchase (“win-
ners”) than stocks that have lost in value (“losers”).5 This “disposition effect” has been
documented for professional investors in Israel (Shapira and Venezia (2001)), Finland
(Grinblatt (2001)) and Taiwan (Barber et al. (2007)).6 This paper provides additional
evidence in support of loss averse trading behaviour: the price at which US corporate
bond dealers sell is truncated sharply at purchase price.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a possible resolution of this clash
between theory and empirics. It develops a theory in which traders are profit-maximizing
and yet traders behave as if they were loss averse. No loss averse preferences need to
be postulated to explain why traders that are employed by financial institutions tend to
hold on to losers.
The argument is based on trader career-concerns (in the spirit of Fama (1980) and
Holmstrom (1999)).7 Profit-maximizing financial institutions delegate market-making to
profit-maximizing traders. Traders vary in skill and financial institutions attempt to
infer trader skill from trading history. Key is that skilled traders have superior informa-
tion about the evolution of asset prices. When evaluating a trading opportunity, skilled
traders will sometimes foresee a loss, sometimes a small gain and sometimes a large gain.
They will choose to enter the trade if they foresee a gain. This implies that financial
institutions extract relatively little information about trader skill whether they observe
full rational expectations can in fact survive in the market.
4This evidence has prompted a theoretical literature that explores the consequences of loss aversion
for asset pricing (such as Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001), Barberis,
Huang and Thaler (2006), Yogo (2008), Barberis and Huang (2009)).
5This tendency is especially surprising since tax considerations and momentum in returns create
incentives to sell losers.
6Odean (1998) uses trading accounts at a large discount brokerage house to document the “disposition
effect” for individual investors in the US.
7Important contributions in the career-concerns literature include Scharfstein and Stein (1990),
Zwiebel (1995), Prendergast and Stole (1996). This study differentiates from these papers by show-
ing that career concerns can make closing trades at gain/loss a key endogenous threshold in the trader
retention decision of financial institutions.
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that trades are closed at a small gain or a large gain. Both skilled and unskilled traders
would have entered such a trade. In contrast, a trade closed at loss strongly revises the
financial institution’s prior on trader skill. A skilled trader is unlikely to have entered
such a trade in the first place, making it likely that the employed trader is unskilled.
Endogenously, the number of loss-making trades therefore becomes a key criterion in the
financial institutions’ trader retention strategy (potentially trumping average historical
profits of the trader). Traders (skilled and unskilled) know this and therefore aim to
avoid closing trades at a loss.
To explore this argument formally, this study develops two models that explore two
notions of what it means “to avoid closing trades at a loss”. The first model (model
A) emphasizes that, once a trading position is opened, career concerns make traders
reluctant to resell the position at loss. Instead, they will lean towards holding out until
an opportunity to resell at gain emerges. Career concerns generate a “disposition effect”.
The second model (model B) shows that, even if financial institutions and traders are
risk-neutral, traders worried about their reputation will not open a trading opportunity
that is on expectation profitable if the possibility of incurring a loss is large. Trading
opportunities will be entered only if they are sufficiently attractive to make a loss very
unlikely.
To test a core prediction of this career-concerns hypothesis, this paper turns to
TRACE corporate bond transactions data. This dataset offers some new evidence that
corporate bond dealers are loss averse: the distribution of prices at which dealers resell
assets is truncated sharply at the last observed purchase price. More importantly, it al-
lows to estimate the probability of a trade loss conditional on whether a gain or loss was
realized on the previous trade in that asset. Baseline loss-averse preference models assume
trades are evaluated on a transaction-by-transaction basis (the so-called assumption of
narrow framing), implying that current loss probability is uncorrelated with whether the
previous trade was a gain/loss. In contrast, the career-concerns hypothesis predicts that
the probability of a trade loss is lower if the previous trade was realized as a loss. Intu-
itively, one loss may be due to low skill or pure bad luck. Two losses in a row, however,
substantially move the institution’s prior towards a view that the trader has low skill.
This makes traders especially intent on avoiding multiple trades closed at loss within a
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short period of time. The data appears in line with this prediction of the career-concerns
hypothesis.
This paper contributes to an emerging body of theoretical and empirical work empha-
sizing that delegated trading by institutional investors can have important implications
for asset pricing and corporate finance. For example, Vayanos and Woolley (2011) develop
a theory in which asymmetric information between investors and mutual fund managers
generates momentum and eventual reversal in asset prices. Dasgupta, Prat and Ver-
ardo (2011) show that career-concerns create incentives for mutual fund managers to
herd, generating return persistence. Basak and Pavlova (2011) propose a theory in which
career-concerned mutual fund managers tilt their portfolio towards stocks included in the
benchmark index against which they are assessed.8
Section 4.1 shows that career concerns make traders reluctant to close positions that
are trading at a loss. Reputational concerns can explain a disposition effect for profes-
sional investors. Section 4.2 develops a model in which career concerns make traders
reluctant to enter trading positions that are on expectation profitable for fear of taking
a loss. This effect is magnified if previous trades were closed at loss. Section 4.3 docu-
ments some new empirical evidence that US corporate bond dealers are loss averse. As
predicted by the career concerns mechanism, loss aversion becomes stronger if the trader
has recently realized a trade loss. Section 4.4 offers concluding discussion.
4.1 Exiting Trading Positions and Career Concerns
This section develops a model to show that career concerns can induce a disposition
effect: traders are reluctant to resell a position that they hold at loss. This model is
from hereon referred to as model A. Subsection 4.1.1 presents the setup and equilibrium
concept used. Subsection 4.1.2 shows that with high enough trader firing cost (cf ) a
simple equilibrium emerges that can be transparently specified. Specifically, the solution
exhibits an endogenous disposition effect due to career concerns. Subsection 4.1.3 shows
8Other contributions that highlight the implications of delegated portfolio management for trading
behaviour and asset pricing results include Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Vayanos (2004), Berk and Green
(2004), Dasgupta and Prat (2008), Petajisto (2009), Kaniel and Kondor (2011), He and Krishnamurthy
(2011), Cuoco and Kaniel (2011), Guerrieri and Kondor (2011) and Malliaris and Yan (2012).
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that this endogenous disposition effect generalizes to any model A equilibrium. Subsection
4.1.4 shows that results are robust to an extension of the model in which the financial
institution observes how long traders take before closing asset positions.
4.1.1 Model A Setup
Theoretical analysis in this paper is based on a common general framework. Consider a
two period model (t = {1, 2}) in which a profit-maximizing financial institution delegates
trading in an asset to a profit-maximizing trader. A fraction γ of a unit measure of
candidate traders are skilled (the others are referred to as unskilled), but the financial
institution cannot directly observe trader type. Denote it = 1 if the trader employed at
the start of period t is skilled (and it = 0 otherwise). At the start of period t = 1, nature
assigns a random trader for employment at the financial institution. Each of periods
t = 1, 2 is characterized by two phases: a trading phase and an evaluation phase. In the
trading phase, the trader receives the option of purchasing one unit of the asset at price
pb (he is confronted with a trading opportunity). Before deciding whether to enter the
trade, the skilled trader observes a signal st on resale market conditions. For notation,
denote et = 1 if the trader enters the period t trade (et = 0 otherwise). The trading phase
ends when the asset is resold back on the market at price ps,t. In the evaluation phase
of period t, the financial institution observes period t trading outcomes and updates its
belief on trader skill type. Trader reputation matters for trader remuneration.
Model A completes this general specification along three dimensions. It specifies how
trading positions are closed, the nature of the signal skilled traders receive on the trading
opportunity and how trader remuneration depends on trader reputation. First, model
A assumes that, once a trading position is opened, the trader draws a series of resale
price offers ps,t,j from distribution F (ps,t,j|mt) at cost cs until he accepts to close the
position (where j denotes the jth price offer). Define indicator function xt,j = 1 if the
trade is closed (and xt,j = 0 otherwise) and jt = j if the period t position is closed at the
jth draw.9 Asset market conditions random parameter mt (with associated cumulative
density function G(mt)) is revealed to all trader types once the trade is entered. Second,
9For notational consistency, denote ps,t = jt = 0 if the trade is not entered in period t in the first
place.
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to make the skills gap between trader types especially stark, assume that the signal
received by skilled traders perfectly reveals asset market resale conditions (st = mt).
Third, model A assumes that the financial institution has the option to replace a trader
at cost cf at the end of the period t evaluation phase. Denote r1 = 1 if the trader is
retained in period t = 1 (r1 = 0 otherwise). The fired trader receives outside option o
i
1
and does not re-enter the candidate pool. Whenever the employment relationship ends,
financial institution and employed trader split net trading revenue proportionally (with
fraction ω of trading revenue going to the trader). If the trader is fired after period 1
trading, a new trader is hired from the candidate pool at the start of period 2.10
Figure 4.1 summarizes graphically the sequence of decisions in model A.11 Notice that,
since the game ends after two periods, it is never optimal for the financial institution to
incur the cost of firing the trader in the evaluation phase of period 2. This (trivial) decision
option is therefore suppressed from hereon.12 For the baseline result, assume that the
financial institution observes whether the period t trade is entered and at what price the
trade is eventually closed.13 An extension in subsection 4.1.4 shows that the results are
substantively unaltered once one allows the financial institution to gain information on
how long the trader keeps the trading position open.
Before defining equilibrium, note that the game has five potential player types: skilled
and unskilled traders hired at the start of period 1, skilled and unskilled trader hired at
the start of period 2 as well as the financial institution. To define equilibrium strategies,
10Notice the paper does not solve for the optimal financial contract. Instead, it aims to offer a
simple setting that retains the flavour of real-world employment contracts in the financial industry:
remuneration is largely driven by performance-dependent bonus payments and the firing threat looms
large in the background.
11This decision tree clarifies that the model makes particular timing assumptions that ensure tractabil-
ity. For example, the setup assumes that a trading position has to be closed before an alternative trading
position is opened. This abstracts away from strategic interaction between different open trading posi-
tions. In practice, this assumption may reflect risk limits on trading positions or trader limited attention.
Equally, the model assumes that traders are evaluated by the financial institution only after a trade is
closed. This appears a natural assumption, since it is difficult for an outsider to evaluate whether an
open position trading at loss reflects a good trading idea waiting for prices to realign or a bad trading
idea that a loss-averse trader is reluctant to close. If the trader closes a position at loss, then he reveals
that he also believes the trading idea is bad.
12Alternatively, the results would be unchanged if firms were forced to fire their traders at the end of
period 2.
13Assume that trading profits are only shared between trader and financial institution when the trader
is replaced or the game ends. This ensures that the financial institution cannot infer the number of resale
draws taken by the trader (jt) from period profits received.
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it is useful to introduce additional notation. Specifically, denote strategy functions of
a trader with first superscript i (for type i trader where i = 1 indicates the trader is
skilled and i = 0 otherwise) and second superscript h (where h indicates the period the
trader first has a trading opportunity). Under this notation for example, xi,ht,j denotes an
indicator function that equals 1 if the trader of skill type i with first trading opportunity
in period h accepts to exit a given trading position at the draw j resale price offer in
period t (0 otherwise). After period t trading, denote with µt the updated probability
that the financial institution assigns to the employed trader being skilled.
This is a dynamic game of incomplete information. The study therefore appeals to
the notion of a (weak) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium to study equilibrium play. The
strategies of all players must be optimal given actions of other players and beliefs. Beliefs
must be consistent with Bayes law for any set of actions played with positive probability
in equilibrium. Definition 4.1.1 operationalizes this concept for model A.
Definition 4.1.1. A perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in pure strategies specifies trader
entry strategy functions ei,ht , trader exit stratgies x
i,h
t,j , financial institution trader retention
strategies rt and financial institution beliefs µt such that:
1. The skilled trader hired in period 1 (i = 1, h = 1) makes trade entry decisions
e1,11 (s1) and e
1,1
2 (s2, e1, ps,1, j1) as well as trade exit decisions x
1,1
1,j(ps,1,j,m1) and
x1,12,j(ps,2,j,m2, e1, ps,1, j1) to maximize profits given retention strategy of the financial
institution:
Max
e1,11 ,e
1,1
2 ,x
1,1
1,j ,x
1,1
2,j
E0(ω(ps,1 − pb − j1cs)1(e1 = 1) (4.1.1)
+ω(ps,2 − pb − j2cs)1(e2 = 1, r1 = 1)
+o111(r1 = 0))
2. The unskilled trader hired in period 1 (i = 0, h = 1) makes trade entry deci-
sions e0,11 and e
0,1
2 (e1, ps,1, j1) as well as trade exit decisions x
0,1
1,j(ps,1,j,m1) and
x0,12,j(ps,2,j,m2, e1, ps,1, j1) to maximize profits given retention strategy of the financial
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Figure 4.1: Model A decision tree
103
institution:
Max
e0,11 ,e
0,1
2 ,x
0,1
1,j ,x
0,1
2,j
E0(ω(ps,1 − pb − j1cs)1(e1 = 1) (4.1.2)
+ω(ps,2 − pb − j2cs)1(e2 = 1, r1 = 1)
+o011(r1 = 0))
3. The skilled trader hired in period 2 (i = 1, h = 2) makes trade entry decision e1,22 (s2)
as well as trade exit decision x1,22,j(ps,2,j,m2) to maximize profits given retention
strategy of the financial institution:
Max
e1,22 ,x
1,2
2,j
E0(ω(ps,2 − pb − j2cs)1(e2 = 1)) (4.1.3)
4. The unskilled trader hired in period 2 (i = 0, h = 2) makes trade entry decision
e0,22 as well as trade exit decision x
0,2
2,j(ps,2,j,m2) to maximize profits given retention
strategy of the financial institution:
Max
e0,22 ,x
0,2
2,j
E0(ω(ps,2 − pb − j2cs)1(e2 = 1)) (4.1.4)
5. The financial institution chooses whether to retain the trader r1(e1, ps,1) to maximize
expected trading profits subject to beliefs on trader type employed:
Max
r1
Eˆ0((1− ω)(ps,1 − pb − j1cs)1(e1 = 1) (4.1.5)
+(1− ω)(ps,2 − pb − j2cs)1(e2 = 1)
−cf1(r1 = 1))
6. Financial institution equilibrium beliefs on trader type employed are consistent with
Bayes Law given any observed trading history {e1, ps,1} played with positive proba-
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bility in equilibrium:
µ1 =
Pr(e1, ps,1|i1 = 1)γ
Pr(e1, ps,1|i1 = 1)γ + Pr(e1, ps,1|i1 = 0)(1− γ) if e1, ps,1 equilibrium play
(4.1.6)
Notice model A can be interpreted as reflecting either centralized spot market trading
or over-the-counter search market trading. Under the spot market interpretation, trading
opportunities reflect trading ideas that come to the trader. Once the trader opens a
position, he observes the evolution of spot prices and decides when to close the trade.14
The cost of drawing another sales price cs then reflects the time (risk) cost associated
with exposure to the open position. Under the search market interpretation, a trading
opportunity reflects meeting a counterparty willing to sell the asset. If the trade is entered,
repeated draws from the resale price distribution reflect meeting different potential buyers
with different private asset valuations. The cost of drawing another sales price cs can
then also be interpreted as an effort cost of contacting another counterparty.15
4.1.2 Baseline Equilibrium
This subsection presents a baseline model A equilibrium in which career concerns generate
an endogenous disposition effect. To develop this result, it is natural to proceed by
backward induction and to first solve for period 2 equilibrium. Since the game ends after
period 2, traders face no career concerns. Final period trading behaviour therefore offers
a benchmark against which to subsequently compare the effect of trader career concerns
in period 1.
Period 2 equilibrium: No career concerns
Key to structuring this problem is to realize that an open trading position effectively
represents an infinitely lived option to resell. For the lifetime of the option, traders pay
14Given idiosyncratic draws from the resale price distribution F (.), notice that the model does not
allow for serial correlation in price offers. This assumptions is without loss of generality and the intuition
behind all results would go through qualitatively in more general cases. Effectively, serial correlation
would simply introduce an additional state variable in the decision of the trader at what price to close
an open trading position.
15Of course the (risk) cost story of cs in the spot market interpretation also remains valid once one
views the market through a search market lens.
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a per-period fee cs. The value of the open position (V (m2)) therefore reflects the cost cs
of taking another draw from the resale price distribution as well as the subsequent choice
of whether to exercise the resell option.16’17
V2(m2) = −cs +
∫ p¯s
0
max(V2(m2), ps)dF (ps|m2) (4.1.7)
Once this option value formulation is adopted, optimal period 2 trade exit and entry
decisions follow naturally. The trader (whether skilled or unskilled) resells whenever the
offered resale price exceeds the value of the resell option, yielding optimal resale condition
4.1.8.
xi,h2,j = 1 iff. ps,2,j > V
1
2 (m2) (4.1.8)
A skilled trader enters the trading opportunity whenever purchasing the position
(pb) is cheaper than the option value of the open position given the received signal on the
resale market (V2(m2)). Unskilled traders go through the same thought process. However,
since they do not observe asset resale market conditions, they base their decision on the
unconditional expected option value of the open position. Since results will extend to
period 1, these equilibrium properties are stated in general period t terms in expressions
4.1.9 and 4.1.10.18
e1,ht = 1 iff. V
1
t (mt) ≥ pb (4.1.9)
e0,ht = 1 iff.
∫ m¯
0
V 0t (mt)dG(mt) ≥ pb (4.1.10)
In combination, the arguments 4.1.8 and 4.1.9 imply that skilled traders do not realize
a trading loss in period 2 equilibrium play. Figure 4.2 illustrates this graphically. The
16Notice, as alternative to imposing a fixed cost cs on keeping a position open, one could introduce
traders with a proportional discount factor. All results would go through under this alternative specifi-
cation.
17Technically, the option value of the open position for the trader is ωV (m2). This reflects that the
trader receives only a fraction of trading profits (the rest going to the financial institution that employs
him). The main text considers a rescaled option value expression to simplify notation.
18Notice that this characterization implies that the period 2 trading sub-equilibrium is unique. More-
over, optimal play is independent of the trading and retention outcomes in period 1.
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opportunity
Figure 4.2: A skilled trader does not make a trading loss in period 2
horizontal axis denotes resale price ps,2 and the vertical axis reflects the option value of
an open position given resale market condition m2 is known (V2(m2)). The region below
the thick black line denotes combinations of open position option value and resale price
offers at which a trader accepts to close the position (expression 4.1.8). The region above
the horizontal dashed line denotes market conditions at which the option value of an
open position exceeds its purchase price and skilled traders enter the trade (expression
4.1.9). Trading outcomes, given a skilled trader enters the trade, are therefore always
in the triangle above the horizontal dashed line and below the diagonal thick solid line.
By implication, a skilled trader never records a trading loss in period 2 equilibrium.
Proposition 1 states this result formally.19
Proposition 1. In period 2 of any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of model A, the skilled
trader closes the position at gain if he enters the trade, since:
19A natural first reaction to this threshold result is to ask how the resale threshold occurs at purchase
price pb given that traders expect to incur transaction costs cs. To cover transaction costs, should the
threshold point not be greater than pb? The answer to this question lies in the fact that the trade entry
decision is based on expected value. The trader enters whenever the expected net trade gain exceeds
expected transaction costs. The expected trade gain threshold for skilled trader entry is therefore indeed
positive. However, this concept does not extend to limit the set of realized resale price offers at which
the trader decides to close an open trading position.
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1. any trader closes the trade only if the resale price offer exceeds the option value
(ps,2,j ≥ V (m2))
2. the skilled trader enters the trade only if the option value exceeds purchase price
(V (m2) ≥ pb)
Interestingly, proportional profit sharing ensures that the period 2 privately optimal
equilibrium solution coincides with the socially optimal solution to the trading problem
(in the sense that the financial institution would choose the same trading strategy itself
if it did not have to employ a trader agent to do its bidding). In period 1, private career
concerns of the trader will distort trading decisions away from the profit-maximizing
outcome for the bank.
Proposition 2. Trader equilibrium strategies in period 2 of model A coincide with optimal
per-period trader equilibrium strategies in an alternative game in which traders face no
career concerns (cannot be fired)
Full Equilibrium With Career Concerns
In period 1, the employed trader makes trade entry and exit decisions taking into account
not only within-period trading profits, but also reputational consequences. In order to be
retained for period 2 trading, the trader aims to convince the financial institution that he
is skilled. Denote by ωpii2 expected payoff of trader i for period 2 trading. Then V
i
1 (m1)
denotes the period 1 option value of an open position.
V i1 (m1) = −cs +
∫ p¯s
0
max(V1(m1), ps + (
oi1
ω
− pii2)(1− r1(e1, ps)))dF (ps|m1) (4.1.11)
Notice, in contrast to period 2, this option value is contingent on the trader retention
decision of the financial institution. The employed trader takes into account whether he
will be fired if he closes the trading position at the current resale price offer. Furthermore,
the option value of an open position is type-specific, reflecting that skilled and unskilled
traders may have different outside options and skilled traders have more to gain by staying
employed.
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As in period 2, the traders optimally enter the trading opportunity subject to con-
ditions 4.1.9 and 4.1.10. However, in contrast to period 2, the trade exit decision is
modified. In effect, the trader will reject to exit some resale opportunities where the
offered resale price exceeds the option value of the open position. Reputational concerns
about the future lead the agent to forego some within-period gains. Expression 4.1.12 ex-
presses this mathematically. The wedge (oi1/ω)−pii2 represents the reputational concerns
key to the endogenous disposition effect described in this section.
xi,h1,j = 1 iff. ps,1,j + ((o
i
1/ω)− pii2)(1− r1(e1, ps)) ≥ V1(m1) (4.1.12)
Conjecture now a simple equilibrium in which the financial institution retains the
trader whenever either the trade is not entered (e1 = 0) or the trade is entered and closed
at a gain (e1 = 1 and ps,1 ≥ pb). If the trader closes a trade at loss, he is replaced by a
new candidate for period 2 trading. In this case, figure 4.3 illustrates the effect of career
concerns in period 1. As in figure 4.2, the area under the thick black line identifies resale
price offers at which the trader closes the open position given resale market conditions.
Key is that career concerns generate a kink. Effectively, the trader is reluctant to close
the position at loss because he will then not be retained for period 2 trading. Waiting
longer to sell at gain becomes relatively more attractive. For moderate resale market
conditions, the trader will not accept selling at loss even though he would do so in the
absence of career concerns. There is an endogenous disposition effect.
This reputational effect does not impact trading decisions of a skilled trader. Since he
enters trades only if the option value of the open position (given resale market conditions)
exceeds the price of purchase, his trade exit decision is unaffected by the reputational
threat. The threat of being fired only affects the trade exit decision of unskilled traders
that are considering selling positions at loss.
To support the conjectured retention strategy of the financial institution in equilib-
rium, assume (for a non-trivial) equilibrium that the unskilled trader optimally enters the
trade in period 1. Furthermore, the conditional distribution of resale price offers and the
distribution of market resale conditions has full and finite support. In this case, Bayes
law postulates that the financial institution assigns positive probability to the employed
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Figure 4.3: Unskilled traders are reluctant to realize losses in period 1
trader being skilled whenever the trade is not entered or the trade is entered and closed
at gain. Financial institutions put a zero probability on the period 1 trader being skilled
if they observe that the trade was entered and closed at loss. With high enough firing
costs cf , given trader strategies, the financial institution optimally replaces the trader
after period 1 if and only if the period 1 trade is entered and closed at loss. Proposition
3 summarizes this equilibrium.
Proposition 3. In the baseline version of model A, define
V i1 (m1) = −cs +
∫ p¯s
0
max(V1(m1), ps + (
oi1
ω
− pii2)1(ps < pb))dF (ps|m1) (4.1.13)
V i2 (m2) = −cs +
∫ p¯s
0
max(V2(m2), ps)dF (ps|m2)
pi12 =
∫ m¯
0
max(V 12 (m2)− pb, 0)dG(m2) (4.1.14)
pi02 =
∫ m¯
0
(V 02 (m2)− pb)dG(m2)
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q1(m1) = 1(ps,1 ≥ V 11 (m1) ≥ pb)(
∞∑
j=1
(1−
∫ p¯s
0
1(ps < V
1
1 (m1))dH(ps|m1))j−1) (4.1.15)
q0(m1) = 1(ps,1 ≥ V 01 (m1))(
∞∑
j=1
(1−
∫ p¯s
0
1(ps < V
0
1 (m1))dH(ps|m1))j−1)
µˆ1(e1, ps,1) =

0 if e1 = 1, ps,1 < pb
1 if e1 = 0∫ m¯
0 q
1(m1)γdG(m1)∫ m¯
0 (q
1(m1)γ+q0(m1)(1−γ))dG(m1) > 0 if e1 = 1, ps,1 ≥ pb
(4.1.16)
µ¯ = min
ps,1≥pb,
(µˆ1(e1 = 1, ps,1)) (4.1.17)
assume that,
1. the set of trade outcomes observed by the financial institutions is bounded
• ps,t|mt and mt has support on [0, p¯s] and [0, m¯] where p¯s ∈ <+ and m¯ ∈ <+
2. the outside options of both trader types are not better than staying in the game
oi1
ω
≤ pii2 (4.1.18)
3. entry incentive for unskilled traders is high enough
∫ m¯
0
(V 01 (m1)− pb)dG(m1) ≥ 0 (4.1.19)
4. the costs that financial institutions face in firing a worker are large
µ¯pi12 + (1− µ¯)pi02 ≥ γpi12 + (1− γ)pi02 −
cf
1− ω > pi
0
2 (4.1.20)
then there exists a (weak) perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which:
1. the strategy of the skilled trader hired in period 1 (i = 1, h = 1) is:
e1,1t =
 1 if V 1t (mt) ≥ pb0 if V 1t (mt) < pb ∀t = 1, 2 (4.1.21)
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x1,11,j =
 1 if ps,1,j + (
o11
ω
− pi12)1(ps,1,j < pb) ≥ V 11 (m1)
0 if ps,1,j + (
o11
ω
− pi12)1(ps,1,j < pb) < V 11 (m1)
(4.1.22)
x1,12,j =
 1 if ps,2,j ≥ V 12 (m2)0 if ps,2,j < V 12 (m2) ∀t = 1, 2 (4.1.23)
2. the strategy of the unskilled trader hired in period 1 (i = 0, h = 1) is:
e0,1t = 1∀t = 1, 2 (4.1.24)
x0,11,j =
 1 if ps,1,j + (
o01
ω
− pi02)1(ps,1,j < pb) ≥ V 01 (m1)
0 if ps,1,j + (
o01
ω
− pi02)1(ps,1,j < pb) < V 01 (m1)
(4.1.25)
x0,12,j =
 1 if ps,2,j ≥ V 02 (mt)0 if ps,2,j < V 02 (mt) (4.1.26)
3. the strategy of the skilled trader hired in period 2 (i = 1,h = 2) is:
e1,22 =
 1 if V 12 (m2) ≥ pb0 if V 12 (m2) < pb (4.1.27)
x1,22,j =
 1 if ps,2,j ≥ V 12 (m2)0 if ps,2,j < V 12 (m2) ∀t = 1, 2 (4.1.28)
4. the strategy of the unskilled trader hired in period 2 (i = 0, h = 2) is:
e0,22 = 1 (4.1.29)
x0,22,j =
 1 if ps,2,j ≥ V 02 (mt)0 if ps,2,j < V 02 (mt) (4.1.30)
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5. the financial institution retention rule for the trader is:
r1 =
 0 if e1 = 1, ps,1 < pb1 if otherwise (4.1.31)
6. financial institution belief whether the trader is skilled is given by µˆ1(e1, ps,1)
4.1.3 Equilibrium Property: Endogenous Disposition Effect
There may exist alternative equilibria in which the trader is fired even if the period 1
trade is realized as gain. In these cases, the threat of firing can lead the skilled trader to
avoid closing trades at such prices, sustaining equilibrium beliefs and financial institution
retention strategy. However, it is possible to characterize some general properties of
any model A solution. Specifically, any model A equilibrium exhibits an endogenous
disposition effect. Proposition 4 summarizes these results.
Proposition 4. In the baseline version of model A, assume that,
1. the outside options of both trader types are not better than staying in the game
oi1
ω
≤ pii2 (4.1.32)
2. the costs that financial institutions face in firing are not too large
γpi12 + (1− γ)pi02 −
cf
1− ω > pi
0
2 (4.1.33)
3. there exist bad enough market conditions
• ps,t|mt and mt has support on [0, p¯s] and [0, m¯] where p¯s ∈ <+, p¯s > pb and
m¯ ∈ <+
• f(ps,t = 0|mt = 0) = 1
then any (weak) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of model A satisfies,
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1. the skilled trader never resells at a loss
x1,1t,j = 1 only if ps,t,j ≥ pb (4.1.34)
2. in period 1, the financial institution fires the trader if a loss is realized
r1 = 0 if e1 = 1, ps,1 < pb (4.1.35)
3. in period 1, the unskilled trader behaves loss averse
∃{m∗, p∗s} ∈ {m, ps|ps < pb;x01,j(m, ps,) = 0; x02,j(m, ps,) = 1} (4.1.36)
{m, ps|ps < pb;x01,j(m, ps,) = 1; x02,j(m, ps,) = 0} = ∅ (4.1.37)
Intuitively, the skilled trader never enters trades if the purchase price exceeds the
value of an open position. No trader closes a position if the value of the open position
exceeds the resale price offer. It follows that a skilled trader does not close a position at
loss. If firing costs are not too large, the financial institution therefore fires the trader if
a loss is realized in period 1. This makes unskilled trader reluctant to realize loss-making
trades. Appendix C.1 provides a formal proof for proposition 4.
It should be noted that the baseline equilibrium discussed in the previous section
relied on the notion that firing costs are “large enough”. This ensured the existence of
an especially clean and simple solution to the model that is useful for initial discussion.
In contrast, the equilibrium properties discussed in this subsection do not rely on this
assumption. Specifically, this implies that the endogenous loss aversion result does not
require “high enough” firing costs.
4.1.4 Extension: Signal on Trader Holding Period
The baseline version of model A assumes that the financial institution does not observe
how long the trader waits before closing an open position. In practice, this assumption
appears unrealistic. Employers can learn about trader type if they observe that a trading
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position is not closed for a long time, suggesting that a bad trader is stuck with a bad
trading decision and is “fishing” to resell at a gain. Key is however that revelation is not
perfect. A good trader that enters a fundamentally attractive trading opportunity may
also take considerable time selling the position if he is unlucky and he receives a series of
bad resale price offers.
To show that the baseline equilibrium in proposition 3 is robust to relaxing this
assumption, assume that the financial institution observes signal jˆt on the number of
resale draws jt taken by the period t trader. In this case, appendix C.2 shows that an
equilibrium of the same form as proposition 3 emerges.
Proposition 5. In a version of model A in which the financial institution observes a
finite partition signal on the number of resale draws taken by the trader in period t (jˆt =
k(j) : j 7→ {1, 2, ..., N}), there exists an equilibrium of the same form as proposition 3.
4.2 Opening Trading Positions and Career Concerns
Section 4.1 developed one manifestation of career concerned trader loss aversion: em-
ployees are reluctant to resell open asset position at a loss. In practice however, traders
may also pursue a complementary strategy. Traders may choose to be selective in en-
tering trades in the first place, only accepting trading opportunities that look attractive
enough to make an eventual loss very unlikely. This section explores this alternative
manifestation of trader loss aversion.
In model A, reluctance to enter profitable trades is not present by construction. Skilled
traders can perfectly discriminate between trading opportunities and they can there-
fore avoid entering loss-making trades with certainty. Unskilled traders cannot discrimi-
nate between trading opportunities, implying they cannot choose to enter only attractive
trades. To introduce reluctance to enter profitable trades, this section therefore develops
model B. Effectively, this setup builds on the general framework underlying model A,
but it assumes that skilled traders receive an imperfect signal about asset market resale
conditions.
Once this (realistic) assumption is introduced, a core prediction of the career concerns
mechanism for loss aversion emerges: loss aversion increases in the number of previous
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trade losses. Intuitively, one loss might be interpreted as a skilled trader having a bad
day. Two losses in a row substantially move the institution’s posterior towards the belief
that the employed trader is unskilled. Because traders know this, they particularly avoid
taking a loss after a recent string of losses.
Subsection 4.2.1 presents the setup and equilibrium concept used. Subsection 4.2.2
develops the equilibrium. It shows that traders pass out on profitable trading opportuni-
ties because they are worried about taking a loss. This trading reluctance effect becomes
more severe if the previous trade is closed at loss.
4.2.1 Model B Setup
Model B builds on the same general framework as model A. The model consists of two
periods. Each period has a trading phase and an evaluation phase. In the trading phase,
the employed trader receives a trading opportunity that he can decide to enter. In the
evaluation phase, the reputation of the trader is linked to remuneration.
However, model B differs on how this general framework is closed. First, model B
focusses on the trade entry decision of traders (and not on the trade exit decision that is
vital to model A). It therefore assumes that, once a trade is entered, the trader receives
a resale price ps,t drawn from the distribution with cumulative density function F (ps,t).
The trader is forced to close the position at this resale price. Second, model B makes
the (realistic) assumption that skilled traders receive only an imperfect signal about the
attractiveness of the period t trading opportunity. Particularly, assume the signal st
equals the actual resale price in period t plus noise (st = ps,t + t where t has associated
cdf H(.)). Third, following Prendergast and Stole (1996), model B assumes that trader
per-period wage is directly linked to trader reputation at the end of that period. In
reduced form, this arrangement reflects the idea that traders with a good reputation face
high outside options. They can therefore leverage their bargaining position during wage
negotiations with their employer. To be able to solve the model transparently, assume
(as in Prendergast and Stole (1996)) that the trader maximizes current period payoff in
every period.20 Figure 4.4 summarizes the decision tree in model B.
20This eliminates one layer of strategic thinking in the model. Effectively, the trader does not take
into account that his trading decisions in period 1 affects his reputation not only during the evaluation
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Figure 4.4: Snapshot of general framework game from the perspective of the financial
institution
As in model A, this game is solved using the concept of a (weak) Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium. Definition 4.2.1 operationalizes this for model B. Since traders are not
replaced after period 1, model B has only three player types: a skilled trader, an unskilled
trader and the financial institution. Since there is no exit decision, optimal trader strategy
reduces to specifying under what conditions the period t trading opportunity is entered.
Assume trader reputation enters linearly (with parameter coefficient a) into per-period
remuneration.
Definition 4.2.1. A perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in pure strategies specifies trader
entry strategy functions eit and financial institution beliefs µt such that:
1. The skilled trader (i = 1) makes trade entry decisions e11(s1) and e
1
2(s2, e1, ps,1) to
maximize per-period profits given financial institution belief on trader type:
Max
e11
E1(ω(ps,1 − pb)1(e1 = 1) + aµ1) (4.2.1)
phase of period 1 but also during the evaluation phase of period 2. The cost of this approach is that the
model is not fully rational in the conventional sense of the word used in the context of expected utility
maximization. The trader is rational in the sense that he acts to maximize the posited objective function
faced in the given period. The benefit of this assumption is simplicity and transparency.
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Max
e12
E1(ω(ps,2 − pb)1(e2 = 1) + aµ2) (4.2.2)
2. The unskilled trader (i = 0) makes trade entry decisions e01 and e
0
2(e1, ps,1) to max-
imize per-period profits given financial institution belief on trader type:
Max
e01
E0(ω(ps,1 − pb)1(e1 = 1) + aµ1) (4.2.3)
Max
e02
E0(ω(ps,2 − pb)1(e2 = 1) + aµ2) (4.2.4)
3. Financial institution equilibrium beliefs on trader type employed are consistent with
Bayes Law given any observed trading history played with positive probability in
equilibrium:
µ1 =
Pr(e1, ps,1|i1 = 1)γ
Pr(e1, ps,1|i1 = 1)γ + Pr(e1, ps,1|i1 = 0)(1− γ) (4.2.5)
if e1, ps,1 equilibrium play
µ2 =
Pr(e1, e2, ps,1, ps,2|i1 = 1)γ
Pr(e1, e2, ps,1, ps,2|i1 = 1)γ + Pr(e1, e2, ps,1, ps,2|i1 = 0)(1− γ) (4.2.6)
if e1, e2, ps,1, ps,2 equilibrium play
4.2.2 Model B Solution: Reluctance to Enter Profitable Trades
The study takes advantage of the per-period profit maximization simplification and solves
for period 1 and 2 equilibrium sequentially. The key link between action in the two
periods is trader reputation. The trading outcome in period 1 affects the reputation that
the trader has at the start of period 2. In turn, traders take account of their starting
reputation when formulating period 2 trading decisions.
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Period 1 Equilibrium: Reluctance To Enter Profitable Trades
Notice that the model B signal st on trading opportunity has a natural interpretation: the
higher the value of the signal, the more attractive is the trade. Based on this intuition,
posit therefore a period 1 equilibrium in which the skilled trader follows a threshold
strategy. He enters the trade whenever the signal exceeds a threshold κ1.
e11 =
 1 if s1 ≥ κ10 otherwise ∀t = 1, 2 (4.2.7)
Conditional on the period 1 trader being skilled, the joint probability of observing a
period 1 trade closed at ps,1 depends on the likelihood that that resale price is drawn
from the resale distribution as well as the likelihood that the skilled trader enters the
trade. Given the posited threshold strategy for skilled trader entry, this joint probability
can be re-expressed as:
Pr(ps,1, s1 ≥ κ1|i1 = 1) = Pr(1 ≥ κ1 − ps,1|ps,1, i1 = 1)Pr(ps,1) (4.2.8)
= (1−H(κ1 − ps,1))f(ps,1) (4.2.9)
Posit now that the unskilled trader enters the period 1 trading opportunity. Using
Bayes law, posterior belief about trader type consistent with these equilibrium strategies
is given by equation 4.2.10. If the period 1 trade is not entered, then the institution
knows the trader is skilled. If the trade is entered, then it becomes more likely that the
trader is unskilled the lower the resale price ps,1. Effectively, for low ps,1 it is unlikely that
a skilled trader would receive a signal above the κ1 threshold. Therefore, it is unlikely
that the skilled trader would have entered such a trade in the first place.
µ1 =

γ(1−H(κ1−ps,1))
γ(1−H(κ1−ps,1))+1−γ if e1 = 1, ps,1
1 if otherwise
(4.2.10)
Assume that the noise term t in the signal received by the skilled trader is normally
distributed. Then figure 4.5 shows how posterior belief µ1 responds to realized period
1 sales price. This makes two points. First, the higher the sales price, the higher the
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p_{s,1}-kappa_{1}
gamma
mu_{1}
0
Figure 4.5: Period 1 posterior belief as function of realized sales price; imprecise signal
(dashed line), medium signal (dotted line), precise signal (solid line)
posterior belief that the employed trader is skilled. Intuitively, it is very unlikely that
a skilled trader would have received a signal above the threshold κ1 if the realized sales
price is low. Since the trade was entered, the employed trader is very likely to be an
unskilled one. Second, the lower the variance of the noise in the signal received by skilled
traders, the more the posterior belief becomes a step function around κ1. If κ1 is close
to pb (and we show below this is the case when the noise variance is low), then posterior
beliefs effectively conclude the trader is unskilled if the trade is closed at loss. Their prior
is not moved if the trade is closed at gain. In this sense, the reputational concerns of
the trader in this conjectured equilibrium approximate concerns about whether the trade
will be closed at loss if entered.
Using posterior beliefs 4.2.10, one can re-express the expected payoff of a skilled trader
from entering the period 1 trade. The higher the signal on resale price, the greater the
expected trading profit from entering (differentiation shows ∂pi1e,1/∂s1 > 0).
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pi11,e=1(s1) = E1(ps,1 − pb + a(
γ(1−H(κ1 − ps,1))
γ(1−H(κ1 − ps,1)) + 1− γ )|s1) (4.2.11)
= s1 − pb + aE1( γ
γ + 1−γ
1−H(κ1−s1−1)
) (4.2.12)
In contrast, not entering the trading opportunity implies foregoing the possibility of a
trading gain. The reputation of the trader improves however, since he reveals himself as
skilled (given posited equilibrium strategies). Expression 4.2.13 denotes the period payoff
from not entering the trade.
pi11,e=0 = a (4.2.13)
Comparing expressions 4.2.11 and 4.2.13, it follows naturally that the skilled trader
entry strategy is indeed a cut-off function. The skilled trader enters if the signal s1 is
large enough. The cutoff κ1 denotes the signal s1 for which the skilled trader is indifferent
between entering or not entering the period 1 trade (pi1,e=1(κ1) = pi1,e=0). This yields
closed form expression 4.2.14 for the threshold κ1.
κ1 = pb + a(1−
∫
(
γ
γ + 1−γ
1−H(−1)
)dH(1)) (4.2.14)
To ensure that the posited entry strategy of the unskilled trader is optimal, notice that
expected payoff from entering and not entering are identical to the skilled trader except
for the fact that skilled traders condition expectations on the signal s1. Assuming that the
unconditional expected profit from entering the trade is large enough (a < E1(ps,1 − pb))
is sufficient to ensure that the unskilled trader optimally enters in period 1. Then the
conjectured strategies for skilled and unskilled traders are indeed a period 1 equilibrium
of model B.
Expression 4.2.14 is key to understanding in what sense traders in model B are re-
luctant to enter profitable trades. A period 1 trade is profitable on expectation for the
skilled trader whenever s1 > pb. Hence the trader will decline profitable trades (those
linked with signals κ1 > s1 > pb). To understand the source of this result, it is useful to
break up the κ1 expression in two components (expression 4.2.15). The first component
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is an entry effect. By entering, the trader foregoes not entering and revealing himself to
be a skilled trader. The second component is a trade loss effect. By entering, the trader
exposes himself to closing the trade at loss and making the institution believe that he is
in fact unskilled. Both factors mean that equilibrium trade entry by the skilled trader
occurs only if the resale market conditions signal st is sufficiently attractive.
κ1 = pb + a(1− γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entry effect
+ a(γ −
∫
(
γ
γ + 1−γ
1−H(−1)
)dH(1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Trade loss effect
(4.2.15)
Loss Averse Behaviour Increasing In Recent History Of Losses
In period 2, the model can be solved for equilibrium along the same lines as the approach
used in period 1. The trade entry decision of the skilled trader is again governed by a cut-
off decision. Crucially, however, period 2 beliefs about trader type depend on equilibrium
play observed in both periods 1 and periods 2. The cut-off κ2 becomes a function of
trading outcomes in period 1:
κ2 =
 pb + a(1−
∫
( γ(1−H(2))(1−H(κ1−ps,1))
γ(1−H(2))(1−H(κ1−ps,1))+(1−γ))dH(2)) if e1 = 1, ps,1
pb if otherwise
(4.2.16)
Notice now κ2 falls in the period 1 profitability of the trade (if the trade is opened).
Why? Effectively, a less profitable period 1 trade moves the institution’s prior towards the
fact that it is employing an unskilled trader. This makes period 2 beliefs more sensitive
to additional information that points towards the trader being unskilled. Traders know
this and an unprofitable trade in period 1 makes them especially averse to taking an
unprofitable trade in period 2.
Proposition 6 summarizes the equilibrium:
Proposition 6. In model B, define:
κ1 = pb + a(1−
∫
(
γ(1−H(−1))
γ(1−H(−1)) + 1− γ )dH(1)) (4.2.17)
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κ2 =
 pb + a(1−
∫
( γ(1−H(−1))(1−H(κ1−ps,1))
γ(1−H(−1))(1−H(κ1−ps,1))+(1−γ))dH(2)) if e1 = 1, ps,1
pb if otherwise
(4.2.18)
assume that trading opportunities are on average attractive enough:
Et(ps,t − pb) > a (4.2.19)
then there exists a (weak) perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which:
1. the entry strategy of the skilled trader is:
e1t =
 1 if st ≥ κt0 otherwise ∀t = 1, 2 (4.2.20)
2. the entry strategy of the unskilled trader is:
e0t = 1∀t = 1, 2 (4.2.21)
3. financial institution belief whether the trader is skilled is given by:
µˆ1 =

γ(1−H(κ1−ps,1))
γ(1−H(κ1−ps,1))+1−γ if e1 = 1, ps,1
1 if otherwise
(4.2.22)
µˆ2 =

γ(1−H(κ2−ps,2))(1−H(κ1−ps,1))
γ(1−H(κ2−ps,2))(1−H(κ1−ps,1))+(1−γ) if e1 = 1, e1 = 2, ps,1, ps,2
1 if otherwise
(4.2.23)
4.3 Empirical Evidence from Corporate Bond Deal-
ers
The corporate bond market offers empirical support for the trading theory developed
in this paper. Given the over-the-counter structure of this market, the typical trade
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involves an investor (say Fidelity) trying to sell a bond position. He contacts a dealer
(say Goldman Sachs). The dealer purchases the position and subsequently contacts other
investors in the market until another investor buyer for the position is found (say Allianz
Group) and the asset is resold. The dealer thus effectively takes the position of a trader
in the theory developed in this paper. He is an agent employed by a financial institution
to trade. He receives trading opportunities and decides whether to take a position given
the purchase price. Having opened a position, he samples resale prices offered by different
counterparties in the market until he chooses to close the trade.21
Traditionally, transactions in this market have been shrouded in secrecy. However,
since 2002, the National Association of Security Dealers (NASD) requires its members
to report transactions using the Trade Reporting And Compliance Engine (TRACE).22
Since October 2008, the reporting system also identifies publicly whether the reporting
dealer acts as buyer or seller on a given transaction (or whether the transaction is inter-
dealer). The corporate bond market therefore offers a natural opportunity to analyse the
properties of trader gains and losses.
In practice, to develop a dataset of dealer trade outcomes, this study takes two steps.
First, the raw transactions data is cleaned following the procedure in Dick-Nielsen (2009)
(also used in Feldhuetter (2012)). This involves deleting duplicates, applying trade sub-
mission corrections and cancellations. Outlier buy and sell transactions at extreme prices
(relative to other reported transaction prices) are eliminated. In a second step, the
TRACE dataset based on reported individual transactions has to be transformed into a
set of round-trip trade observations (linking trade entry and exit price). A given dealer
sale is therefore linked to the previous observed dealer purchase for that asset. Trade
gain/loss is computed as the percentage difference between dealer sell price and purchase
price. To raise the likelihood that the two linked transactions in fact constitute a round-
trip trade, observations are limited to cases in which the two transactions occur on the
same trading day.
The key issue with this approach to linking transactions is that TRACE does not allow
21For a good institutional overview of the corporate bond market, see Bessembinder and Maxwell
(2008).
22In February 2005, NASD announced 99% coverage of corporate bond transactions in TRACE. See
the following news announcement: http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2005/P013274.
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to verify whether the morning purchase transaction is executed by the same dealer as
the afternoon sell decision. Bessembinder and Maxwell (2008) provides some justification
for this approach by observing that “except for the largest and most actively traded
bonds, only a few dealers (including the investment bank or the syndicate that originally
underwrote the bond issue) typically “make a market”- that is actively buy and sell a
particular bond issue.” Coupled with the fact that bond trading is infrequent, it follows
that a dealer buy report in the morning and a dealer sell report in the afternoon are likely
to be originated by the same dealer as part of a round-trip trade.23’24 The ultimate test
for the linking procedure however are the empirical results below. If the linking procedure
ends up merging unrelated transactions, then no patterns should emerge in the resulting
trade gains/losses dataset. As seen below, in fact the trade dataset yields strong patterns
consistent with career-concern induced loss aversion in traders.25
The constructed trade dataset spans trading years 2009 and 2010, containing 364.274
trades for 16.402 bonds. The average transaction gain is 1.69% (with one standard
deviation of 2.48).26 On average, it takes 72 minutes to do a trade.
23Concerning low deal trading frequency, Bessembinder and Maxwell (2008) report the following statis-
tics from Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007): “individual bond trades did not trade in 48 percent of
days in their 2003 sample, and ... the average number of daily trades in an issue, conditional on trading,
is just 2.4.”
24In practice, one often observes in TRACE that a dealer buys an asset position in the morning. In the
afternoon of the same day, TRACE then records an inter-dealer transaction for the same asset volume,
followed within a few minutes by a dealer selling the same asset to a customer. The algorithm used in
this dataset to compute a trade would compare the dealer purchase price in the morning with the dealer
sale price in the afternoon. A natural interpretation of this type of pattern is that dealer A purchases the
asset from a seller in the morning. Dealer B then identifies a potential buyer, purchases the asset from
dealer A and immediately resells the asset to the buyer. In this case, the morning buy and afternoon sell
do not originate from the same dealer. Nonetheless, it appears natural to use the price information from
these two transactions to learn about trade gains/losses. If dealer A trades subject to career concern
induced loss aversion and dealer B charges a (small) mark-up on his intermediation service, then the
difference between morning buy price and afternoon sell price is a good proxy for the trade gain/loss of
dealer A.
25One approach to tightening the link between purchase and sell transactions further would be to only
consider trades in which purchase and sale volume coincide. However, in practice, limiting attention
to this subset of trades severely reduces sample size. Studying TRACE transaction patterns offers a
potential explanation for this. It appears that dealers often purchase large lots and then resell them by
parcelling them up into several smaller resale transactions.
26In line with findings in the previous empirical literature (Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007)), the
average transaction gain falls dramatically with volume of assets sold. A natural explanation for this
finding is the notion that retail investors have less bargaining power than institutional investors. Duffie,
Garleanu and Pedersen (2005) develop a search and matching model that formalizes this notion (see also
Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen (2007)).
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4.3.1 Truncation of Trading Profits Distribution
Two features stand out in the resulting histogram of trade gains/losses (figure 4.6). There
is a spike of trades for which buy and sell prices nearly coincide as well as a truncation
of trade gain/losses at the break-even mark.
The spike of trades at the break-even mark reflects so-called agency trades. In these
trades, a customer that wants to sell calls the dealer. The dealer then contacts other
customers until a buyer is found. Once counterparties are established, the dealer exe-
cutes the transaction (first purchasing the asset from the customer that wants to sell
and then immediately selling the asset to the customer that wants to buy). Since the
terms of the purchase and sale are pre-agreed, in such trades the dealer takes no bal-
ance sheet risk and collects only a small price mark-up fee. Reflecting that principal
trades (in which dealers do take on balance sheet risk) make up 92% (FINRA report:
”http://www.finra.org/Industry/Compliance/MarketTransparency/TRACE/p011447”) of
transactions in the corporate bond market, the theory in this paper does not speak to
these agency trades.
Support for a core prediction of the theory developed in this paper comes from the
truncation of the trade gain/loss distribution at the break-even point. Compared to
standard asset pricing theory, it appears that traders make purchase and sale decisions
by putting special weight on avoiding losses.27 This is consistent with the career concerns
theory developed in this paper. Traders aim to avoid closing trades at loss by only
entering trades that are very unlikely to end in a loss or by “fishing”- holding on to open
positions until the opportunity to resell at gain emerges.
Figure 4.7 shows that this truncation result persists if one considers only trades that
are closed after several hours. This speaks against two alternative stories. First, the
dataset may reflect more agency trades than the 8% reported in the 2004 ”http://www.finra.org/Industry/Compliance/MarketTransparency/TRACE/p011447””FINRA
report”. Second, dealers may have a very good notion of eventual resale price when en-
tering the trade (effectively, most traders are of the skilled type in model A). Either of
these stories would predict that dealers only enter trades that they eventually close at
gain. Both theories would however also predict that the truncation result should disap-
27A natural baseline model of dealer trade gains/losses without career concerns is represented by the
period 2 model A equilibrium outcome.
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of dealer trade gains/losses
pear for that subset of trades that are closed after a prolonged period of time (several
hours). Presumably, such long-horizon trades are unlikely to be pre-arranged and, if they
are not pre-arranged, it would be difficult for the dealer to forecast resale prices at time
of position purchase.28
Figure 4.8 provides suggestive evidence that this truncation in resale prices is at least
in part due to a disposition effect. The time-to-sale increases substantially for trades that
sell at loss (especially for the upper quantiles). This is consistent with traders ‘fishing’
for a counterparty until they can resell at gain. Regression 4.1 confirms that this result
is statistically significant.
4.3.2 Dynamic Effect of Trading Loss
The truncation result in subsection 4.3.1 is consistent with the career concerns story
developed in this paper. However, it could also reflect two natural alternative factors.
First, Green, Hollifield and Schuerhoff (March 2007) report similar trade gain/loss distri-
butions for dealers in the municipal bond market (high expected return, low frequency of
28Another objection to these two alternative stories are the large expected trade gains reported in this
section. It is hard to believe that such high expected returns (for an average holding period of little more
than an hour) from market-making can persist if dealers do not take on substantial balance sheet risk in
the process.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES time time time time
loss 8.519*** 4.166*** 3.832*** 3.575***
(0.648) (0.651) (0.649) (0.649)
liqu month -0.352***
(0.0165)
Constant 70.90*** 71.15*** 63.19*** 68.64***
(0.155) (0.148) (0.845) (0.883)
Observations 290,274 290,274 290,274 290,274
R-squared 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.008
Number of id 8,419 8,419 8,419
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.1: Regression: ‘losers’ take longer to sell
loss-making trades, a distribution skewed towards gains). Their explanation for this phe-
nomenon relies on dealer bargaining power. Dealers lower purchase prices below average
market price when facing customers especially eager to sell. This skews the distribution
of trade gains/losses towards gains.29 Second, the truncation result may simply reflect
the behavioural hypothesis that traders have loss averse preferences.
This section therefore tests for an implication of the career concerns theory not di-
rectly shared with these other alternatives. Specifically, note that the career concerns
mechanism suggests that loss aversion becomes stronger after a recent string of losses.
Why? The trader can blame one loss on bad luck. However, a string of losses is likely
to lead the financial institution to exclude bad luck and instead believe that the trader
is unskilled. Section 4.2 illustrates this effect explicitly in the trade entry decision of the
trader. In contrast, theories of loss averse preferences or dealer bargaining power do not
naturally predict a dynamic relationship between trading outcomes.30
29Consistent with the notion that dealers have much less bargaining power when facing large institu-
tional traders, they report that mean, variance and loss frequency of dealer trade gains fall when the par
value of trades increases. However, they also report that a “high level of skewness in the mark-ups per-
sists for all trade sizes.” These results are broadly replicated in the corporate bond dataset of this study.
Moreover, the truncation of trade gain/loss at the break-even mark remains a salient visual feature when
restricting attention to large trades.
30Coval and Shumway (2005) find that Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) proprietary traders take
more risk in the afternoons if they have taken trading losses in the morning session. To explain this
finding, they suggest that traders have loss averse preferences defined over end-of-day trading profits.
This would also introduce a dynamic element into trade-by-trade loss probabilities - however it would
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES loss loss loss loss loss
L.loss 1 4 -0.00382*** -0.00450*** -0.00491*** -0.00504*** -0.00539***
(0.00123) (0.00125) (0.00125) (0.00125) (0.00125)
L.loss 2 4 -0.00808*** -0.00904*** -0.00940*** -0.0100***
(0.00252) (0.00253) (0.00254) (0.00254)
L.loss 3 4 -0.0204*** -0.0216*** -0.0223***
(0.00550) (0.00551) (0.00551)
L.loss 4 4 -0.0396*** -0.0408***
(0.0130) (0.0130)
liqu month -0.000475***
(4.79e-05)
Constant 0.0497*** 0.0499*** 0.0500*** 0.0500*** 0.0577***
(0.00269) (0.00269) (0.00269) (0.00269) (0.00280)
Observations 281,855 281,855 281,855 281,855 281,855
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Number of id 6,798 6,798 6,798 6,798 6,798
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.2: Regression of dynamic loss aversion
To construct a measure of recent trading history, the study constructs a variable
that counts the number of losses among the previous four trades. It then creates four
dummy variables depending on whether there was one loss, two losses, three losses or four
losses. The baseline specification then analyses how a recent history of losses affects the
probability of observing a loss in the subsequent trade (regression results in table 4.2).
As seen, the probability of observing a loss falls from about 5% to less than 1% if the
previous four trades were losses (regression four). These regressions are consistent with
the view that traders behave more loss averse if they have recently experienced a string
of losses.
A simple regression of a loss dummy on the history of recent losses could reflect
learning in liquidity clusters. After a long period without trades, the first trade of the
dealer is likely to end up as a loss because the dealer cannot assess the current resale
not explain the regression results in this paper. A daily loss aversion target would suggest that morning
losses are more likely to result in afternoon losses (traders gamble for resurrection and increase risk in
the afternoon). Such a theory would also not explain the truncation of trade-by-trade resale prices at
last observed purchase price.
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market price distribution. Because trading opportunities are clustered, the dealer learns
from the first trade about market conditions and becomes much more adept at avoiding
trading losses in subsequent trades of the same liquidity cluster.
To provide some evidence against this learning story alternative, the final regression
in 4.2 adds a proxy for recent liquidity (the number of trades observed in the previous
month). As predicted, greater liquidity lowers the probability of observing a loss-making
trade. It presumably reflects that traders are better able to ex-ante evaluate the trading
opportunity if they have recently been in touch with buyers and sellers. Once inside the
trade, a counterparty for the position can be found quickly since many traders are active.
However, even controlling for intensity of recent trading activity, the main result remains:
recent trading losses substantially lower the probability of observing trading losses in the
near future.
4.4 Concluding Discussion
This paper shows that career concerns can lead rational profit-maximizing traders to
exhibit loss aversion. Fear of realizing a loss makes them reluctant to enter trades that
are profitable on expectation. Once they hold a position that is trading at a loss, they
are reluctant to close the trade. Key is that loss realizations send especially powerful
signals about trader skill to employers. Corporate bond dealer transactions data offers
some empirical evidence consistent with this story.
To conclude, this section discusses three natural questions that arise from this career
concerns theory of loss aversion: in what situations is it most likely to apply? What does
it imply for the literature on loss averse preferences? And finally, how should trading
floors be organized to avoid the decision-distorting effects of trader career concerns?
4.4.1 Where Does this Career Concerns Theory Bite?
Three ingredients are central to the career-concerns mechanism developed in this paper.
First, traders must have some discretion over when to enter and when to exit trading
positions. Second, some traders must have an edge over others in evaluating trading
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opportunities. Third, traders must care about how trading losses impact on their repu-
tation.
At first sight, this suggests that the theory does not bite in explaining the trading pat-
terns of at least three empirically prominent trader types: high frequency traders, traders
with a long trading history and private account traders. High frequency algorithms ex-
ecute millions of trades within seconds, implying that individual trade gains and losses
hardly register with management before average profitability of the trading strategy is
revealed. In this environment, realizing a loss on an individual trading position generally
does not impact trader reputation with his employer. Equally, one may speculate that
established traders with a long trading record have effectively revealed their trading skill.
These traders should therefore not fear reputational consequences from closing trading
positions at loss. Finally, traders that use their own private accounts are not in an agency
relationship with a financial institution. Career concerns per-se therefore do not influence
their trading decisions. In the first two cases, taking a loss on individual trading positions
does not impact trader reputation with his employer. In the latter case, the trader does
not have an employer to signal high trading skill to. For all three trader types, the third
ingredient of the career concerns theory for loss aversion appears to be missing.
This subsection aims to sketch out how a slightly broader interpretation of the theory
developed in this paper in fact allows the framework to also speak to these three special
cases.
Considering high frequency trading, once a computer algorithm has been designed,
the key decisions of the trader are whether to take the algorithm online and when to
withdraw it from the market. These actions offer direct counterparts to the model deci-
sions to enter and close a trading opportunity. Building on this analogy, closing a trading
opportunity at loss is equivalent to taking a trading algorithm oﬄine while recording an
overall trading loss for the strategy. Trader reputation at the financial institution takes
a hit, since he should have shown judgement and rejected the trading idea ex-ante. The
predictions developed in this paper therefore have a natural cousin in the world of high
frequency trading: career concerns make algorithmic traders too reluctant to withdraw
loss-making algorithms and they make them too reluctant to try new algorithms that
are on expectation profitable for fear of eventually having to withdraw the product at a
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trading loss.
Considering traders with long trading history, the model would indeed predict that
these trader types should be less career-concerned. However, there are various reasons to
believe that trader type is never revealed perfectly and reputational concerns therefore
continue to matter even for established market participants. Whether entering a trading
opportunity was a good or bad idea can take years to establish (think of trading against
the stock bubble in the late 1990s or trading against the subprime mortgages in the
2000s). Even once a range of trades are closed successfully, considerable market noise
may make it difficult to distinguish between a lucky unskilled trader and a skilled stock-
picker. Finally, it may well be that the skill of a trader is time-varying (in stochastic
and unobservable ways). Traders may learn about how to evaluate trading opportunities
as they gain experience, or they may become less perceptive as they age. Traders may
inherently stay the same, but their skills and thought processes become unsuitable to
a new market environment. For all these reasons, it is unclear whether reputational
concerns really disappear even for veterans of the trading industry. The career concerns
theory of loss aversion may continue to apply (though in weakened form) for this class of
actors.
Finally, by definition, private investors are not employed by a financial institution - the
agency relationship at the core of this paper is missing. Yet, in practice, the judgmental
eye of an employer may often be replaced by the judgmental eye of a spouse, children
and friends (and maybe once own self) for these types of traders. In this setting, the
threat of losing a trading job or taking a wage cut may be replaced by the social cost
of being seen as the market fool. Reputation continues to matter, albeit for a different
reason. The career concerns theory of loss aversion developed in this paper is therefore
not necessarily silent on why homeowners are reluctant to sell houses below the price at
which they bought (Genesove and Mayer (2001)) or why private stock traders exhibit a
disposition effect (Odean (1998)).
Overall, the theory developed in this paper undoubtedly applies best to traders such
as corporate bond dealers: they face high stake, low frequency trading opportunities
as employees of large financial institutions. However, as this subsection suggests, the
three core ingredients behind the theory can be found in many trading situations (indeed
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probably in most situations in which people have to decide on whether to take an action
or not). The career concerns theory developed in this study can be applied more generally
than first meets the eye.
4.4.2 What Do these Results Imply for the Literature on Loss
Averse Preferences?
A pessimistic reading of this paper suggests an important caveat for empirical work on
loss aversion: finding empirical evidence for a trader disposition effect does not necessarily
imply that loss averse preferences are at play. In certain market situations, trader career
offer a rational explanation for such phenomena.
However, this subsection would like to offer a more positive take-away for research on
loss averse preferences: the rational career concerns theory of loss aversion developed in
this paper may help explain why people have adopted loss aversion heuristics in the first
place. Humans are inherently social animals. In various forms, we depend on how our
actions are perceived by our superiors and peers. In this context, the broad message of
this paper is that it is optimal to (i) avoid taking action if the likelihood of an outcome
interpreted as loss relative to status quo is high and (ii), once an action is taken, to
invest considerably in making sure the outcome is interpreted as gain. Societal pressure
could therefore explain why people have developed loss aversion bias in preferences. In
evolutionary terms, agents with loss aversion bias may have an edge in defending their
place in society. Constant repetition of career concerns may have led to automation (a
short-cut) in the initially conscious decision to avoid outcomes perceived as “loss”- to the
point that these heuristics are today applied even in situations in which no principal is
directly evaluating agent decisions.
Overall, this argument suggests that the career concerns theory of loss aversion does
not have to be seen in confrontation with loss averse preferences. Instead, the two mech-
anisms may co-exist and feed on each other.
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4.4.3 What Do these Results Imply for Best Practice on the
Trading Floor?
From the perspective of the financial institution, career concerns lead traders to deviate
from profit-maximizing trade entry and exit decisions. They become too reluctant to
enter trades and they become too reluctant to close positions once they are trading at
loss. A natural question to ask is therefore how trading floors should be organized to
mitigate the distorting effects of this agency problem. The paper concludes by discussing
three such proposals.
First, the career concerns effect could be eliminated if financial institutions would
commit to long-term contracts. By retaining traders for the length of the contract and
delinking wage rises from trader reputation, traders would stop worrying about the short-
term reputational consequences of realizing losses. In practice, this benefit of long-term
contracts would of course have to be weighed up against the flexibility of being able to fire
traders as they reveal themselves to be low-skilled and incentive effects from the latent
threat of losing ones job. Whether the current hire-fire culture at financial institutions
strikes an optimal compromise remains an open empirical question.
Second, the career concerns distortion could be mitigated by rotating portfolios across
the firm. Traders would face no career concerns in selling the position of a predecessor
at loss, since they were not the one making the decision to enter in the first place.
While such a policy at first appears highly unconventional, in fact Hertzberg, Liberti
and Paravisini (2010) document that banks do use a very similar scheme in rotating loan
officers across corporate clients over time: credit officers are more likely to signal that a
loan arrangement is failing if they were not the ones that agreed to give the loan in the
first place.
Finally, in the context of this model, it appears natural to promote skilled traders to
the management of trading desks. By definition, such managers can recognize ex-ante
whether a trading opportunity is attractive or not. In evaluating traders, they can there-
fore use soundness of investment decision rather than relying solely on outcome variables.
This diminishes the ability of unskilled traders to mimic skilled traders and dampens the
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career concerns mechanism for loss aversion.31 This argument may offer one explana-
tion for why banks are so willing to promote top-performing traders into management.
Though the promotion detracts skilled manager-traders from making profitable trades
for the bank, they may make up for this by imposing discipline on the behaviour of their
peers on the trading desk.
31For example, once an unattractive trading opportunity is entered, a skilled trader-manager is aware of
the blunder and the agent cannot hide by “fishing” to sell at gain. Equally, an opportunity may appear
highly promising ex-ante and, once the trading position is opened, new information may reveal that
the trade will results in a loss. A skilled manager-trader would recognize that the agent demonstrated
judgement despite ending up losing the bank money.
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Appendix A
Appendix To Chapter 2
A.1 Robustness Checks for Section 2.1
This section considers two robustness checks for the results in section 2.1. It confirms that
the strong response of housing sales rate to monetary policy is not purely an artefact of the
Romer and Romer (2004) monetary policy shock identification scheme. It also confirms
that the new housing sales rate is not the only measure of housing liquidity that rises
substantially given expansionary monetary policy.
To tackle the first point, figure A.1 replicates the results in section 2.1 using a quar-
terly recursive Vector-Autoregressions identification scheme (this method is reviewed for
example in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999)). The identification ordering as-
sumes that output and price level do not respond contemporaneously to monetary policy.
The housing variables can respond contemporaneously. The VAR includes a constant, a
linear trend and seasonal dummies.
Romer and Romer (2004) find that their identification scheme leads to large estimates
for the macroeconomic response to monetary policy (relative to the recursive identifica-
tion scheme). Figures 2.3 and A.1 reveal that this finding carries over to the housing
market response. Key however is that the sales rate response remains significantly more
pronounced than the response of transaction prices under the recursive identification
scheme.
To tackle the second point, figure A.2 shows the response of other proxies for housing
liquidity to Romer and Romer (2004) monetary policy shocks. The data sources are
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summarized in section A.2. Notice first that the strong response of new housing sale
rates is reflected in an actual increase in transaction volumes both for new and existing
properties.1
Equally, figure A.2 shows that the dampening of the new housing sales rate response
after two years roughly coincides with a substantial rise of for-sale new housing on the
market. The construction sector responds to a hot housing market by raising supply.
This response is not captured in the DSGE model of section 2.3 where a constant total
housing supply is assumed. Note however that, from the standpoint of the lender decision
in the model, the ratio of sales to for-sale housing is key to evaluate the security provided
by housing collateral.
Finally, figure A.2 also reports the response of the median months new houses are
reported for sale. This measure behaves very similarly to the housing sales rate considered
in the main text.
A.2 Data Sources
Table A.1 summarizes the data sources used in this study.2’3
A.3 Characterizing Optimality Conditions for the Con-
sumer in Section 2.3
Consider the consumer problem described in section 2.3. The associated first order con-
ditions are key drivers of the macroeconomic mechanism behind this paper. First, for
1The fact that existing housing responds with a lag, while new housing sale numbers jump on impact
of the monetary policy shock, reflects differences in the way these two statistics are collected. The
new housing sales measure captures when the sales contract is signed, while an existing housing sale is
recorded at the close of the sale (when the mortgage has been approved and the transfer of funds has
taken place). This can explain a response lag of a month or two.
2Alternative popular house price indexes such as the FHFA index and the S&P/Case-Shiller index
are available only starting in the early 1990s, precluding their use in conjunction with the Romer and
Romer (2004) policy shocks. Using the U.S. Census Bureau index of purchase prices on new single-family
homes (available since 1963) leads to a larger peak response of house prices at 4%. The FMHPI index
is used in the main text, since (i) its repeat-sales methodology controls for variation in the quality of
housing sold and (ii) it considers the value of both new and existing housing.
3House prices are reported in real terms by deflating with the CPI price index measure
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Figure A.1: Response of the housing market (Recursive identification VAR; in log dev.
from trend; 95% confidence intervals)
Variable Source
Federal funds rate Federal Reserve Board (FRB) H.15
Output Ind. prod. (major ind. groups) (FRB) G.17
Price level Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) CPI
House prices Freddie Mac House Price Index (FMHPI)
Rents Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) CPI
New housing sales rate US Census New residential housing
Sales volume (existing housing) National Association of Realtors
Sales volume (new housing) US Census new residential housing
Sales volume (existing housing) National Association of Realtors
For-sale housing (new housing) US Census new residential housing
Med. for-sale months (new housing) US Census new residential housing
Table A.1: Data sources
139
Figure A.2: Response of other housing liquidity measures (Romer and Romer (2004)
shocks; in log dev. from trend; 95% confidence intervals)
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notation, it is useful to introduce the shadow price of vacant housing before search in
period t (qvb,t). Irrespective of consumer type, this is given by:
qvb,t = −m− τ + Ps(θt)qm,t + (1− Ps(θt))qv,t (A.3.1)
Second, for any type i, either the price of a vacancy at the end of period t equals the
present discounted value of a vacancy at the start of period t+ 1, or no vacant property
is held by that type at the end of period t.
qv,t ≥ Et(Qit+1qvb,t+1); vit ≥ 0; (qv,t − Et(Qit+1qvb,t+1))vit = 0 (A.3.2)
Third, the fundamental (shadow) value of occupied housing V ft equals its current
consumption-equivalent service value, its present discounted future value (either as matched
house or as newly unmatched house) as well as its value as collateral asset to access debt
finance (where the Lagrangian λt denotes the consumption-equivalent value of collateral).
V f,it = j
cit
hit
+Et(Q
i
t+1(−m− τ + zqvb,t+1 + (1− z)V f,it+1)) + λit
1
Et(Qit+1
Rt(1−z)
pit+1
)
qv,t (A.3.3)
Fourth, consumers undertake search effort for housing up to the point where marginal
benefit equals marginal cost. In effect, this links equilibrium sales probability to the
difference between fundamental housing value and the current bargained transaction price
when housing fit for occupation is found.4 Note that, if both patient and impatient
consumers have put effort into search, then in equilibrium the free entry condition must
equalize perceived fundamental value across types. As will be shown, this condition will
hold in the neighbourhood of the deterministic steady state.
V f,it ≤
κb
Prb(θt)
+ qm,t; e
i
t ≥ 0; (V f,it − (
κb
Prb(θt)
+ qm,t))e
i
t = 0 (A.3.4)
Fifth, the Euler equation ensures consumption is optimally allocated across time,
given rates of return available and the borrowing constraint.
4Note this condition offers an analogue to the free entry condition for vacancy posting in the labour
market search literature (see Pissarides (2000)).
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1 = Et(Q
i
t+1
Rt
pit+1
) + λit (A.3.5)
Sixth, in equilibrium, either the stock price equals the present discounted value of
future dividend and capital gain for consumer type i, or no equity is held by that subgroup
of the population.
qo,t ≥ Et(Qit+1(qo,t+1 + Πt+1)); ot ≥ 0; (qo,t − (Et(Qit+1(qo,t+1 + Πt+1))))ot = 0 (A.3.6)
Seventh, the intratemporal labour-consumption first order condition ensures workers
optimally trade-off the utility cost of providing additional labour against the consumption
gains from greater labour income.
wt
cit
= χ(lit)
η (A.3.7)
Eighth, the Lagrangian for the borrowing constraint is zero if the borrowing constraint
does not bind:
Et(Q
i
t+1
Rt
pit+1
)bit ≤ qv,thit; λt ≥ 0; (Et(Qit+1
Rt
pit+1
)bit − qv,thit)λt = 0 (A.3.8)
The first order conditions of the wholesale producer and retailer follow the standard
textbook.
A.4 Characterizing the Steady State in Section 2.3
This section describes the steady state (the deterministic solution of the model in a setting
without stochastic shocks) of section 2.3 in a series of propositions. Denote steady state
variables by a star subscript.
Proposition 7. In any steady state of the model, the patient consumer is not credit
constrained.
Proof of proposition 7: Assume the patient consumer credit constrained. Then we
have (bp)∗ > 0 and, using A.3.8, the shadow value of funds is strictly positive for patient
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consumers ((λp)∗ > 0). Note now by the bond market clearing this implies (bip)∗ =
−(bp)∗ < 0 and, using A.3.8, the shadow value of funds for the impatient must be zero
((λip)∗ = 0). Subtract now the Euler equations A.3.5 of the two types to get:
0 = (βp − βip)R∗ + (λp)∗ (A.4.1)
Since R∗ > 0 in a well-defined steady state, this implies βip > βp. This contradicts
the definition of patient and impatient consumers (βip < βp).
Proposition 8. In any steady state of the model, the impatient consumer is credit con-
strained.
Proof of proposition 8: Assume the impatient consumer is not credit constrained in
steady state. Since we have established that the patient consumer must not be credit
constrained in steady state, by equation A.3.8, the shadow value of funds is zero for
both types: λip = λp = 0. Using equation A.3.5 this implies 1 = βpR∗ and 1 = βipR∗.
Subtracting these two statements yields 0 = (βp− βip)R∗. Since R∗ > 0 in a well-defined
steady state, this implies βp = βip. But this contradicts the assumption that there is a
patient and impatient consumer type (βp > βip).
Proposition 9. In any steady state of the model, both consumer types search for new
housing for occupation.
Proof of proposition 9: Assume consumer of type i did not search in steady state
(ei)∗ = 0. By the dynamic equation for occupied housing held by type i consumers 2.3.3,
this implies that the consumer does not occupy any housing in steady state ((hi)∗ = 0).
But then the fundamental value of housing is undefined, since the fundamental housing
value equation A.3.3 implies lim(hi)∗↓0(V i,f )∗ = +∞. The first order condition A.3.4
((V i,f )∗ ≤ κb
Prb(θt)
+ qm,t) cannot hold.
Proposition 10. In any steady state of the model, both consumer types occupy housing.
Proof of proposition 10: The proof for this statement follows straightforwardly com-
bining proposition 9 and the equation for housing dynamics 2.3.3.
Proposition 11. In any steady state of the model, both consumer types have the same
fundamental valuation of housing.
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Proof of proposition 11: Since (ei)∗ > 0 for both types, free entry condition A.3.4
implies that (V i,f )∗ = κb
Prb(θt)
+ qm,t. Subtracting the statement across types yields:
(V p,f )∗ = (V ip,f )∗.
Proposition 12. In any steady state of the model, the patient agent holds all firm equity.
Proof of proposition 12: At least one consumer type must hold all equity, since the
equity market clears in equilibrium and equity is in positive supply. Assume now that
both types hold equity in steady state. Then first order condition A.3.6 implies: (qo)
∗ =
βi((qo)
∗+ Π∗). Subtracting this equation by consumer type yields: 0 = (βp− βip)((qo)∗+
Π∗). Since ((qo)∗ + Π∗) > 0 in a well-defined steady state, this implies βp = βip. But
this contradicts the assumption that there is a patient and impatient consumer type
(βp > βip).
Proposition 13. In any steady state of the model, the patient agent holds all end-of-
period vacant property and physical capital.
Proof of proposition 13: The proof of this proposition follows directly the pattern of
the argument for proposition 12.
A.5 Derivation of Section 2.2.1 Log-Linearization Re-
sult
Taking a first order (log) Taylor approximation of equation 2.2.1 yields equation A.5.1.
q∗v qˆv,t = q
∗
vQˆt+1+[Q
∗(q∗m(1−Fs)−q∗v)]Pˆ s,t+1+[Q
∗P ∗s (1−Fs)]qˆm,t+1 +Q∗q∗v(1−P ∗s )qˆv,t+1 (A.5.1)
Defining ρ1 =
Q∗(q∗m(1−Fs)−q∗v)P ∗s
q∗v
, ρ2 =
Q∗P ∗s q∗m(1−Fs)
q∗v
and ρ3 = Q
∗(1−P ∗s ) we can rewrite
this as equation A.5.2.
qˆv,t = Et(Qˆt+1 + ρ1Pˆs,t+1 + ρ2qˆm,t+1 + ρ3qˆv,t+1) (A.5.2)
Log-linearization of expression 2.2.2 yields expression A.5.3. Inserting A.5.3 in A.5.2
an iterating forward yields expression 2.2.3 in the main text.
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Et(Qˆt+1) = −rˆf,t+1 (A.5.3)
145
Appendix B
Appendix To Chapter 3
B.1 Numerical Methods
This section outlines the numerical simulation procedure used in this paper. This broadly
follows Bloom (2009).
1. Compute firm policy function: The three state variables in the firm problem are (i)
business condition factor ai,t , (ii) employees carried over from the previous period
li,t, (iii) Tτ,t the number of periods since announcement of the tax cut. Given the log-
linear structure of the demand process, the study keeps track of business conditions
and employment state variables in logs. If the tax cut is not yet announced or has
already expired, set Tτ,t to 0. Note the firm does not need to keep track separately of
macro and idiosyncratic business condition shocks, since both subcomponents follow
an autoregressive order 1 process (AR1) with identical persistence parameter. Since
hiring and firing is subject to time-to-build and hours choice is contemporaneous,
the hours choice can be computed analytically and simplified out of the problem.
The policy choice of the firm at time t is therefore reduced to choosing employment
level at t+ 1 subject to period t state variables
To solve the problem, first use numerical Bellman value function iteration on an
evenly spaced grid in ai,t and li,t space to solve for value function and policy function
of the firm when Tτ,t = 0. Expectations over future business conditions faced
by the firm are computed discretizing the assumed autoregressive process using
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Tauchen approximation. Given Tτ,t = 0 value function, the study iterates backwards
(starting with the last period of the tax cut), to back out value function and policy
function during the period in which the tax cut is implemented and the period
in which it is announced. During backward iteration, wage and payroll tax are
adjusted depending on whether a temporary wage response is assumed and whether
the tax cut is announced or already implemented.
In practice, the grid for ai,t and li,t is defined as ±50% of non-stochastic steady state
solution for the two variables. The grid is discretized with 200 cells. This ensures
that firms virtually always stay inside the specified grid space during the simulation
runs.1 Results are insensitive to local changes in these discretization choices.
2. Draw business condition shocks: For each parameterization, 1000 macro simulations
are drawn (for 100 periods). For each macro simulation, 1000 firm-specific business
condition shocks are drawn (implying a total of 1 million firm-specific shock series).
Macro and idiosyncratic shocks are added multiplicatively. All business condition
shocks are initialized at the non-stochastic steady state of 1.
3. Compute macroeconomic response: given policy functions and business condition
time series, firm-level employment responses are computed. After a warmup period
ensuring distributions have converged, the tax cut is announced in period T1 = 60
and then implemented for periods T2 to T3. For the baseline simulation, the study
sets T2 = 61 and T3 = 64. Employment, hours, output and tax revenue are then
aggregated to the macroeconomic level (the 1000 macro business cycles analyzed).
Statistics shown in the paper give expected values based on an average over these
macro draws.
1In the rare event that a firm does want to leave the edges of the grid, the algorithm effectively
assumes that forces push it to remain on the grid (returning the firm to the point on the grid closest to
its actual optimal choice). These occurrences however are only very rare and are not driving the macro
results this study puts focus on. The procedure follows other studies in the literature such as Bloom
(2009).
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B.2 Historical Background: The US Payroll Tax
As part of the New Deal, President Roosevelt signed the Social Security Act into law
in 1935. Among other programs, this policy established unemployment insurance and
retirement benefits.
Today a hope of many years’ standing is in large part fulfilled. The civilization
of the past hundred years, with its startling industrial changes, has tended
more and more to make life insecure. Young people have come to wonder
what would be their lot when they came to old age. The man with a job has
wondered how long the job would last.
This social security measure gives at least some protection to thirty millions of
our citizens who will reap direct benefits through unemployment compensation,
through old-age pensions and through increased services for the protection of
children and the prevention of ill health.
We can never insure one hundred percent of the population against one hun-
dred percent of the hazards and vicissitudes of life, but we have tried to frame
a law which will give some measure of protection to the average citizen and
to his family against the loss of a job and against poverty-ridden old age.
Statement by President Roosevelt on Signing of the Social Security Act,
August 14 1935
To pay for social security, Congress passed the Federal Insurance Contributions Act.
This effectively established the payroll tax structure the United States still faces today.
It mandates a proportional wage tax (up to a specified maximum taxable earnings level)
that is shared equally between employers and employees. As figure B.1 shows, expansion
of social security raised this tax from a relatively modest level of 2% in 1937 to reach a
plateau of 15.3% by 1990. Maximum taxable earnings were raised gradually from 3000
dollars to reach 106,800 dollars in 1990.
The passage of the Medicare Program in 1965 (providing health coverage for the above-
65) stands out in this expansion. Concerning the payroll tax, this program established a
separate HI wage tax (health insurance) without maximum taxable earnings limit. For
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distinction, HI tax is therefore generally reported separately from the traditional OASDI
payroll tax (Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance programs). Figure B.1 follows
this convention.2
While, in this period of gradual increases, payroll taxes were not used as countercycli-
cal fiscal tool, the events of 2008 and 2009 have radically changed this. With unemploy-
ment still clinging stubbornly above the 9% level, the US government has lowered the
employee payroll tax contribution from 6.2% to 3.1% in the fiscal year 2011. For fiscal
year 2012 a centre piece of the President Obama’s “American Jobs Act” was a proposal to
half employer payroll tax cuts for 98% of businesses (the tax cut would apply to the first
5 million dollars in payroll). Furthermore, there would be a complete employer payroll
tax holiday for payroll increases due to newly hired workers or higher wages.
This brief review of payroll tax history illustrates several points. First, our historical
experience using employer payroll tax cuts to stimulate the economy is limited. The
simulation analysis in this paper aims to shed light on the consequences and workings
of such a policy given limited empirical data for the US. As shown in section 3.4.1,
the historical structural adjustments in payroll tax cannot be used to directly infer the
multiplier associated with a temporary tax cut measure. Second, the payroll tax in the
model abstracts from some important features of the real-world payroll tax. Notably,
it does not feature a maximum taxable earnings limit. The tax cut considered in this
study treats the entire firm payroll uniformly. It does not allow for payroll tax breaks
limited to new employment (as Obama’s “American Jobs Act” proposes). Presumably,
such alternative tax cuts would be more cost-efficient in creating jobs than the across-the-
board tax cut considered in this study.3 Third, there is growing recognition that payroll
tax can be an important lever of government fiscal stimulus programs. This study offers a
contribution towards better understanding the stimulus consequences of this policy tool.
2Besides HI and OASDI payroll tax, employers generally also pay tax under the Federal Unemploy-
ment Tax Act (FUTA). This rate is currently set at 6.2% on the first 7000 dollars by each employee
in the first calendar year. The simulations also do not explicitly model state level taxes. The implicit
working assumption is that these taxes are not changed as part of the stimulus considered. They are
then part of the normalization of wages and productivity in section 3.1.
3A tax cut on payroll additions only could encourage firms to churn labour to reap tax benefits (firing
worker A and hiring worker B instead, “recycling” worker A in the following tax year). Legislation would
need to implement safeguards against such distorting incentive effects from the stimulus policy.
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Figure B.1: Historical payroll tax and maximum taxable earnings
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Appendix C
Appendix To Chapter 4
C.1 Model A General Properties: Formal Proof
Assume there exists market condition m∗ and resale price p∗s such that the skilled trader
enters the period 1 trade given resale market condition m∗, the skilled trader subsequently
accepts to close the trade given resale opportunity p∗s and closing the trade at p
∗
s implies
a loss (p∗s < pb). Since the outside option of the skilled trader is not better than staying
in the game ((o11/ω)−pi12 ≤ 0) and r(.) is an indicator function, since the resell price offer
is accepted (condition 4.1.12), since the trade is entered by the skilled trader (proposition
4.1.9), the inequality chain C.1.1 holds. This contradicts that the sale takes place at a
loss. Given the period 2 optimal strategies determined in 1, in any equilibrium of model
A, the skilled trader therefore never resells at loss.
p∗s ≥ p∗s + (
o11
ω
− pi12)r1(e1, ps) ≥ V 11 (m∗) ≥ pb (C.1.1)
By implication, a period 1 trade closed at loss always reveals that the trader is un-
skilled. Since firing costs are not too large (γpi12 + (1 − γ)pi12 − cf1−ω > pi02), the financial
institution fires the trader if a loss is incurred in period 1.
To show the unskilled trader is endogenously loss averse in equilibrium, this study
proceeds in two steps. First, it shows there exists equilibrium market condition m∗ and
resale price offer p∗s such that an unskilled trader would not close an open position at
resale price offer p∗s if and only if faced with career concerns (in other words, in period 1
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of the game, but not in period 2) and closing the position at p∗s would imply selling at
a loss (p∗s < pb). The regularity conditions on the distribution of mt and ps,t ensure the
existence of an m∗ such that V 01 (m
∗) + pi02 − o
0
1
ω
< pb where the trader sometimes accepts
to sell at loss and to be fired. This, in turn, implies strict inequality C.1.2 (using the
definition of option value in periods 1 and 2). By implication, there exists a p∗s such that
V2(m
∗) < p∗s < V
0
1 (m
∗) + pi02 − o
0
1
ω
. Given an unskilled trader opens a market position
given resale condition parameter m∗, he accepts to close the position at p∗s if and only if
he faces no career concerns (in period 2 only).
V i1 (m
∗) + pi02 −
o01
ω
= −cs +
∫ p¯s
0
max(V1(m
∗) + pi02 −
o01
ω
, ps − (o
0
1
ω
− pi02)r1(e1, ps))dF (ps|m1)
> V2(m
∗) (C.1.2)
Consider now the second step of the argument for endogenous loss aversion. Suppose
there exist m∗ and p∗s such that the trader would close an open position at resale price
offer p∗s if only if faced with career concerns (in other words, in period 1 of the game, but
not in period 2) and closing the position at p∗s would imply selling at a loss (p
∗
s < pb).
Since the resell price is below purchase price, since the optimal exit condition 4.1.12
holds, since inequality C.1.2 holds, we must have that inequality C.1.3 holds. But this
contradicts that reselling in period 2 would not be optimal (condition 4.1.8).
pb > p
∗
s ≥ V 01 (m∗) + pi02 −
o01
ω
> V2(m
∗) (C.1.3)
C.2 Baseline Model A Equilibrium with Signal on
Resale Draws
Proposition 14. In a version of model A in which the financial institution observes a
finite partition signal on the number of resale draws the trader takes in period t (jˆt =
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k(j) : j 7→ {1, 2, ..., N}), define
V i1 (m1) = −cs +
∫ p¯s
0
max(V1(m1), ps + (o
i
1 − pii2)1(ps < pb))dF (ps|m1) (C.2.1)
V i2 (m2) = −cs +
∫ p¯s
0
max(V2(m2), ps)dF (ps|m2)
pi12 =
∫ m¯
0
max(V 12 (m2)− pb, 0)dG(m2) (C.2.2)
pi02 =
∫ m¯
0
(V 02 (m2)− pb)dG(m2)
q1(m1, jˆt) = 1(ps,1 ≥ V 11 (m1) ≥ pb)(
∑
j∈{j:k−1(jˆt)}
(1−
∫ p¯s
0
1(ps ≥ V 11 (m1))dH(ps|m1))j−1)
(C.2.3)
q0(m1, jˆt) = 1(ps,1 ≥ V 01 (m1))(
∑
j∈{j:k−1(jˆt)}
(1−
∫ p¯s
0
1(ps ≥ V 01 (m1))dH(ps|m1))j−1)
µˆ1(e1, ps,1, jˆt) =

0 if e1 = 1, ps,1 < pb
1 if e1 = 0∫ m¯
0 q
1(m1,jˆt)γdG(m1)∫ m¯
0 (q
1(m1,jˆt)γ+q0(m1,jˆt)(1−γ))dG(m1) > 0 if e1 = 1, ps,1 ≥ pb, jˆt
(C.2.4)
µ¯ = min
ps,1≥pb,jˆt
(µˆ1(e1 = 1, ps,1), jˆt) (C.2.5)
assume that,
1. the set of trade outcomes observed by the financial institutions is bounded
• ps,t|mt and mt has support on [0, p¯s] and [0, m¯] where p¯s ∈ <+ and m¯ ∈ <+
2. the outside options of both trader types are not better than staying in the game
oi1
ω
≤ pii2 (C.2.6)
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3. entry incentive for unskilled traders is high enough
∫ m¯
0
(V 01 (m1)− pb)dG(m1) ≥ 0 (C.2.7)
4. the costs that financial institutions face in firing a worker are large
µ¯pi12 + (1− µ¯)pi02 ≥ γpi12 + (1− γ)pi12 −
cf
1− ω > pi
0
2 (C.2.8)
then there exists a (weak) perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which:
1. the strategy of the skilled trader hired in period 1 (i = 1, h = 1) is:
e1,1t =
 1 if V 1t (mt) ≥ pb0 if V 1t (mt) < pb ∀t = 1, 2 (C.2.9)
x0,11,j =
 1 if ps,1,j + (
o11
ω
− pi12)1(ps,1,j < pb) ≥ V 11 (m1)
0 if ps,1,j + (
o11
ω
− pi12)1(ps,1,j < pb) ≥ V 11 (m1)
(C.2.10)
x1,12,j =
 1 if ps,2,j ≥ V 12 (m2)0 if ps,2,j < V 12 (m2) ∀t = 1, 2 (C.2.11)
2. the strategy of the unskilled trader hired in period 1 (i = 0, h = 1) is:
e0,1t = 1∀t = 1, 2 (C.2.12)
x0,11,j =
 1 if ps,1,j + (
o01
ω
− pi02)1(ps,1,j < pb) ≥ V 01 (m1)
0 if ps,1,j + (
o01
ω
− pi02)1(ps,1,j < pb) ≥ V 01 (m1)
(C.2.13)
x0,12,j =
 1 if ps,2,j ≥ V 02 (mt)0 if ps,2,j < V 02 (mt) (C.2.14)
3. the strategy of the skilled trader hired in period 2 (i = 1,h = 2) is:
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e1,22 =
 1 if V 12 (m2) ≥ pb0 if V 12 (m2) < pb (C.2.15)
x1,22,j =
 1 if ps,2,j ≥ V 12 (m2)0 if ps,2,j < V 12 (m2) ∀t = 1, 2 (C.2.16)
4. the strategy of the unskilled trader hired in period 2 (i = 0, h = 2) is:
e0,12 = 1 (C.2.17)
x0,22,j =
 1 if ps,2,j ≥ V 02 (mt)0 if ps,2,j < V 02 (mt) (C.2.18)
5. the financial institution replacement rule for the trader is:
r1 =
 0 if e1 = 1, ps,1 < pb1 if otherwise (C.2.19)
6. financial institution belief whether the trader is skilled is given by µˆ1(e1, ps,1, j1)
155
Bibliography
Abel, Andrew B, and Janice C Eberly. 1994. “A Unified Model of Investment under
Uncertainty.” American Economic Review, 84(5): 1369–84.
Adrian, Tobias, and Hyun Song Shin. 2010. “Liquidity and leverage.” Journal of
Financial Intermediation, 19(3): 418–437.
Albrecht, James, Axel Anderson, Eric Smith, and Susan Vroman. 2007.
“Opportunistic Matching In The Housing Market.” International Economic Review,
48(2): 641–664.
Alchian, Armen A. 1950. “Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory.” Journal of
Political Economy, 58: 211.
Almunia, Miguel, Agustin Benetrix, Barry Eichengreen, Kevin H. O’Rourke,
and Gisela Rua. 2010. “From Great Depression to Great Credit Crisis: similarities,
differences and lessons.” Economic Policy, 25: 219–265.
Andolfatto, David. 1996. “Business Cycles and Labor-Market Search.” American Eco-
nomic Review, 86(1): 112–32.
Andrew, Mark, and Geoffrey Meen. 2003. “House Price Appreciation, Transactions
and Structural Change in the British Housing Market: A Macroeconomic Perspective.”
Real Estate Economics, 31(1): 99–116.
Auerbach, Alan J., and Yuriy Gorodnichenko. 2010. “Measuring the Output Re-
sponses to Fiscal Policy.” National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc NBER Working
Papers 16311.
156
Axtell, Robert L. 2001. “Zipf Distribution of U.S. Firm Sizes.” Science,
293(5536): 1818–1820.
Barber, Brad M., Yi-Tsung Lee, Yu-Jane Liu, and Terrance Odean. 2007. “Is
the Aggregate Investor Reluctant to Realise Losses? Evidence from Taiwan.” European
Financial Management, 13(3): 423–447.
Barberis, Nicholas, and Ming Huang. 2009. “Preferences with frames: A new utility
specification that allows for the framing of risks.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 33(8): 1555–1576.
Barberis, Nicholas, Ming Huang, and Richard H. Thaler. 2006. “Individual Pref-
erences, Monetary Gambles, and Stock Market Participation: A Case for Narrow Fram-
ing.” American Economic Review, 96(4): 1069–1090.
Barberis, Nicholas, Ming Huang, and Tano Santos. 2001. “Prospect Theory And
Asset Prices.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1): 1–53.
Basak, Suleyman, and Anna Pavlova. 2011. “Asset Prices and Institutional In-
vestors.” AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper.
Baxter, Marianne, and Robert G King. 1993. “Fiscal Policy in General Equilib-
rium.” American Economic Review, 83(3): 315–34.
Benartzi, Shlomo, and Richard H Thaler. 1995. “Myopic Loss Aversion and the
Equity Premium Puzzle.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(1): 73–92.
Bentolila, Samuel, and Giuseppe Bertola. 1990. “Firing Costs and Labour Demand:
How Bad Is Eurosclerosis?” Review of Economic Studies, 57(3): 381–402.
Berk, Jonathan B., and Richard C. Green. 2004. “Mutual Fund Flows and Perfor-
mance in Rational Markets.” Journal of Political Economy, 112(6): 1269–1295.
Bernanke, Ben, and Mark Gertler. 1989. “Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business
Fluctuations.” American Economic Review, 79(1): 14–31.
157
Bernanke, Ben S., Mark Gertler, and Simon Gilchrist. 1999. “The financial ac-
celerator in a quantitative business cycle framework.” In Handbook of Macroeconomics.
Vol. 1 of Handbook of Macroeconomics, , ed. J. B. Taylor and M. Woodford, Chapter
21, 1341–1393. Elsevier.
Bertola, Guiseppe, and Ricardo J Caballero. 1994. “Irreversibility and Aggregate
Investment.” Review of Economic Studies, 61(2): 223–46.
Bessembinder, Hendrik, and William Maxwell. 2008. “Markets: Transparency and
the Corporate Bond Market.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22(2): 217–234.
Blanchard, Olivier, and Roberto Perotti. 2002. “An Empirical Characterization Of
The Dynamic Effects Of Changes In Government Spending And Taxes On Output.”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4): 1329–1368.
Blatter, Marc, Samuel Muehlemann, and Samuel Schenker. 2008. “The Costs
of Hiring Skilled Workers.” University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business
Economics (ISU) Economics of Education Working Paper Series 0015.
Bloom, Nicholas. 2009. “The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks.” Econometrica, 77(3): 623–
685.
Bloom, Nick, Max Floetotto, and Nir Jaimovich. 2010. “Really Uncertain Business
Cycles.”
Brunnermeier, Markus K., and Lasse Heje Pedersen. 2009. “Market Liquidity
and Funding Liquidity.” Review of Financial Studies, 22(6): 2201–2238.
Caballero, Ricardo J., and Eduardo M. R. A. Engel. 1999. “Explaining Invest-
ment Dynamics in U.S. Manufacturing: A Generalized (S,s) Approach.” Econometrica,
67(4): 783–826.
Calvet, Laurent E., John Y. Campbell, and Paolo Sodini. 2009. “Measuring the
Financial Sophistication of Households.” American Economic Review, 99(2): 393–98.
158
Calza, Alessandro, Tommaso Monacelli, and Livio Stracca. 2007. “Mortgage
Markets, Collateral Constraints, and Monetary Policy: Do Institutional Factors Mat-
ter?” C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers CEPR Discussion Papers 6231.
Camerer, Colin, Linbda Babcock, George Loewenstein, and Richard Thaler.
1997. “Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time.” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 112(2): 407–41.
Campbell, John Y., and N. Gregory Mankiw. 1989. “Consumption, Income and
Interest Rates: Reinterpreting the Time Series Evidence.” In NBER Macroeconomics
Annual 1989, Volume 4. NBER Chapters, 185–246. National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, Inc.
Campbell, John Y., Stefano Giglio, and Parag Pathak. 2009. “Forced Sales and
House Prices.” National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc NBER Working Papers
14866.
Carroll, Christopher D., and Andrew A. Samwick. 1997. “The nature of precau-
tionary wealth.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 40(1): 41–71.
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles L. Evans. 1999.
“Monetary policy shocks: What have we learned and to what end?” In Handbook of
Macroeconomics. Vol. 1 of Handbook of Macroeconomics, , ed. J. B. Taylor and M.
Woodford, Chapter 2, 65–148. Elsevier.
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles L. Evans. 2005.
“Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy.” Journal
of Political Economy, 113(1): 1–45.
Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo. 2011. “When Is
the Government Spending Multiplier Large?” Journal of Political Economy, 119(1): 78
– 121.
Coval, Joshua D., and Tyler Shumway. 2005. “Do Behavioral Biases Affect Prices?”
Journal of Finance, 60(1): 1–34.
159
Cuoco, Domenico, and Ron Kaniel. 2011. “Equilibrium prices in the presence of
delegated portfolio management.” Journal of Financial Economics, 101(2): 264–296.
Dasgupta, Amil, and Andrea Prat. 2008. “Information aggregation in financial mar-
kets with career concerns.” Journal of Economic Theory, 143(1): 83–113.
Dasgupta, Amil, Andrea Prat, and Michela Verardo. 2011. “Institutional Trade
Persistence and Long-Term Equity Returns.” Journal of Finance, 66(2): 635–653.
Davis, Morris A., and Jonathan Heathcote. 2005. “Housing And The Business
Cycle.” International Economic Review, 46(3): 751–784.
Dhar, Ravi, and Ning Zhu. 2002. “Up Close and Personal: An Individual Level Anal-
ysis of the Disposition Effect.” Yale School of Management Yale School of Management
Working Papers.
Dick-Nielsen, Jens. 2009. “Liquidity Biases In TRACE.” Journal of Fixed Income,
19(2).
Duffie, Darrell, Nicolae Garleanu, and Lasse Heje Pedersen. 2005. “Over-the-
Counter Markets.” Econometrica, 73(6): 1815–1847.
Duffie, Darrell, Nicolae Garleanu, and Lasse Heje Pedersen. 2007. “Valuation in
Over-the-Counter Markets.” Review of Financial Studies, 20(6): 1865–1900.
Edwards, Amy K., Lawrence E. Harris, and Michael S. Piwowar. 2007.
“Corporate Bond Market Transaction Costs and Transparency.” Journal of Finance,
62(3): 1421–1451.
Eisfeldt, Andrea L. 2004. “Endogenous Liquidity in Asset Markets.” Journal of Fi-
nance, 59(1): 1–30.
Fama, Eugene F. 1980. “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm.” Journal of
Political Economy, 88(2): 288–307.
Feldhuetter, Peter. 2012. “The Same Bond at Different Prices: Identifying Search
Frictions and Selling Pressures.” Review of Financial Studies, 25(4): 1155–1206.
160
Fisher, Jonas D. M. 2007. “Why Does Household Investment Lead Business Investment
over the Business Cycle?” Journal of Political Economy, 115: 141–168.
Forlati, Chiara, and Luisa Lambertini. 2011. “Risky Mortgages in a DSGE Model.”
International Journal of Central Banking, 7(1): 285–335.
Gali, Jordi. 2008. Monetary Policy, Inflation And The Business Cycle. Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Geanakoplos, John. 2009. “The Leverage Cycle.” Cowles Foundation for Research in
Economics, Yale University Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1715.
Genesove, David, and Christopher Mayer. 2001. “Loss Aversion And Seller Be-
havior: Evidence From The Housing Market.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
116(4): 1233–1260.
Gneezy, Uri, and Jan Potters. 1997. “An Experiment on Risk Taking and Evaluation
Periods.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2): 631–45.
Green, Richard C., Burton Hollifield, and Norman Schuerhoff. March 2007.
“Financial Intermediation and the Costs of Trading in an Opaque Market.” Review of
Financial Studies, 20(2): 275–314.
Grinblatt, Mark. 2001. “What Makes Investors Trade?” Journal of Finance,
56(2): 589–616.
Guerrieri, Veronica, and Pter Kondor. 2011. “Fund Managers, Career Concerns, and
Asset Price Volatility.” C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers CEPR Discussion Papers 8454.
Hall, Robert E. 2009. “By How Much Does GDP Rise if the Government Buys More
Output?” National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc NBER Working Papers 15496.
Hamermesh, Daniel S. 1989. “Labor Demand and the Structure of Adjustment Costs.”
American Economic Review, 79(4): 674–89.
Hart, Oliver, and John Moore. 1994. “A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability
of Human Capital.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4): 841–79.
161
Hedlund, Aaron. 2011. “The Cyclical Behavior of Housing, Illiquidity and Foreclo-
sures.” University of Pennsylvania Working paper.
Hertzberg, Andrew, Jose Maria Liberti, and Daniel Paravisini. 2010. “Informa-
tion and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation.” Journal of
Finance, 65(3): 795–828.
He, Zhiguo, and Arvind Krishnamurthy. 2011. “A Model of Capital and Crises.”
The Review of Economic Studies.
Holmstrom, Bengt. 1999. “Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective.”
Review of Economic Studies, 66(1): 169–82.
Hort, Katinka. 2000. “Prices and turnover in the market for owner-occupied homes.”
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 30(1): 99–119.
House, Christopher L., and Matthew D. Shapiro. 2006. “Phased-In Tax Cuts and
Economic Activity.” American Economic Review, 96(5): 1835–1849.
Hsieh, Chang-Tai, and Enrico Moretti. 2003. “Can Free Entry Be Inefficient? Fixed
Commissions and Social Waste in the Real Estate Industry.” Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 111(5): 1076–1122.
Iacoviello, Matteo. 2005. “House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy
in the Business Cycle.” American Economic Review, 95(3): 739–764.
Iacoviello, Matteo, and Stefano Neri. 2010. “Housing Market Spillovers: Evidence
from an Estimated DSGE Model.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
2(2): 125–64.
Ilzetzki, Ethan. 2011. “Fiscal policy and debt dynamics in developing countries.” The
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series 5666.
Ilzetzki, Ethan, Enrique G. Mendoza, and Carlos A. Vegh. 2010. “How Big
(Small?) are Fiscal Multipliers?” National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc NBER
Working Papers 16479.
162
Jappelli, Tullio. 1990. “Who Is Credit Constrained in the U.S. Economy?” The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 105(1): 219–34.
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision under Risk.” Econometrica, 47(2): 263–91.
Kaniel, Ron, and Peter Kondor. 2011. “The Delegated Lucas Tree.” CEPR Discus-
sion Paper.
King, Robert G., and Sergio T. Rebelo. 1999. “Resuscitating real business cycles.”
In Handbook of Macroeconomics. Vol. 1 of Handbook of Macroeconomics, , ed. J. B.
Taylor and M. Woodford, Chapter 14, 927–1007. Elsevier.
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, and John Moore. 1997. “Credit Cycles.” Journal of Political
Economy, 105(2): 211–48.
Koszegi, Botond, and Matthew Rabin. 2005. “A Model of Reference-Dependent
Preferences.” UCLA Department of Economics Levine’s Bibliography.
Krainer, John. 2001. “A Theory of Liquidity in Residential Real Estate Markets.”
Journal of Urban Economics, 49(1): 32–53.
Krusell, Per, Anthony A. Smith, and Jr. 1998. “Income and Wealth Heterogeneity
in the Macroeconomy.” Journal of Political Economy, 106(5): 867–896.
Kurlat, Pablo. 2009. “Lemons, Market Shutdowns And Learning.” Working Paper.
Lawrance, Emily C. 1991. “Poverty and the Rate of Time Preference: Evidence from
Panel Data.” Journal of Political Economy, 99(1): 54–77.
Levitt, Steven D., and Chad Syverson. 2008. “Market Distortions When Agents Are
Better Informed: The Value of Information in Real Estate Transactions.” The Review
of Economics and Statistics, 90(4): 599–611.
List, John A. 2003. “Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1): 41–71.
163
List, John A. 2004. “Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the
Marketplace.” Econometrica, 72(2): 615–625.
List, John A. 2011. “Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies? The Case
of Exogenous Market Experience.” American Economic Review, 101(3): 313–17.
Long, James De, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Waldmann. 1991. “The Survival
of Noise Traders in Financial Markets.” The Journal of Business, 64(1): 1–19.
Malliaris, Steven, and Hongjun Yan. 2012. “Reputation Concerns and Slow-Moving
Capital.” Yale University Working Paper.
Mas, Alexandre. 2006. “Pay, Reference Points, and Police Performance.” National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc NBER Working Papers 12202.
Mayer, Christopher J. 1998. “Assessing the Performance of Real Estate Auctions.”
Real Estate Economics, 26(1): 41–66.
Mertens, Karel, and Morten Overgaard Ravn. 2011. “Understanding the Aggregate
Effects of Anticipated and Unanticipated Tax Policy Shocks.” Review of Economic
Dynamics, 14(1): 27–54.
Merz, Monika. 1995. “Search in the labor market and the real business cycle.” Journal
of Monetary Economics, 36(2): 269–300.
Michaillat, Pascal. 2011. “Fiscal Multipliers over the Business Cycle.”
Milbradt, Konstantin, and Zhiguo He. 2012. “Endogenous Liquidity and Defaultable
Bonds.” MIT Working paper.
Monacelli, Tommaso. 2009. “New Keynesian models, durable goods, and collateral
constraints.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 56(2): 242–254.
Ngai, L. Rachel, and Silvana Tenreyro. 2009. “Hot and Cold Seasons in the Housing
Market.” Centre for Economic Performance, LSE CEP Discussion Papers dp0922.
164
Nickell, S.J. 1987. “Dynamic models of labour demand.” In Handbook of Labor Eco-
nomics. Vol. 1 of Handbook of Labor Economics, , ed. O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard,
Chapter 9, 473–522. Elsevier.
Novy-Marx, Robert. 2009. “Hot and Cold Markets.” Real Estate Economics, 37(1): 1–
22.
Odean, Terrance. 1998. “Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses?” Journal of
Finance, LIII(5): 1775–1798.
Oi, Walter Y. 1962. “Labor as a Quasi-Fixed Factor.” Journal of Political Economy,
70: 538.
Olivei, Giovanni, and Silvana Tenreyro. 2007. “The Timing of Monetary Policy
Shocks.” American Economic Review, 97(3): 636–663.
Pereira, Manuel Coutinho, and Artur Silva Lopes. 2010. “Time-varying fiscal
policy in the U.S.”
Petajisto, Antti. 2009. “Why Do Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down?” Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 44(05): 1013–1044.
Piazzesi, Monika, and Martin Schneider. 2009. “Momentum Traders in the Hous-
ing Market: Survey Evidence and a Search Model.” American Economic Review,
99(2): 406–11.
Pissarides, Christopher. 2000. Equilibrium Unemployment Theory. MIT Press.
Pope, Devin G., and Maurice E. Schweitzer. 2011. “Is Tiger Woods Loss Averse?
Persistent Bias in the Face of Experience, Competition, and High Stakes.” American
Economic Review, 101(1): 129–57.
Poterba, James M. 1991. “House Price Dynamics: The Role of Tax Policy.” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 22(2): 143–204.
Prendergast, Canice, and Lars Stole. 1996. “Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded
Old-Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning.” Journal of Political Economy,
104(6): 1105–34.
165
Ramey, Valerie A. 2011. “Can Government Purchases Stimulate the Economy?” Jour-
nal of Economic Literature, 49(3): 673–85.
Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer. 2004. “A New Measure of Monetary
Shocks: Derivation and Implications.” American Economic Review, 94(4): 1055–1084.
Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer. 2010. “The Macroeconomic Effects
of Tax Changes: Estimates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks.” American
Economic Review, 100(3): 763–801.
Samwick, Andrew A. 1998. “Discount rate heterogeneity and social security reform.”
Journal of Development Economics, 57(1): 117–146.
Scharfstein, David S, and Jeremy C Stein. 1990. “Herd Behavior and Investment.”
American Economic Review, 80(3): 465–79.
Shapira, Zur, and Itzhak Venezia. 2001. “Patterns of behavior of professionally
managed and independent investors.” Journal of Banking & Finance, 25(8): 1573–
1587.
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W Vishny. 1992. “Liquidation Values and Debt Ca-
pacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach.” Journal of Finance, 47(4): 1343–66.
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W Vishny. 1997. “The Limits of Arbitrage.” Journal
of Finance, 52(1): 35–55.
Simsek, Alp. 2012. “Belief Disagreements and Collateral Constraints.” Harvard Univer-
sity Working paper.
Stein, Jeremy C. 1995. “Prices and Trading Volume in the Housing Market: A Model
with Down-Payment Effects.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(2): 379–406.
Sterk, Vincent. 2010. “Credit frictions and the comovement between durable and non-
durable consumption.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 57(2): 217–225.
Susan Yang, Shu-Chun. 2005. “Quantifying tax effects under policy foresight.” Journal
of Monetary Economics, 52(8): 1557–1568.
166
Thaler, Richard, Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, and Alan Schwartz. 1997.
“The Effect of Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking: An Experimental Test.”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2): 647–61.
Thomas, Julia K. 2002. “Is Lumpy Investment Relevant for the Business Cycle?”
Journal of Political Economy, 110(3): 508–534.
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1991. “Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A
Reference-Dependent Model.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4): 1039–61.
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1992. “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cu-
mulative Representation of Uncertainty.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4): 297–
323.
van Ark, Bart, and Erik Monnikhof. 1996. “Size Distribution of Output and Employ-
ment: A Data Set for Manufacturing Industries in Five OECD Countries, 1960s-1990.”
Vavra, Joseph. 2012. “Inflation Dynamics And Time-Varying Uncertainty: New Evi-
dence and an SS Interpretation.” Working Papers.
Vayanos, Dimitri. 2004. “Flight to Quality, Flight to Liquidity, and the Pricing of
Risk.” National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc NBER Working Papers 10327.
Vayanos, Dimitri, and Paul Woolley. 2011. “An institutional Theory of Momentum
and Reversal.” Financial Markets Group FMG Discussion Papers dp666.
Wasmer, Etienne, and Philippe Weil. 2004. “The Macroeconomics of Labor and
Credit Market Imperfections.” American Economic Review, 94(4): 944–963.
Wheaton, William C. 1990. “Vacancy, Search, and Prices in a Housing Market Match-
ing Model.” Journal of Political Economy, 98(6): 1270–92.
Williams, Joseph T. 1995. “Pricing Real Assets with Costly Search.” Review of Fi-
nancial Studies, 8(1): 55–90.
Yogo, Motohiro. 2008. “Asset Prices Under Habit Formation and Reference-Dependent
Preferences.” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 26: 131–143.
167
Zwiebel, Jeffrey. 1995. “Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation.” Journal
of Political Economy, 103(1): 1–25.
168
